Struan, various David's, or any one else:
(I realize this is a bit lengthy, but I don't get to argue like this very
often so I beg your indulgence.....)
Struan Wrote:
"The question raised is that of whether free will is anywhere other than in
our heads (or other than an intellectual pattern in moq language - and I do
realise that they are not entirely equivalent). The next question is whether
the concept of free will has any referent outside of the intellectual level
and I think that you suggest it does not."
--- I didn't mean to suggest that free will has no referent outside the
Intellectual (I don't think I did anyway), in fact all I meant to suggest is
that I'm not sure what to think quite yet. Both sides of the arguement seem
defensible.
Struan wrote:
"For the moq this is no problem as intellectual patterns are as real as any
other pattern, but I would suggest that intellectual patterns which are
backed up by non-intellectual level empirical evidence are more 'valid' than
those which are not."
---(I hope this makes sense to you) If you're talking "external validity"
then that last part seems perfectly acceptable but tautological. Saying
that intellectual patterns which are backed up by non-intellectual level
empirical evidence are more 'externally valid' than those which are not is
really just saying that ideas with external validity are more externally
valid than those that without external validity. But there is also internal
validity (which I believe could be compared to coherence). As far as I know
and idea can be internally valid (coherent) without being externally valid
(empirically verified), but the reverse isn't true (you can't empirically
verify a logical absurdity). I'm inclined to think that some kinds of ideas
just cannot be judged empirically but I'm not sure this depreciates their
value. If you'll continue reading I'll use your own example to try and
explain better what I mean.
Struan Wrote:
"For example, in a football game yesterday my team won. If I have the
concept that my team won or alternatively the concept that my team lost,
both are real in the sense of being intellectual patterns, but only one has
a referent in other levels which point to it being the more accurate.
Transpose that metap . . . damn . . analogy to free will and I question
whether it can be shown that free will has a referent outside the
intellectual level. That being the case it is in one sense real, but in
another sense it is a chimera equivalent to the intellectual pattern that my
football team lost yesterday."
---(Once again, I hope this makes sense) Now in the case of the football
game we have two competeing ideas. (1) Team A Won or (2) Team A lost.
Both are Internally Valid (that is, they are both truly possible outcomes)
but they compete with each other because when Externally verified only one
will match up with "empirical reality". But carry the analogy back over to
free will. We have two competeing ideas (1) Man freely chooses his own
actions or (2) Man only believes he freely chooses his own actions. As we
agreed, when externally verified their is no real difference whatsoever
between the consequences of these competeing ideas. And if the consequences
of the respective answers are indistiguishable then there is really no
"empirical" way to ever determine which one is correct. But furthermore,
there is no value in the question if it makes no difference how you answer
it.
Struan wrote:
"Essentially the main question, and the main threat to human morality, is
whether our belief that we are morally responsible and self-determining is
equivalent to my belief that my team won yesterday or whether it is
equivalent to believing that my team lost."
----Actually, I think it would be more like arguing over whether (1) Team A
won or (2) Team B lost. Either way.....
Struan wrote:
"If it is the latter than it is not clear that a non-subjective definition
of moral responsibility can be constructed which has any resemblance to the
accepted use of the phrase."
---I'm not sure I see why the question of free will has anything to do with
this question. Pirsig's moral model (as well as some others) is based on an
evolutionary model. It sets up rules for morality (see examples like
"Hindu's and Cows" or "Doctor and Germ") and outcomes moral behavior should
have (i.e. moral behavior furthers dynamic Q, while preserving the static
patterns necessary to maintain "latching"). I can't see how these ideas are
any less "objective" simply because we don't know whether we really obey
them, or we just think we do. It would be like saying that the New York
State Penal Code isn't real, we just obey it because we think it is.
BUT..... I realize you qualified your question by adding "....which has any
resemblance to the accepted use of this phrase." Accepted where? By who?
When? I believe it will require only a brief literature review to remind
you just how elastic the phrase morality has always been. If we are to
establish a truly objective morality, don't we have to consider every
"accepted" use of the phrase that has been? It just wouldn't be fair to say
"we can't form a universally objective theory of morality that fits our our
own "accepted" definition." Maybe the accepted definition is what needs
work, not the theory.
Finally, Struan wrote:
"Note that denying the subject does not eliminate the problem because
subjects and objects still exist in the moq and the reduction of human
ethics to a secondary metaphysical level does nothing to diminish the vital
field of human ethics which is all about the relationships between different
people and peoples together with their environments."
----Agreed, but acknowledging he subject doesn't eliminate the problem
either. You're damed if you do and damned if you don't....
In closing, I just mean to suggest that maybe external validity and empircal
verification are just useless criteria for settling the question of free
will or determining the value of a moral theory.
Richard
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