Everyone
Pirsig's many sets of truth idea, which he expounds in chapter 8
is about profound truths about the nature of reality - metaphysical
truths, not conflicting values. Not that there isn't such a thing
as conflicting values, but that isn't what he's getting at when
he talks about truths.
David's example about infidelity is something that anyone of
any culture can understand. It doesn't take a new metaphysical
paradigm to explain it and the SOM doesn't deny conflicting
values, even if it doesn't actually call them that. And the fact
that Clinton won't be president next year doesn't need a new
paradigm either. The SOM doesn't deny that things change
over time.
Pirsig introduces the idea specifically to show that the MOQ
doesn't invalidate the SOM. He talks about different "constructions
of things", different "sets of truths", different "intellectual
realities" and different "intellectual patterns for interpreting
reality". He doesn't actually use the phrase "many truths" that
I can find (pls point it out if he does). He offers the SOM as
one example of a set of truths and the MOQ as another example.
And he implies that there may be other sets which may also be
valid.
The kind of truth that he's talking about is metaphysical truths
about what things exist, what is their nature and relationship.
Is time an arrow or a cycle? Are things divided or separate?
Do we have free will or not? Is it a truth that all things should
realize their true nature? And it's also the truth that we should
transcend our true nature? Yes, that's a contradiction but both
are truths in a real and profound sense.
I think Platt's "Catches" if they're still around, might have
some more examples of paradoxical truths.
Diana
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