Greetings,
Roger. I think you will find that the author (Gary Watson) of the article you have read was saying
how intractable the problem of proving a philosophically clear 'free will' which entails moral
responsibility and what he calls autonomy. It is intractable because the free will it attempts to
prove is a chimera. I sketched out my view of free will in my initial posting on the subject and
showed how, contrary to your claim, autonomy is perfectly possible under the definition that, "free
will lies in the fact that we cannot predict what we are going to do." I wrote:
An analogy: A computer is set up to solve an equation. An electronics engineer would consider this
to be a physical system set up according to determinate laws, therefore its behaviour is determined
purely by physical causes. The user, on the other hand, would consider that what matters is that the
computer's behaviour is completely determined by the problem it is solving. There is no conflict
here as the equation is not something outside the computer but embodied within it in such a way that
the computer's behaviour is determined both by the physical forces and by the equation. The solving
of the equation is the significance of the physical activity and so the two answers to the question,
'What determines behaviour?' are not rivals but complementary. (A and not A!)
Transport this analogy to humans and the significance is clear. A deterministic explanation showing
how physical forces determine behaviour would rule out 'free will' only if choices and thought were
external to the physical system. If our thinking and decision making processes are embodied in the
workings of the brain then there is no contradiction in claiming that our behaviour is determined by
our thinking and choosing, even if our brain mechanism is wholly physically determinate.
I still have a perfectly satisfactory answer which is accepted by most scientists and non-theologian
philosophers working in the field and I see no need for your moq solution - of which, incidentally,
I still can't make head nor tail. You seem to have a self which is identifying with other selves in
some schizophrenic frenzy of action. What is this self which chooses between identifying with the
biological self and the inorganic self? And how can this self affect the value patterns to make one
victorious? Or does it just go with the flow? This seems unfeasibly confused and terribly convoluted
to me and I can't see its relation to free will at all.
I'm afraid that I can't even begin to think in those terms any more. They seem so obscure and
confused. Just in the first line of your explanation you wrote, "In SOM, the self is some fixed,
objective entity." Again. If that is SOM then most empiricists do not subscribe to it. Take Hume for
example, 'the self is nothing more than a bundle of perceptions which change from one instant to the
next.' It seems to me that every time somebody throws SOM into the conversation, they do it solely
to obfuscate precisely who and what they are talking about. Am I to take it that Hume is not part of
this SOM conspiracy, or will he be dragged back in for the next conversation? It is like God.
Impossible to disprove because it shifts around with every argument to suit the arguer. Disprove one
use of the term (as I just have if the main strand of empiricism is to remain SOM) and remarkably a
new use will emerge phoenix like from the ashes just in time to re-establish itself as the 'worthy
adversary.' Can you blame me for concluding that it doesn't exist?
ROGER:
"The MOQ recognizes the limitations of intellectual patterns and is post
rational. It is in no way irrational. Recognizing the limitations of logic
and proof is not illogical or irrational. Kurt Godel, I believe, would agree.
And continuous dynamic re-evaluation is not irrational either. So again,
where I find complete value, you find no value."
Erm . . . well . . . it isn't rational. The 'framework of the hierarchy of quality' (to which I was
referring) is not remotely rational and the idea that it is post rational is amusing but nothing
more. However, now we are simply in the realm of mere contradiction so I will not label a point that
has been made many times. Agreed about the limitations of logic BTW. This is not the issue.
ROGER:
"I won't argue that he made no mistakes in 1000 plus pages, but I believe his
representations of most of the above issues was quite accurate. I appreciate
your criticisms, but I rarely agree with you on them (though I do agree he
botched the free will issue.)"
Again. If I answer this we will be merely contradicting each other. It does. No it doesn't. But it
does. . . . etc.
And the same with the conclusions. Especially this mythical catch all, SOM.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@clara.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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