ROGER REPLIES TO JON ON OUR FAVORITE CONTRARIAN
JON:
Earlier today I was reviewing some of Struan's old posts.
When he wasn't busy explaining why something was stupid
he was very consistent about some important points which did not receive
adequate feedback IMO.
ROGER:
I like the way Struan keeps us from blind faith in the MOQ. I think some
members of the squad treat the MOQ like a new religion. It is just one
particular monistic metaphysics. The thing I like most about the MOQ is its
recognition of its own limitations.
I question whether Struan is really as negative toward the MOQ as it appears
he is. If he was, I would assume he wouldn't keep coming in and out of the
squad over an almost 2 year period.
JON:
The thing that stands out the most for me is Struan's claim that
Subject-Objects metaphysics gets blown waaayyy out of proportion by
supporters of Pirsig's MoQ. Struan stressed the importance of this apparent
folly repeatedly. He said that no "serious" philosophers make any kind of big
deal over the SO division, and that this was perhaps Pirsig's biggest blunder
of all. Interestingly, no one here seemed to give this particular opinion of
Struan's much consideration, with the exception of Bo, who reacted violently
to it.
I am interested in knowing where each member of the group stands on this
issue. Do any of you agree with Struan's assertion that most of us are
needlessly making a big deal out of SO metaphysics? As much as Pirsig talks
about SO metaphysics, it could possibly have serious ramifications on the way
we view the MoQ. And is Struan indeed correct when he states that most
"serious" philosophers don't pay much attention to the SO division?
ROGER:
The very first structured monthly topic of the Lila Squad was on this topic
(April-May 1998). Below is the final agreed summary of most members to
define SOM:
THEO QUOTE:
<<" A subject object metaphysics is any one of a family of explanations of
reality which rest upon the tacit assumption that there are two separate
and irreducible fundamentals in the way we perceive the universe, namely the
experiencing subject and the experienced object. Although not
necessarily recognized by its proponents this 'A or not A' position leads to
an irreconcilable tension between subjective reality and objective
reality with each vying for dominance within the subject object metaphysical
system.">>
ROGER:
This was Theo's attempt at a consensus between Horse, Hugo and Diana. Bo and
Magnus pretty much agreed with it too.
There was a contingent of members though (most vocally Donny) that felt that
the weaknesses above were remedied in ANY reasonable monistic metaphysics.
Below is a cleaned up (for spelling and such) version of this view:
DONNY QUOTE:
>>"MoQ is a metaphysical system; one that's contra posed to "SOM," a type of
metaphysical system. Is the MoQ the only system that stands
outside SOM? I don't think so. SOM indicates a system built on the
EXCLUSIVITY of S and O (the knower and the known (consciously or
otherwise). But "Idealism" is specifically defined as a system recognizing
the IDENTITY of S and O.>>
<<This gets a bad reaction because several people in the LS take this to mean
MoQ=Idealism. NO! What I'm saying is MoQ is a TYPE OF
Idealism; I'm not saying that all Idealist systems are the same. Obviously
Zen is different from Kantian Formalism which is different from
Hinduism which is different from MoQ, etc. They all have the similarity that
they say S and O are actually the same thing. What this thing turns out
to be, however, (the Tao, Kant's "Moral Self," Brahman or Anatman
["no-self"], Hegel's "Spirit" or Pirsig's Quality) varies tremendously from
one
system to another. Of course Pirsig's idea is not the same as everyone
else's... but it fits a general type.>>
<<Bo objected because Idealisms say that what really exists is "Mind." That's
one way to put it, but when you look at how each system
defines/describes this "mind" you find that that word cannot be taken very
strictly. In almost none of these systems is there anything resembling
what we normally mean by "mind" with all of our psychological and Cartesian
baggage. For example "mind" is a really bad translation of Hegel's
"geist". And most of these want to go beyond words anyway and talk about "The
Undifferentiated," "The Void," or "The Tao which cannot be
named.">>
ROGER CONTINUES:
I believe Donny is right that the MOQ would be classified as a form of
idealism in a metaphysical encyclopedia. And I concur with some of his
writing that most of Pirsig's metaphysical arrows are aimed at dualistic
philosophies. These have ample weaknesses. I am not sure how many real
philosophers are still around, but I think the SOM criticism would apply to
most that believe in a fundamental duality.
JON:
Struan also seems to think that Quality and Morality are not the same thing,
as Pirsig says they are.
ROGER:
In a monistic philosophy they had better be!
JON:
And finally there's Struan's assessment that saying Quality is the primary
empirical reality of the world can easily be replaced with "X" is the primary
empirical reality of the world. How many would agree with this? Is the logic
sound? Can we easily replaced Quality with X...?
ROGER:
Of course you can, if it is a better definition..... if it is more true to
experience .... if it is simpler and more concise .... if it is less
confusing and inconclusive ... if it is more elegant and connected to other
beliefs and experiences....IN OTHER WORDS, "X" IS BETTER THAN "QUALITY" ONLY
IF IT IS OF BETTER QUALITY.
I think I will stick with "Quality."
Rog
MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html
MD Queries - horse@wasted.demon.nl
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:00:35 BST