Greetings,
JONATHAN:
>1. There is no such thing as "objective randomness". Randomness is a
>perception of a system in relation to various expectations (context).
>This is one point I make in my "Causality" essay. In contrast,
>determinism relies on a belief in some absolute, objective deterministic
>principals. Determinism and randomness are like oil and water - they
>just won't mix. Thus, Struan's mixing of determinism and randomness in
>the same sentence is decidedely wierd.
But you just did the same thing in that last sentence. Was that weird? I didn't address the
uncertainty issue in full because it has no bearing on free will, which was the subject of my
posting.
JONATHAN:
>2. Determinism is in opposition to empiricism. Determinism says that the
>apple will always fall downwards from the tree because that is
>absolutely determined by the laws of physics. On the other hand,
>empiricism says that we can only ever observe a small sample of
>incidences of apples falling - thus the belief that apples fall is
>merely a summary of experience. Apples TEND to fall, but we can never
>know for sure about every single apple from now to eternity. Cause vs.
>tendency is another issue discussed in my Casuality essay.
I disagree. Determinism merely says that every effect has a cause. Empiricism extrapolates that
principle to apples and trees. In other words, determinism has nothing whatsoever to say about
apples and trees until empiricism observes the tendency and concludes that (in the absence of
evidence to the contrary) an apple is going to fall. Or, in other words still, determinism is an
empirical theory as is each law of physics. The whole lot is merely a summary of experience and so
there is no opposition. What determines what can only be ascertained empirically.
JONATHAN:
>To put this in Human terms, one can say that people tend to behave in
>certain expected patterns. You can learn those patterns by watching the
>ways people tend to behave, but you may never be able to predict how
>each individual person will behave in every circumstance.
I agree entirely but not for the reasons above.
RICH:
"there is no (independent) "self"
Which is why I wrote that choices are part of the overall system and can influence it. But there
still is a self - just not an independent one - and that self likes to know if it can make choices
which are free. The self may well be a 'myth,' but that doesn't make it any less 'real' or worthy of
investigation. All this talk of illusions and myths, Rich. Anyone would think that intellectual
patterns had no value for you. Well, my self is as real as real gets and there is an end to the
matter (sic). Of course I can understand your being so pissed off with yourSELF that you want to get
rid of it; My commiserations.
Interesting though that your position rejects individual free will. There goes morality,
responsibility and the ethical dimension of Lila.
RICH:
"(Struan - are "you" listening? Have you read Plato? Locke? - SOM
IS most definitely a REAL metaphysic, though IMPLICIT - as you coarsely
pointed out, NOT explicit)"
Yes, yes and yes. I'm listening to another one of those brilliant, incisive and indisputable
arguments for SOM being a real metaphysical position. The argument runs, 'you are wrong Struan, SOM
is real.' My, my, how did you think of that one and how can I possibly devise of a coherent argument
back? And, BTW, I did not say it was implicit rather than explicit. Do keep up.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@clara.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
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