Hi Struan,
Again we couldn't disagree more, but I won't try to
convince you.
I believe it's useless, your mind seems quite made up ; but
I'd like to offer an option to those who wonder if you may
be right... ;)
>
> [STRUAN]
> ROGER:
> 1) Define free will
>
> The position that human behaviour is not determined by
the existential, normative and factual
> conditions alone, but by a combination of that and one's
intentions, experiences and thoughts, that
> are subject to modification by the will.
>
Ha, language. What a beautiful invention, with it we
could believe almost anything, including that we are a
unified entity that has such a thing as "a will". My
intentions, my will, all those "my"s are beautiful but
ultimately useless. They own "me", not the other way round.
We are our values, so "my" intentions and desires define
"me". "Me" doesn't produce them as if by magic.
"My will", according to the MOQ, is a convenient fiction
that comes after the conflict of values has resolved
itself, letting "me" believe that I've made a choice. I
understand that some will not like this (except probably
Rich) but if we are a collection of patterns of values,
there is no place for an "I" except as an intellectual
static pattern of value, AMONG OTHERS. Which is to say that
we deduce early on that we are an ongoing entity, but the
only principle behind the values is QUALITY ITSELF. Not an
individual, but the universe itself. No "I", no little
homonculus behind our eyes, hence, no will. The "I" is an
abstraction that has no relevence to will. If you push
Roger's example about wanting chocolate, wanting to go out,
etc., you come to the conclusion that which level of value
wins DOES NOT DEPEND ON "US". There is no "us". The
strongest level or static pattern at the moment of "choice"
wins. Period. No "I" that "prefer" or "choose" one over
another.
Quite funny really, I'd like you to see the irony,
especially the one where "my" values try to influence
"yours"... ;)
>
> 3) Does the MOQ adequately address the free will issue?
>
> No. It reduces the position of what it calls SOM to an
argument about physical determinism which
> misses the point. Free will is not, 'the philosophical
doctrine that man makes choices independent
> of the atoms in his body.' The question is not even
addressed and if that is the framework of the
> question then Pirsig is quite right that in the MoQ it
doesn't come up. Of course it doesn't come up
> anywhere else either. The real question does still come
up in the MoQ and it remains, 'Can we choose
> to follow DQ?' Answers so far have carried on the
Pirsigian tradition of missing the point.
>
> The argument that there is no self and therefore the
problem doesn't arise, does nothing more than
> ignore it. We all demonstrably have a self which
operates in the world and it is this operation
> that requires an ethical standpoint.
>
"We all demonstrably...". Struan, I love you because you
are so clear-cut. Your faith is as unshakeable as that of a
Christian fundamentalist. You are so devoted to "save" us
from this nasty illusion that MOQ is a valuable philosophy
that I wonder how seriously you take this "savior" role of
yours. You sound a bit like a christian in an atheist
forum... or the reverse. ;)
On the bright side, you won't have to prove to me that I
have a self, I know I've got one. But it is secondary, not
primary as you believe. This self is second-hand, if you
like (but of course, you won't). As Pirsig puts it, it is
deduced from experience. Even you Struan, I believe, will
see that this position is pretty much unpregnable. Problem
is, you misunderstand almost everything else about the
MOQ... BTW, your definition of free will conveniently
sidesteps the issue of what determines/influences your
"will" (which you said could modify your intentions,
experiences and thoughts). Is it influenced or not ? By
what ? Or is it primary ? How can that be ? A little
homonculus behing your eyes ? What's the nature of your
will ? What is it made of ? :)
To your question, Roger, my answer is : yes and no. It
describes the process admirably, and underlines the fact
that it IS a "mu" question, but fail to dismiss completely
the SOM notion of "freedom". Freedom is a construct that
derives from the notion of subject. No subject, no freedom.
Harsh on the Human Rights, but necessary to get rid of
subjects. Freedom is better replaced by "capacity for
Dynamism", anyway, and this gets rid of a lot of paradoxes,
like "the limits of freedom", or the fact that while we
live in a hierarchical system of dominance we nevertheless
consider ourselves "free", on the amusing "proof" that we
get to put a little piece of paper in a box every once in a
while...
>
> 4) As succinctly as possible, what is the resolution to
the free will issue?
>
> Our desires, intentions, minds, brains, bodies and
environments are all part of one inseparable
> system and all contribute to the direction the system
takes, thus the definition above is fulfilled.
>
No it isn't, you just don't answer. You don't explain if
one of the above constituents is more important than the
others, or what are the relationships between them. In the
end, do we have free will or not ? I think you'd say yes,
but this seems to contradict my position that self is
deduced from experience. Perhaps you'd like to criticize
this point ?
>
> DAVID:
> "What difference does it make whether we have free will
or not?"
>
> If we have no free will then we have no moral
responsibility. While judicial systems could be
> constructed on purely utilitarian grounds, the system of
claiming mitigation on grounds of
> diminished responsibility would no longer be tenable. For
the MoQ the inquiry into morals aspect
> would be redundant as, without free will, there can be no
such thing as morality under any
> reasonable use of the word.
>
As I have already explained in another post, the death of
free will doesn't entail the death of morality. Many
cultures which believe in a pre-ordained world nevertheless
judge some acts moral, and some others immoral. Immoral
acts are (by definition) either against established taboos,
or "felt" as being wrong, and are therefore punished as
such. The logic behind this in a "pre-ordained world"
culture is that even if Fate is responsible, the burden is
still on Man to preserve the moral order of the world (the
Dharma). Greeks are interesting in this, because their
legends are the embodiment of such a world-view. Oreste'
ancestor, Pelops, had been cursed (and all his progeny
along) by Hermes, but when fulfilling the curse Oreste
killed his mother, the Gods nevertheless put the blame on
him, not Hermes, and set the Furies after him. This is only
one example among others, Oedipus being another one. Asian
cultures, or the Hindu have the same beliefs about self
being an illusion (remember I was talking about
pre-Socratic greeks), but I've never heard they were less
diligent in establishing justice (in fact I've heard the
opposite).
While some people might find this concept of
"responsability even if free will is non-existent"
loathsome, I find some kind of cosmic principle of
evolution in this. If being immoral is to ignore DQ, then
an immoral act is the equivalent of not "evolving", either
as a human or as a society, and an equivalent of being "too
mechanistic" (remember that evolution's "direction" is to
move out of any mechanistic pattern). Therefore, to punish
an immoral act is the equivalent of natural selection,
weeding out bad patterns to make place for good patterns
(whether static or dynamic), and preserving the dynamicity
of the whole. People acting immorally are therefore guilty
of "not evolving", or degenerating (depending or the
static/dynamic context) and must be "cured", more than
punished. Which means eliminating the bad patterns
poisoning the individual "jungle". Prison without
rehabilitation then becomes a stupid mistake, because
nothing is solved : you just push the problem under the
carpet for a few years. Of course, killing the person is
another way of curing the problem, but that is a debate for
another time.
FREE WILL
As a final note on this topic, Horse started it by asking
if we had free will or if we were just "pushed around by
DQ". My answer is that since we don't have "will" to start,
"free will" seems plain ridiculous to me. But DQ doesn't
"push" anything, it is just our evolving nature. WE ARE
QUALITY. We are DQ. We evolve along with the universe, it
doesn't have to kick us in the butt. To understand the MOQ
is to accept the death of the ego. On the intellectual
level, at least. This is where you fail the most, Struan.
[...]
> SOM?
>
> The hot stove example is where Pirsig sets out his stall
with regards to SOM. It is after accepting
> his position here that, 'things become enormously more
coherent.' The whole argument can be
> condensed into this one episode. If SOM does what Pirsig
claims here then it is a genuine position.
> If it doesn't then it is a strawman. So what does Pirsig
claim for this SOM? What exactly is this
> 'culturally inherited blindspot'?
>
> PIRSIG:
> "Our culture teaches us to think that it is the hot stove
which directly causes our oaths. It
> teaches that low values are a property of the person
uttering the oaths."
>
> Our culture does not teach us this. It teaches us that
the low value is a result of the relationship
> between the stove and the person. It teaches (along with
our biology and instinct) that if we get
> off the stove we will be in a higher value situation. The
low value is therefore between the person
> and the stove and is perceived as the primary empirical
reality of that situation, (i.e. the first
> thing we notice about the relationship).
>
Struan, are you so mixed up about what you've been taught
that you confuse a MOQ position with rational western
culture ? This is ridiculous.
>
> What our culture does not do is teach us that we can then
make the leap from here to value creating
> subjects and objects. It does not teach this because
there is no reason whatsoever to think this.
> There is no logical connection.
>
> For Pirsig the grave error of SOM is to try and, 'assign
them (values) to subjects and objects.' If
> that is what SOM does then SOM is a strawman.
>
>
So, Struan, you have never been taught that "water was
wet" or that "fire is hot", but that "when you feel
wetness, that is water. Either that or you've pissed in
your pants."
Your parents were way ahead of their time, Struan. :o)
>
> The whole of the rest of Lila rests upon this invented
> fight with a mythical enemy for its support. Without this
fight and the invented problems derived
> from it, the MOQ would be left with the 'ad hoc'
hypothesis that Quality is the font of all things.
> This is, of course, a position which many have held over
the last few thousand years and a worthy
> position it is too. Having said that, it is not
scientific or backed up by any empirical evidence
> and had it not been for the battle between the MOQ and
SOM very, very few people would have bought
> the book and this forum would probably not exist. It is a
literary device and no more and it relies
> upon 'convoluted semantics' to establish itself with the
suggestible.
>
"Suggestible" is how I would define myself if I was to
agree to such an appallingly poor attack on the MOQ. You
miss all the pertinent points and misconstrue almost
everything that 'ZMM' or 'Lila' try to define.
"SOM" is an underlying metaphysical assumption, you try
to make it pass for an explicit philosophical position, one
that isn't defended by anyone. As I said, the way you
define it it isn't, but your definition miss the point.
Free will is a non-existent notion in the MOQ, you make
it an "not understood concept". Even when defining free
will in your "man in a closed room" experience, you didn't
understand what free will was about. Free will (in a
classical philosophical sense) doesn't have to be
actualized to exist. If you can *want* to get out, then
your will *is* free isn't it ? Your body isn't, but your
will is. Of course, whether or not you want to get out is
dependent upon which values constitute "you", but I don't
think you will ever accept that.
We are (intellectually at least) what we believe in. To
change one's mind requires a "ego-death", it requires to
accept that we were wrong. Something I've never seen in
your posts is Roger's leitmotiv : "I may be wrong". Doubt
is necessary to evolve, even about Pirsig I agree, but
above all about what we believe.
My credo is that if "mathematics is the only religion
which can prove it's a religion", then the MOQ is the only
religion which basic tenet is that it IS a religion (ie.
intPoV are beliefs, the MOQ is an intPoV). I'd like
everybody to reflect on this. Perhaps the worth of this
credo will appear to you, if it hasn't already.
Be good
Denis
PS : David B., don't jump on my ass, the "religion" stuff
was just an analogy. Really. Don't. ;^)
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