Hi Jon, Rick, Platt, Richard, and others
JON: On the topic of the "good of utility" versus "the good of morality."
We assume Morality is a human or social invention, much like the laws passed
in courts are inventions. To assume this would indeed be logical and
rational, but it wouldn't be correct. Morality is not a law passed in a
court; it exists regardless of the courts. If a court decided we didn't need
gravity anymore, gravity wouldn't go away. Morality won't go away. Oh, we
can ignore it, much like we can ignore gravity, but we will suffer the
consequences.
...
Here we are getting close to something. Even Struan admits that there is "an
important relationship" between what he calls "the good of utility" and "the
good of morality."
I wish Struan would come back and elaborate some on the nature of this
relationship. In his words it is an important relationship, and I agree. It
is also a mysterious relationship. Has anyone solved the mystery?
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
I've been thinking about this, but from a different perspective. In a prior
email I responded to a criticism Struan raised: "Morality is entirely
concerned with the goodness or badness of human behaviour." With this
restraint any activity at levels other than human behavior can be deemed
amoral. It seems necessary to demonstrate, if possible, the applicability of
morality to levels outside of human behavior. If this can be done there is
better defense for suggesting that all activities can be viewed in a moral
context. My thoughts on this follow...
ED: A concern: Struan, you are suggesting that morality is confined to
aspects of behavior and thereby restrict any evolution in the understanding
of what morality is and how it can be viewed.
STRUAN: No. Your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise, Ed. This is
simply bad logic. understanding of morality can evolve quite happily, indeed
more happily, when the correct definitions are used.
If morality is strictly confined to human behavior then yes, the logic would
be faulty. Otherwise the logic is sound. Morality concerns itself with
doctrines or systems of morals. Morals are defined as: of, pertaining to, or
concerned with right conduct or its principles. Morality might thereby be
thought of as a system of the principles of right conduct.
The clause 'or its principles,' I believe, enables the expansion of how
morality is viewed. Principles can be thought of as 'an originating or
actuating agency or force' as in the principles of yin and yang. Pirsig
looked at Quality as an originating agency and it was necessary for this to
be in place in order for him to set forth what I would deem as an evolution
in our view of morality. P158-159 Lila: "What the evolutionary structure of
the Metaphysics of Quality shows is that there is not just one moral system.
There are many. ... What is today conventionally called 'morality' covers
only one of these sets of moral codes, the social-biological code." Since
society depends upon biology for survival it is moral to make for safe
passage when elders cross the street and to provide for their well being;
without them our society is weakened. I expect few people would take issue
with the use of the term 'moral' in this context.
Given the inorganic-biological-social-intellect paradigm, another set of
moral codes would appear at the biological-inorganic interface. Since
biology depends upon inorganic substances for its survival, can one say it
is 'moral' for stomachs to be able to digest food? Stomachs don't have
free-will to choose their activities in the same way that humans do, but
they do engage various behaviors depending on the stimulus - not unlike
humans. Stomachs struggle to keep people and animals alive and well, just as
people struggle to keep societies alive and well. These struggles, although
occuring at different levels, do utilize systems of right conduct, and in
this sense can be associated with moral activities.
One might argue that morals are concerned only with 'right human conduct' as
opposed to a less restrictive 'right conduct.' Dictionaries I've consulted
differ on this. Even if morals are thought to be concerned strictly with
'right human conduct' they are also concerned with the principles behind
this conduct. Clearly the principles of the moq can be applied to levels
other than the social-biological level. We must then ask whether these
principles bring forth a moral system only at the social-biological level,
and amoral systems at all other levels. Struan, I expect, would say yes at
this juncture. When one focuses attention on the principles themselves,
independent of the level to which they are applied, they remain a set of
principles of right conduct, a concern of morality. But once applied to a
level other than social-biological, they may lose their moral flavor to some
and be relegated to mere "utility." Yet this distinction may be in
connotation only, not dictum.
Pirsig has expanded upon the manner in which morals have been strictly
defined and I believe there is precedent in this. I see it as an evolution,
similar to Einstein's theory of relativity encompasing, refining, and
expanding upon Newton's laws of motion. Einstein applied his theory to areas
beyond what was customary in Newton's time, just as Pirsig is applying the
concept of morality to areas beyond what is customary. An analogy, albeit
imperfect, follows:
Relative to a stationary observer, is the passage of time for a particle
approaching the speed of light no longer a scientific observation? Is the
passage of time only a scientific observation when we are dealing with
speeds well below the speed of light, the level at which Newton set forth
the original laws? Newton held the passage of time to be constant in
conformity to the prevailing body of scientific fact; had he not done so I
doubt his work would have been deemed scientific. Einstein allowed the
passage of time to be variable (the passage of time for people in flight is
measurably slower relative to the passage of time for people on the ground).
When Einstein applied his theory of relativity to a new level he contributed
to the evolution of our understanding of time. I would contend that the
passage of time is no less a scientific observation at very fast speeds than
at relatively slow speeds, just as activities at the biological-inorganic
level (or at other levels) are no less moral than activities at the
social-biological level. Just as we do not hold the passage of time to be
constant for it to maintain its being desribed as a scientific observation,
we need not hold activities to be confined to human conduct for them to
maintain their being described as moral.
Ed
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