Hi,
<glenn>
> Hi Platt, 3WD, and others,
>
> Sorry for the delay, but I had some car trouble this past week.
</glenn>
Subjective or objective?
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> He says science should be subservient to social morality, and
> unless you can find more examples in Lila, it is the only one he
> cites that goes against the grain of the moral hierarchy between
> the social and intellectual levels. This in itself is telling.
>
> PLATT: (Gave a number of examples to show science not
> subservient to society.)
>
> Actually if you look over the examples you gave you'll see they are
> of intellectual patterns that aren't about science (human rights) or
> are very general in nature and don't mention science.
</glenn>
I think you probably mean Physics and Chemistry, maybe Biology as opposed to Anthropology, Genetics
[vis-a-vis the barfsome Bell Curve] ? Ouias, peut-etre?
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> No, I was asking for cases the other way round. Perhaps you
> misread my paragraph above?
>
> PLATT:
> Here’s another:
>
> PIRSIG:
> The Metaphysics of Quality says that science’s empirical rejection
> of biological and social values is not only rationally correct, it is
> also morally correct because the intellectual patterns of science
> are of a higher evolutionary order than the old biological and
> social patterns. (Lila, Chap. 29)
>
> He doesn't mean this entirely. He doesn't like it when science rejects
> social values if those social values are rejecting biological values.
> To do this is not morally justifiable. This is why he thinks science is
> on the side of criminals. Of everything that constitutes the intellectual
> level, apparently only science is guilty of this type of infraction.
</glenn>
<<This is why he thinks science is on the side of criminals>>
Erm. At the risk of stating the bleeding obvious - you have got hold of the wrong end of the
stick. Unless you're just some agent provocateur that is.
The point is that science in denying a fundamental reality to morality ['not measurable by
scientific instruments', remember? - though I actually contest this myselfk] tends to UNDERMINE THE
VALUES ON WHICH SOCIETY IS CONSTRUCTED. Sorry about the shout but I was getting very bored with
the repetition. In this case, anthropolgy, multiculturalism, ... INADVERTENTLY AND NO MATTER HOW
WORTHY THESE CAUSES tend to cause an immune problem [analogy] in dealing with matters of SIMPLE
CRIMINALITY ON A SOCIAL LEVEL.
This is [I think] Pirsig's case - and I have a lot of sympathy with it.
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> He thinks science is undermining social morals, and according to
> the MOQ, you can go against the grain of the moral hierarchy in
> cases where a higher level undermines a lower level. I thought we
> agreed on this.
>
> PLATT:
> To say “science is undermining social morals” is correct. But
> “undermining” and going “against the grain” is not the same as
> being “subservient to.”
>
> I stand corrected. Subservient is too strong.
</glenn>
TFFT
<glenn>
> PLATT:
> What Pirsig objects to is the use of science’s intellectual pattern in
> social matters because the scientific pattern rejects morals. It
> rejects morals for good reason, as Pirsig explains:
>
> PIRSIG:
> This opposition of levels of static patterns offers a good
> explanation of why science in the past has rejected what it has
> called "values." The "values" it has rejected are static social
> prejudices and static biological emotions. When social patterns
> such as religion are mixed in with the scientific method, and when
> biological emotions are mixed in with the scientific method these
> "values" are properly considered a source of corruption of the
> scientific method. Science, it is said should be "value free," and if
> these were the only kind of values the statement would be true.
> However, the Metaphysics of Quality observes that these two kinds
> of values are lower on the evolutionary ladder than the intellectual
> pattern of science. Science rejects them to set free its own higher
> intellectual pattern. The Metaphysics of Quality calls this a correct
> moral judgment by science. (SODV paper)
</glenn><end of Pirsig quote>
<glenn>
> Except for hypothesis making, scientific methodology is objective,
</glenn>
This is called missing the plot big-time.
What is 'objective', what is 'subjective', how is the determination made?
May I suggest that it is made at least to some extent culturally? Even if that culture is a few
Dead White Greek Males 2500 years dead - who presumably had a culture.
Point being : what exactly are meant by the terms 'objective' and 'subjective', how do we live
folk make the distinction ?
<glenn>
> and
> scientific data and conclusions are published in a morally neutral and
> emotionless style, regardless of the scientist's personal opinions on the matter.
<interjection - BULLSHIT!!!!!>
> Science doesn't "reject" morals, period. This misleading
> characterization of science is troubling; or this characterization is made
> out of ignorance, which is almost unbelievable, considering Pirsig was
> trained as a chemist.
</glenn>
Glenn, I think you are being wilfully ignorant of the level of character assassinations that does
happen in the name of *good science*. I am sorry that this is rushed - I'll try to look up the
description of your activities in previous postings later. I am a *software engineer* [read :
programmer + whatever] with a degree in Physics and another in Computer Science. Whilst my current
activities are hardly *cutting edge*, I have a good foundation in the slaggings off that constitute
scientific progression. It is in all honesty not much different to listening the the latest
beatifications of the Roman Catholic church and wondering if World War Two had ever happend!!????
This is not to deny some degree of 'progress', but 'rationality' and 'objectivity'? Pulease - I
need to barf.
<glenn>
> Here Pirsig is saying that science can reject a static social prejudice
> like original sin, and is morally justified because original sin is a
> static social pattern, a church value at a lower level. Now, if a scientist
> ever published this conclusion, and I don't care if the scientist is a
> physicist or an anthropologist, he would be roundly and rightly censured
> to the extent his career would be jeopardized. In fact I've never heard of
> such a thing happening.
</glenn>
Especially with such a poor reading of Pirsig.
<glenn>
> In Pirsig's SODV quote above, the first and second sentences are incorrect.
> His third sentence is correct only if it bears no relation to the second
> one. He is clearly mixing up the notion of science being "value-free" in
> its methodology, with science rejecting values as a scientific conclusion.
> One doesn't follow from the other.
</glenn>
I'll be polite in that I assume that the paragraph above 'follows' the previous ones by Glenn,
which are badly informed, illogical or plain incorrect. Therefore I'll ignore it.
<glenn>
> PLATT:
> Should the scientific intellectual pattern retreat from the study of
> man and restrict itself to studying rocks and jellyfish? Pirsig’s
> answer is Yes and No—Yes if science is going to stick to its
> assumption that reality consists solely of measurable substances
> and forces, but No if science recognizes reality as patterns of
> value. Here’s how Pirsig put it:
>
> PIRSIG:
> If science is a study of substances and their relationships, then
> the field of cultural anthropology is a scientific absurdity. In terms
> of substance there is no such thing as a culture. It has no mass,
> no energy. No scientific laboratory instrument has ever been
> devised that can distinguish a culture from a nonculture. But if
> science is a study of stable patterns of value, then cultural
> anthropology becomes a supremely scientific field. A culture can
> be defined as a network of social patterns of value. As the Values
> Project anthropologist Kluckhohn had said, patterns of value are
> the essence of what an anthropologist studies. (Lila, Chap. 8)
>
> Pirsig is suggesting something ridiculous here - that a social science
> like anthropology really *is* a study of substance like physics is. His
> interpretation of SOM says it must be, but his interpretation is wrong.
</glenn>
Is Pirsig being ridiculous in suggesting that anthropolgy be constitued of something which is
measulable?
I don't think so.
I think that there is plenty of evidence in the stock market, private advertisements and court
cases to work out some sense of value.
Well, hell, in the name of *pure research* maybe you ought to go out there and try to corrupt
public officials?
<PUBLIC REFUTATION : IN THE EVENT OF THE MAILER TRYING TO VIST THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA THE MAILER ASSERTS THAT ALL OF THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED WITHIN THIS EMAIL ARE PURELY FOR
THE PURPOSES OF PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE AND IN NO MANNER CONSTITUTE INCITEMENT TO MORAL TURPITUDE>
<glenn>
> Pirsig says Boas started the problem in anthropology by only allowing
> dry facts and figures to be published, effectively suffocating the
> discipline. If this characterization is accurate, I agree. He also says
> Boas influence continues to this day. This is probably true to some extent,
> but now some middle ground has most certainly been reached. My guess is
> the good parts about objective methodology were preserved, but
> allowances have been made to develop an hypothesis about a culture's values
> and then defend that hypothesis by a careful examination of the data. The
> data itself may require an understanding of cultural values, and this is
> also permitted by today's standards. If the Inca study and NY Times article
> are any indication, cultural studies are no longer hamstrung as they
> presumably were 80 years ago.
</glenn>
Glad to hear it. But my recent readings of Mediterranean Archaeology furore vis-a-vis dating
hardly give me confidence. Fine it's not anthropology - but it's still *polite academic debate*
:-).
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> I'm trying to develop a motive for his attacks on science, since the
> attacks don't make sense to me.
>
> PLATT:
> In spite of all the quotes I’ve cited, I guess there’s no convincing
> you that Pirsig isn’t out to destroy science. His attacks (if you want
> to call them that) are aimed at the use of the scientific pattern of
> amoral objectivity to study, change or organize society.
> Communism and socialism are examples of social orders
> dominated by the scientific intellectual pattern.
>
> I never said Pirsig was out to destroy science. What I've said is he's out
> to "discredit science enough to allow for explanations of reality that are
> unscientific."
</glenn>
Um. Please would you explain to an ignoramus such as myself, what the difference is?
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> Getting back to Margaret Mead - Pirsig isn't really blaming her as
> much as the amoral science she stands for. He thinks she came
> to this conclusion (free sex is OK here, so it's OK there) because
> she thought her scientific facts proved it, but how could she have
> thought that? *Maybe* her facts show free sex works in Samoa,
> but how can she say they work in America, a completely different
> culture? If she bases her science on the precepts of cultural
> relativism, she can't be making this statement with the authority of
> her school of science. She must have known that she was
> speaking her own beliefs here, not ones arrived at by objective
> evidence. So, if she were acting like a proper amoral scientist, she
> would have kept her mouth shut and kept her personal beliefs to
> herself. The blame falls on her, not amoral science.
>
> PLATT:
> Nowhere can I find in Lila or elsewhere that Margaret Mead said
> any of things you attribute to her. I haven’t read “Coming of Age in
> Samoa” but I doubt if Mead said anything about free sex being OK
> there so it’s OK here, nor did Pirsig say she arrived at such an
> “amoral” conclusion.
>
> Look in the middle of Ch. 22.
</glenn>
Sorry mate? Whose Ch22? Pirsig's or Mead's?
And is your argument stating that <<Pirsig said such-and-such>> or <<Mead said such-and-such>>?
Regret that your level of quotation leaves much to be desired! - What the hell - maybe you were
just tired like me.
But all the same [on careful re-reading] - I'm not sure in your original quotation whether you are
refering to Mead, Pirsig's interpretation of Mead, or your interpretation of Pirsig's
interpretation of Mead. As such - it's *beyond criticism*.
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> What I'm after are specific examples of how science and
> scientists are responsible for the moral decay in the 20th century.
> The only one I can find is the Margaret Mead citation. Usually an
> argument is based on a preponderance of specific examples
> which are all in support of a general conclusion.
>
> PLATT:
> Reread Chapters 4 and 24. And again, keep in mind it isn’t
> science and scientists who are responsible for the moral decay
> but the materialist, subject-object intellectual pattern when it is
> applied to societies.
>
> Why should I think it *isn't* science or scientists who are responsible for
> the moral decay when the the words "science" and "scientific
> intellectual pattern" appear over and over in the book? I'm sorry, Platt,
> but this kind of back-peddling says there is something phony going on
> here. 3WD says I'm missing the big picture, that the SOM culture has
> persisted for 2500 years. It's very difficult to defend an SOM that is not
> of your definition, and over so much history, and whose influence is said
> to be imbued in the collective consciousness.
>
> But Pirsig is not complaining so much about the 2400 years that preceded
> Armistice day. Indeed, he's clear that science has been the problem since
> then. I've heard this kind of retreat to SOM many times before, and it's
> just a slippery tactic as far as I'm concerned. It always comes back to
> science.
</glenn>
Hmm. This bit is a reflection so I'll leave it go.
<glenn>
> PLATT:
> You seem to believe that Pirsig hates science and that the MOQ is
> a thinly disguised screed against science and scientists.
>
> I think he's deeply conflicted about science, and that a part of him hates
> it. I know you disagree strongly about this, but I believe I'm correct.
</glenn>
Last sentence, Glenn - Subjective or Objective?
</glenn>
> I wouldn't call MOQ a screed, not by any means. Lila is, on the contrary, a
> very lively book with many interesting ideas.
>
> Lila is about a lot of things, but I do agree that Lila is a thinly veiled
> treatise against science. It's also a thinly disguised treatise *for*
> mysticism. It's no accident these two themes are in the same book and in
> opposition, and it's also no accident they are both thinly veiled.
</glenn>
Well they're so thinly veiled that my usually blundering sensibilities obviously didn't rip the
veil.
Time for a bit of hectoring if you didn't think the above was bad enough :
You accept the concepts of 'objective' and 'subjective' like manna from God's heaven. Why? How to
you separate the sensations that you feel into the categories of 'objective' and 'subjective'.
Granted that there are an awful lot of evolutionary awkward situations that might be in there
somewhere - ontological discrepancies I'll deal with another time this is basic concept stuff - but
the question still remains : your theories of scientific realism - are they objective or subjective
?
<glenn>
> More than anything, Pirsig wanted Lila to be viewed seriously by his ZMM
> critics, and he bent over backwards to present his ideas in a mainstream
> fashion. Pirsig was hoping to hit the big time in academic circles:
>
> PIRSIG: (Ch. 26)
> James is usually considered a very solid mainstream American philosopher,
> whereas Phaedrus's first book had often been described as a "cult" book.
> He had a feeling the people who used that term *wished* it was a cult
> book and would go away like a cult book, perhaps because it was
> interfering with some philosophological cultism of their own. But if
> philosophologists were willing to accept the idea that the MOQ is an off-
> shoot of James's work, then that "cult" charge was shattered. And this was
> good political news in a field where politics is a big factor.
>
> But it didn't work out that way. Lila is *more* the cult book than ZMM, and
> this website, and particularly its members, are testimony to that. The
> sentiment against orthodox science and the beliefs entrusted in what is
> often labeled pseudo-science and even the occult run right under the
> surface at MOQ.org. People here take their cues from Pirsig and don't
> discuss their beliefs openly, prefering a kind of coded language that
> speaks of "expanded reality".
</glenn>
#1 Rhetorical approach : your last paragraph is so beneath contempt it is not worthy to comment on
it.
#2 Rational approch : your last paragraph is so beneath contempt it is not worthy to comment on it.
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> Can you cite where scientists "claim" only material things are
> real? Do scientists claim that logic, mathematics, art and music,
> cultural values, pain, morals, love, patriotism, awe, jealousy, etc
> are not real? Scientists don't study these things because they're
> too hard to study, not because they're unreal.
>
> PLATT:
> Many scientists claim only material things are real and that all that
> other stuff is illusory or an “epiphenomena.” This “prevailing
> wisdom” has been described by Daniel C. Dennett, director of
> cognitive studies at Tufts University, in his book “Consciousness
> Explained.”
>
> I read this book some years back and I was left with the impression
> that Dennett was more than a materialist - he was a determinist. In
> other words, his claim was that free will is an illusion. I don't think
> all materialist would believe this in light of modern physics and chaos
> theory.
</glenn>
#1 Haven't read the book
#2 Determinism is an impossible logical position to refute.
#3 I refute it
<glenn>
> DENNETT:
> The idea of mind as distinct from the brain, composed not of
> ordinary matter, but of some other, special kind of stuff, is
> dualism, and it is deservedly in disrepute today. The prevailing
> wisdom, variously expressed and argued for, is materialism: there
> is only one sort of stuff, namely matter – the physical stuff of
> physics, chemistry and physiology – and the mind is somehow
> nothing but a physical phenomenon. According to the
> materialists, we can (in principal) account for every mental
> phenomenon using the same physic principles, laws, and raw
> materials that suffice to explain radioactivity, continental drift,
> photosynthesis, reproduction, nutrition and growth. It is one of the
> main burdens of this book to explain consciousness without
> every giving in to the siren song of dualism.
>
> There's no denying that his claim is arrogant, and even though his claim
> is made in principal, you can't help thinking that he thinks his proof
> is right around the corner. It's not. He's extremely optimistic and I
> really wonder if he appreciates the magnitude of work before him and the
> breakthroughs required to realize his claim.
</glenn>
This a subjective or an objective opinion, Glenn?
<glenn>
> I'm not a philosopher so I'm weak when it comes to the definition of
> philosophical schools like materialism, but the way Pirsig makes it
> sound, a materialist believes a culture, for example, is like a possession
> he keeps in his trouser pockets - that is, close to his biological
> self - because materialists only believe in substance. This is a
> strange analogy and I don't buy it. People who have not been introduced
> to the ideas of MOQ think about culture as something "out there", just
> as MOQers believe.
</glenn>
Nope : as far as I read, a materialist [scientific not Marxist] ignores culture - IT DOESN'T
EXIST!!! So you end up sounding like Margaret Thatcher.
<glenn>
> I don't understand your complaint about epiphenomena. If I understand the
> evolutionary aspect of MOQ properly, society or culture evolved from
> human biological patterns (people), and so culture is epiphenomenal in
> MOQ as well. The real difference seems to be a matter of stress.
> MOQers want people to consciously believe that a culture is more "real",
> more "out there", and more independent than they've previously allowed.
> Pirsig stresses that a level may have started out as an extension of the
> previous level, but then it broke out to be its own thing, with its own
> purposes. If this is his way of getting around being "epiphenomenal", it's
> subtle, and requires the levels themselves to take on a kind of reality
> beyond the model of reality for which they were originally intended.
</glenn>
?
<glenn>
>
>
> Based on your definition above, I would have to say I fall into the
> materialist camp. This sounds like a shocking thing to admit but it's
> only shocking if you believe I think as an SOMer. In fact, I thought along
> many of the same lines as MOQ even before I read Lila. The biggest
> difference I have with MOQ is I'm not ready to accept DQ as an undefined
> "something" that creates everything.
</glenn>
Well, in that last sentence, you'll find many a MOQer in agreement with you.
<glenn>
> PLATT:
> Now it’s up to you to cite a contradictory source. As for the things
> you mentioned being “too hard” for science to study, they wouldn’t
> be if they studied them as patterns of value instead of patterns of
> substance.
>
> Perhaps, but I'm doubtful. I'd be interested in seeing how an MOQ-based
> science would study pain, for example, and remain supremely scientific.
> I'm not talking about a rehash of the hot stove passage, but a theory about
> pain that would have impressive explanatory power and be falsifiable. Or
> how about a theory of intelligence, since this seems relevant to knowing
> whether a person can "see" beyond the social level?
</glenn>
No, but as a theory of how chemical change in neurons leads to perception in the *mind*, I think
that MOQ is a little better suited that SOM.
<glenn>
> GLENN:
> You are puzzled because you think my views insist a disconnect
> must exist. You are puzzled because you believe SOM, as Pirsig
> defines it, accurately models the current state of beliefs, including
> my own and those of scientists. I'm arguing it doesn't.
>
> PLATT:
> Pirisig defines SOM as the belief that “everything has to be an
> extension of matter.” Can you support your argument by citing
> sources that say scientists believe otherwise?
>
> There are scientists I could cite who believe otherwise, but I cannot cite
> a source contradicting this as the prevailing view. I agree it is the
> prevailing view.
>
> The key word here is "extension". There are many things that are not
> material, such as emotions and numbers, that most people say are real. That
> some of these are epiphenomenal or a figment, as Pinker would say about
> color awareness, should not be that bothersome. People have evolved in
> special ways to perceive reality, in particular to the features of reality
> found on planet Earth, and even if some of these are deemed subjective,
> these are real enough so long as there is consensus for them.
</glenn>
Or as Pirsig would have it - a quality perception has been amplified.
<glenn>
> Pirsig takes a very strict stance on this view and refuses to say that
> SOM's extensions or epiphenomena are real.
</glenn>
Think you have this wrong. The point is that SOM *denies* reality to anything that isn't in it's
own definition material. It obviously has a problem when it comes to mathematics or the philosophy
of science.
<glenn>
> While all the MOQ patterns of
> value in all the levels are also epiphenomenal (from DQ at least), Pirsig
> says these patterns *are* real. This difference in treatment about what is
> and is not real allows him to overstate his case against SOM.
</glenn>
I think you got this wrong. Paragraphs passim.
</glenn>
> PLATT (previous post)
> Perhaps you can explain what the difference is between saying all
> things are forms of energy and all things are forms of Quality. How
> does the data change?
>
> GLENN:
> Energy and dynamic quality are not comparable. Energy is a
> quantifiable concept. It appears in equations of physical theory. It
> has properties and types, as you say. Dynamic quality has none of
> these. It is undefined. At the subatomic level it is not found. If my
> understanding of MOQ is correct, it would say DQ is a precursor of
> energy and in fact creates it. At the subatomic level DQ is faith,
> simple and pure.
>
> PLATT:
> You misread what I said. I didn’t compare energy to dynamic
> quality. I asked what’s the difference between forms of energy and
> forms of Quality. In the MOQ, energy is explained as an inorganic
> pattern of value, a form of Quality. You can quantify patterns at that
> level, apply equations, specify properties and the rest. The data
> doesn’t change in the MOQ.
>
> Am I ignorant of a convention here? If you use the word "Quality" alone
> does this always mean static quality? Does capitalization signify anything?
>
> The reason I didn't think you meant static quality was because in this case
> the difference between energy and an inorganic pov is only linguistic.
> Their equivalence is true by definition and so is not open to argument.
>
> PLATT:
> I believe you’re correct in stating that DQ (dynamic quality) is the
> precursor of energy and in fact created it. If you reject that as just a
> matter of faith, perhaps you can explain what did create energy?
> Science says energy can neither be created or destroyed, an
> expression of pure faith in an eternal, infinite being which, though
> called energy by scientists, might as well, by their own description,
> be called God. Have you another view?
>
> Scientists don't consider energy an expression of pure faith or an infinite
> being like God, as you say.
>
> Your question about what created energy is a different matter. Some
> scientists would say God, for sure. Some remain non-committal. Now, this
> business about being non-committal allows you to leave your options open
> in case a better explanation comes along. The danger about proposing
> teleogical explanations for things is that strong beliefs in these
> explanations have the effect of closing off areas to scientific
> investigation.
</glenn>
With you that *energy* should be left within the physcists court. TO my mind it's a space time
relationship, but I won't bore you/betray my sad ignorance here.
<glenn>
> An example of such a teleological explanation is DQ. Another one is
> morphogenetic fields, a theory proposed by the biologist Rupert Sheldrake
> to explain the problem of morphogenesis in biology. This is the mystery of
> how cells in a developing fetus, which all start out the same with
> identical genetic material, differentiate so that some cells become eye
> cells, others toenail cells, etc. Sheldrake's idea is that the information
> that tells the cells how and when to differentiate is not contained in the
> cell, but in a specialized field that pervades space, that contains a
> memory of information about the species. Like a telly, the organism tunes
> into the morphogenetic field for 'programming', and in so doing even
> reinforces the field and strengthens the habits and attributes of the
> species as a whole. The morphogenetic field explains much more than
> morphogenesis, however, but also the habits and behaviors of species for
> which Darwinian explanations were a stretch.
</glenn>
But DQ is the antithesis of a morphogenetic field : it is saying that each moment is NOW!! The
governance of that moment could be called quality.
Rupert Sheldrake is in anycase a committed Christian and seeks to entangle his morphogenetic fields
with his theology - or at least that was the impression I got from the last book of his I read,
<glenn>
> Biologists were furious with him, because if his idea took hold, it would
> close the book on much of embryology and perhaps larger chunks of biology,
> and scientific learning in these areas would be seriously crippled or even
> cease.
</glenn>
Glenn - I agree that his idea had problems - but are you sure that it was dealt with as rationally
as this? His book was actually reviewed as "the best candidate for burning"! [sorry quoting from
memory yet again]
For all the concepts in his book which I will quite happily disregard as nonsense, you are
seriously understating the witch-hunt that prevailed at the time.
Objective or Subjective?
<glenn>
> On top of this, biologists have a hard time attacking his theory,
> because it is unfalsifiable. Essentially, Sheldrake has turned his back on
> science. He's written a string of popular books, at least one of which,
> The Rebirth of Nature, attacks mechanistic science mercilessly. His writing
> is quite good and he seems to make a compelling case at least on a first
> reading. His latest book is about doggie telepathy.
>
> Platt, if you've yet to discover Sheldrake, I imagine his ideas would very
> much appeal to you.
</glenn>
Oh for fuck's sake, Glenn - your last bit is just random abuse.
Pirsig tried to start a debate and is willing to accept criticism.
Sheldrake is a pointless arsehole trying to read his own theology into a all-pervading 'I KNOW IT
ALL ' field determining all-future.
If you criticise Pirsig for megalomania, at least accept this : quality is about choice - it
promotes evalutaion - of scientific theories and ones which haven't been accepted as science -
maybe yet, maybe never.
Now I would say that the pervading field of OBJECTIVITY that you obviously pray five times to a day
has just as many as the powers of Sheldrake's morphogenetic field vis-a-vis knowledge and bugger
all of the "well let's try to find out" nature of Pirsig's Dynamic Quality.
Best Regards,
Hamish [Absolute Atheist BTW]
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@wasted.demon.nl
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:00:47 BST