Hi,
Struan:
>RICH:
> "there is no (independent) "self"
>
>Which is why I wrote that choices are part of the overall system and can
>influence it. But there
>still is a self - just not an independent one - and that self likes to know
>if it can make choices
>which are free. The self may well be a 'myth,' but that doesn't make it any
>less 'real' or worthy of
>investigation. All this talk of illusions and myths, Rich. Anyone would
>think that intellectual
>patterns had no value for you. Well, my self is as real as real gets and
>there is an end to the
>matter (sic).
You're right - the 'myth' is ONLY that the self is independent, primary and
permanent. But remember, 'self' is still a word for a very consistent
pattern of intellectual values, and not a "mind" or "subject" in a body. But
you know that. And yes, you know yourself, and I also know very well that
"I" exist - when "I" am defined as a socially-based intellectual definition
of the thoughts, "volitions", feelings, etc, that occur in this brain.
There's more I'd like to say but am having trouble putting into words.
The Hindus have spoken for some time about "chakras" - centers of cosmic
energy in the human body - seven, in ascending order of value, according to
universal and personal evolution. I like to think of the very empirically
real "I" as a CENTER of intellectual energy = value.
And a center, or focus, which is most definitely worth investigation, yes.
"Know thyself". Intellectual patterns DO have value for me - more than S,B
or P-pov's. However, though I failed to speak of it in the last post, I
value Dynamic Quality much more than ANY pattern. In fact, I find it works
well to see DQ as The capital-S-elf, which "underlies", or is the source of
all the little, fleeting intellectually-patterned "s-elf"s.
Struan:
Of course I can understand your being so pissed off with yourSELF that you
want to get
>rid of it; My commiserations.
Well - almost funny. But I'll stick with Monty Python. I do love myself, and
that is both a wonderful attribute and a dangerous attachment. Funny, yes?
Relativity (re: pragmatic moq-ethics), to me, states that it is good, from a
social point of view, for each and every human organism to develop
"self-esteem", and confidence, and an awareness of one's intrinsic value -
no matter how ugly, dumb, powerless, or tactless we happen to be at some
spacetime location. Just like Socrates tried so hard to tell us - get your
head out of the crowd. However, from a Dynamic (mystic) point of view, this
self, after having been actualized, must be "transcended" - which is not
just an intellectual realization of the impermance and non-independence of
the self, but a constant DYNAMIC awareness of said fact - if peace is
sought.
Struan:
>Interesting though that your position rejects individual free will. There
>goes morality,
>responsibility and the ethical dimension of Lila.
No. It seems like you almost get the point, but you're limiting ethics to
ego-decisions - exactly what Pirsig wanted to expand to include chemistry
and biology, etc. Look - we agree on what P means by no independent self.
But you say there still IS a self. According to the MOQ, there ISN'T a self
- there are intellectual patterns built on soc/bio, etc... So the free will
question, I think, is a bit silly, if the question is: "do we or do we not
have free will, and if so, how much in which cases?". Silly, I mean, in the
context of the MOQ. What we really ought to be asking, I understand Pirsig
to be telling us, is whether the Rich- or Struan- pattern is at a maximum
state of Quality experience, whether too or not enough static or Dynamic -
not free or determined. And if not in a high-quality state, then what
maintenance is needed?
"Free will" and "determined behaviour" imply a "self" which is so. "Static"
and "Dynamic" imply nothing more than a pragmatic division of the
"undifferentiated aesthetic continuum", in which the
SOM-platypi do not surface.
Hellier:
>RICH:
>"(Struan - are "you" listening? Have you read Plato? Locke? - SOM
>IS most definitely a REAL metaphysic, though IMPLICIT - as you coarsely
>pointed out, NOT explicit)"
>
>Yes, yes and yes. I'm listening to another one of those brilliant, incisive
>and indisputable
>arguments for SOM being a real metaphysical position. The argument runs,
>'you are wrong Struan, SOM
>is real.' My, my, how did you think of that one and how can I possibly
>devise of a coherent argument
>back? And, BTW, I did not say it was implicit rather than explicit. Do keep
>up.
You misunderstood my sentence. I meant that you pointed out that there does
not exist any explicit SOM in Western philosophy. In fact, I wanted you to
see that, though not explicit (as you pointed out), SOM is in fact there,
implicitly (as I'M pointing out).
I won't here go into the specific evidence for the rampant implicitness of
SOM in the history of Western philosophy. However, once I've finished my
analysis of Western philosophers in light of the MOQ, I would be most
grateful if you would tear it up in as constructive a manner as possible.
I'm being sincere.
I love you. (not sincere)
I value you. (sincere)
Rich (since here)
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