David,
I accept the distinction between mechanical explanation and physical
explanation, though I would say that the former follows from the latter. I
do have a problem with physical explanations though, in the sense that many
of the physical explanations we are talking about are of the order of
Newtonian, classical physics (as my last). Such physical explanations
seem(to me) to underpin Cartesian dualism, the mind / matter split, and as
such hardly seem to support the Buddhist view..?
Another way to put this is to say that the sort of physical explanations
which would support the world-view you describe would need to be of a
radically different (and considerably more complex) than that which
pertained for the larger part of the 20th C.( I'm speaking of the 'majority'
view-point as I assess it to be). Along the way, one would certainly have to
lose 'stimulus-response' models of perception.
If we forego the stimulus-response model, there is then no sound basis for
identifying what we call "perception" as closely similar to what we call
"sensation", as there is not a good argument to support the supposition that
sensation *causes* perception, and one may just as well say that it is
completely the other way round - that "perception" causes the gathering of
"sensations". Indeed, one may also say this of "behaviour"; that it isn't
merely the result of "sensation+cognition", but is actually a perceptible
tool whose utility lies in the potential for eliciting useful sensory
information ( by manoevering the various organs of sensation to [a] act in
concert for specific goals and [b]optimise signal-to-noise relationships,
and therefore optimise information gathering.
Note that in this model, 'information gathering' proceeds from the
generation of 'cognitive hypotheses' (however they may be defined), which
are then tested empirically by correlating sense data *against specific
hypotheses*. Without such hypotheses, (such as in the case of extreme
short-term memory loss), meaningful use of sense-data is improbable.
This seems a potentially useful metaphor for our use of science; the
'science' bit is equivalent to the empirical testing of hypotheses. If the
analogy holds good, we can see how 'science' cannot exist in a vacuum, nor
can it be expected to be a 'comprehensive' world-view; it is wholly
dependant on a larger world-view which facilitates the generation of new
hypotheses. (I've pointed out previously that Karl Popper made this clear).
the interesting area here is the boundary between science and 'not-science',
that frontier where new hypotheses may enter the scientific domain for
destruct testing. Is there a hard line, as some would have it, or is it
somewhat more vague and indefinable?
I'm for the latter view, in that science has never actually completely and
utterly defined anything in what we might call and 'absolute' sense. Not a
Kilogramme, Metre, etc. (I'm excluding the tautological nature of maths, for
a minute).
It is for this last reason (among others) that I'm cautious over the notion
of "empirical proof" as the ultimate validator of 'real'. I'm not denying
the validity of experience in this, merely pointing out that
moment-to-moment experience cannot *define* real. But much science does
proceed on the assumption that one must only deal with that which has been
defined, -is definite, in fact. But there's no such thing, (at least,
provably)!
In this view, science argues itself out of existence, yet we have empirical
eveidence of the efficacy of science......
I'm afraid that I'm not familiar with the Vienna Circle in any meaningful
depth, but certainly I would have a problem with the idea of "truth" being
largely dependant on any sort of majority opinion, though that may not be
what you said.
Certainly, the notion of "objective" truth, as espoused by the scientific
world-view, the legal one, and so on, is an interesting one. Again, Popper
talked a little about this, when proposing his "Worlds 1,2 and 3". So,
something might be objective with respect to me, but still be regarded as
essentially a human product and therefore subjective compared to the sort of
objectivity we would normally assign to 'the physical world". Fashion might
be an example, flat-earth theories another.
Incidentlly, I really was serious when I said that there is no support for
the notion of 5 senses; I should perhaps have said no *scientific* support.
It has never been definitively, scientifically proved how many "senses" we
actually have. Which throws some doubt on the effectiveness of our concepts
of "sense".
Lastly, you seem rather more conversant with the behaviourist doctrine than
I; your interpretation intrigues me, so if you care to carry on this
discussion, I would be pleased.
regards,
peter
Peter Lennox
Hardwick House
tel: (0114) 2661509
e-mail: peter@lennox01.freeserve.co.uk
or:- ppl100@york.ac.uk
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