ROGER CHATS ABOUT TRUTH,
THE SELF AND FREE WILL
To Platt, Matthew, John and Denis, with references to others......
Denis wrote:
"Of course
empirical verification is good, since it means our model
(intPoV) is close to an actual pattern of value."
Platt wrote:
"I’m interested in
what you see as the distinction between truth and belief in truth, and what
your standards for determining truth (or belief in truth) are......
This appears to be similar to Matthew’s version of truth, and to me it seems
to come close to saying truth is mere opinion. But, I could be wrong. Denis,
would you care to comment on Matthew’s version, and vice versa? Are we
stuck with the self-contradictory statement: ‘It’s true we can never know
what’s really true’?"
Matthew wrote:
"....there are nevertheless
facts "out there" that are independent of belief."
Roger replies to all 3:
Welcome Matthew! I have enjoyed hearing your new voice in this forum. I must
jump in and offer that I believe all three of you are on a tangent of 'truth'
that differs from the MOQ and its roots in radical empiricism.
To paraphrase William James, truth concerns statements-about-reality, not
reality (or in Platt's words, "what's really true"). Statements can be true,
but reality just is. Also, I was amazed to see Denis write the first sentence
above. (Though David B. might approve). I would suggest that within the MOQ
the words 'actual pattern of value' should be replaced with 'experience'.
Pirsig carefully warns us in chapter 8 about seeking 'absolute truth'
corresponding to the 'objective' world (note Pirsig puts 'objective' in
parenthesis).
Denis:
"...what if free will is judged by the MOQ as a
bad intellectual pattern, better replaced by "the result of
a conflict of patterns" ? I've proposed this and would like
you to criticize it, since you are the one to have proposed
the conflict. I've substracted the "identifying with one
pattern over another", because, like Struan, I couldn't see
what exactly did identify with the patterns. How does this
impact the MOQ for you, Roger ?.....
So once such a proposition
has been determined to be the best, either by any individual or by a group,
the logically opposed must be rejected as ‘bad,’ or the MOQ is preaching for
cultural relativism."
Roger
I was not clear. I see your perspective on free will as having value. Free
will can be explained away as conflicts in values. My thoughts concur with
Peter's opinion on the issue not being absolute. Experience is. The
statements we build and the intellectual patterns we form should be judged on
their consistency, simplicity, elegance, conclusiveness and ability to
highlight new understandings.
When two statements appear contradictory, but both seem of hi-quality within
their individual contexts, the challenge is to pursue new theories that
harmonize the qualities of both. Even if unsuccessful, I believe the MOQ
teaches we should try to find the value from each perspective. (And this is
not cultural relativism.) As Pirsig states in Chapter 8, intellectual
realities can be examined like paintings in an art gallery "not with an
effort to find out which is the 'real' painting, but simply to enjoy and keep
those that are of value."
John:
"If Pirsig is right, and experience is primary,
how is it we can judge some experiences (such as selfhood and free will) to
be illusory?"
Roger:
Selfhood and free will are not direct experience. They are descriptions of
patterns of experience. Direct experience is DQ. Patterns derived from
direct experience are sq. I am not trying to be anal here, John, but this
distinction is critical to the MOQ. It is closely related to my comments to
the 3 folks above as well, for base reality is direct experience.
John:
"Not that I am saying this is a pseudo question, as I do take fantasy to be a
meaningful term.
There is a sense in which the 'little editor' self is a fantasy, and the
mystics are no doubt right
to critique it, though sadly they have not been able to provide me with
experiences to convert
me to their view. Like Owen, my experiences which I label self and freedom of
choice are at
least as real as my other experiences, and are often most powerful and
disturbing. Telling me
they are illusory does not change that."
Roger:
I think it would be more useful within the context of this conversation to
call the self a hi-quality intellectual pattern or description of experience.
Again, W. James clarifies the distinctions well in his explorations of the
nature of consciousness. The self and the world are two patterns that are
derived from pure experience.
John:
"The really big
question is whether separation is best handled by avoiding it, seeking to
numb down the
awareness that goes with it, and seeking solace in mystic union, or by
accepting separation
as real, the mind as real in its own domain, choice as real as it seems to
be, and moving on
to explore contact, dialogue and encounter, respecting my self as much as
those other
selves with whom I appear to share a planet. I like the thought of
transcending the ego
constriction of my self, and I'll let you know when I find the way, but I
don't wish to, nor can I,
simply deny my experience of self as an agent, whose choices count."
Roger:
The self and the external universe are useful patterns. Rather than giving
up on either, just quit thinking and experience. Don't you ever get so caught
up in the flow of sculpting that you lose all track of yourself and your art?
That is what Pirsig is talking about.
Roger
PS -- Note that Matthew has come down on the side of the free will dilemma
being rooted in problems with the traditional views of 'self'. If anyone else
disagrees with this view as being espoused by David B., David T., Rich,
Matthew, Denis, myself, and (arguably) Struan, could they speak up?
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