Hello everyone,
I've been sitting on the sidelines, but see little progress on the
whole free will issue.
Let me first deal with this comment from ROGER.
> I am also a tad fuzzy on some of what Jonathan M is trying to get
> across (is it that "randomness is an interpretation of experience" or
> something close?)
What I mean is that any definition of randomness is as elusive as the
definition of quality. Actually they are pretty much opposites
(quality=pattern, randomness=lack of pattern). Thus, like quality, the
concept of randomness neither objective nor subjective (I go with Pirsig
on this).
The determinists would have to say that randomness is all subjective -
since eveything is determined, then the result must always faithfully
reflect the causes. The alternative (objective randomness) obligates one
to find a cause for the randomness, something I consider an oxymoron.
The main point of this post is the issue of Free Will.
The only free will I really KNOW is my own. I have no way to prove
whether or not anyone else or thing has free will. Free will is very
central to the concepts of self and consciousness - I can almost
substitute the terms self will (Self determination!) or conscious will.
Free will is central to the concept of thought. Thinking involves making
and pursuing choices. I don't see how one can think without the freedom
to choose what to think about.
Descartes might equally have said "I have free will, therefore I am"
I now fully see why Descarte put thought as the basis of his philosophy
of existance.
This actually dovetails with "Man is the Measure".
Just to make this abundantly clear, I am sticking with my position that
human consciousness is the basis of the world AS WE KNOW IT, or more
specifically, my own consciousness is my own primal reality.
Jonathan
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