clear as
behaviourism might have seemed to say
Peter:
We believe the causes of behavior are in the future. What behaviorist have
you been studying?
David Prince
Systems Analyst
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-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Lennox <peter@lennox01.freeserve.co.uk>
To: moq_discuss@moq.org <moq_discuss@moq.org>
Date: Tuesday, October 10, 2000 11:06 PM
Subject: MD causal mechanisms / platt
Yes, I was making your point, platt - the notion we have of causality is
overly simplistic, and excludes (or at least does not incorporate) too much
which is clearly not 'magic' or 'weird' or, most importantly, unexpected.
I've remarked before that Popper was banging on about this when critically
discussing 'push cauality'. It does seem to me that there are many examples
where 'effect' may temporally precede 'cause'. Thus the stipulation of an
event without 'cause' is difficult to discuss, because it seems to be a case
of scale (again) -in this case, timescale. That is, an apparently uncaused
event might only appear so in one timescale, but in a longer one seem
adequately explained. This especially so in the case of 'intelligent'
agents, for whom the 'cause-and-effect' loop is by no means as clear as
behaviourism might have seemed to say. So, one could actually explain that
the cause of the big bang might well be an intelligent agent, - God- and
it's difficult to argue with this, not because such a suggestion is mystical
(i.e. - rests on un-disprovable arguments, *intrinsically*) but because
anyone can argue (if I'm right about the possibility of effect preceding
cause) that the game isn't over yet, and so all the 'causes' aren't in yet.
Likewise, the traditional notion of causality seems to rely on 'absolute
definitions', and similarly, 'absoluteness' seems to require some sort of
'concrete-ness' of causal processes. I think it would surely be hard to
argue for 'absoluteness' of meanings without 'absolutely' reliable causal
mechanisms, wouldn't it?
Now, I take your point about the apparent absoluteness of certainty of
certain outcomes resulting from certain actions. It does indeed seem to me
that if I leap out of a moving aeroplane, I'm 'absolutely' likely to lose
all structural integrity on meeting the ground (within the context of normal
gravity, etc). And I do indeed treat this sort of causal mechanism with
great respect, witness my presence here (so far). Nevertheless, I still
question whether these casual descriptions are in fact describing processes
which necessarily comprise the 'absolute' units we presently think are
relevant.
Nevertheless, I still propose that there is a number which repesents a high
enough probability that a normal, sane, sentient being will treat it as
effectively absolute, but which nevertheless is not the same thing as 100%
probable. I've already been pulled up on this point, in trying to say that
there is a difference between 99.99999999 etc% and 100%. But I'm sure
there's a way I can say that there is a difference between 99.99999999
(repeated for 3 million years)8, and 100. if that's so, then Nietzche was
right in the sense that one could never PROVE the existence of 100%,
absolute, inevitable, etc. On the other hand, if one could prove such an
entity, then this would surel be tantamount to proving a deterministic
universe..?
It does seem to me that this is the cusp whereupon many arguments hinge; on
the one hand, absolute, causal, 'scientific', logical, deterministic (and no
free will), wholly understandable in terms of descriptions of causes and
concrete entities, where 'objective truth' is the purest form of reality,
and on the other, relatavistic arguments, 'arty' stuff, free will,
mysticism (in the 'un-disprovability' sense), hope, gambling, etc.
The former sounds like the clockwork universe, and the latter sonds like the
animistic crossed with the X-files.
Neither sounds adequate, and it does feel like dualism again. Fortunately,
most individuals I know can deal with this by entertaining dualistic (or
multiplistic) appreciations of the world, and so can say things like "I'm a
hard scientist, and a christian", or " I'm an artist, but things have to
make sense in a logical way", or some such.
Certainly, Pirsig's resort to 'commonsense' arguments doesn't swing it for
me - nothings is actually more absolute thereby. On the other hand, any
philosopher who tells me that the hand in front of my face is not 'real'
becasue it is not absolute will get short shrift.
Yet I do agree that the shifting sands of "..only relatively true" are
hazardous and uselessas a guide for living. And my solution to this is
indeed to subscribe to the notion of something absolute about moral
behaviours; but it is a matter of faith in an essentially hypothetical and
unprovable (or undisprovable) entity. It just works for me, but i can't
make, or understand, an argument for getting from there to 'really, really,
objectively, true'.
What I was saying about 'definitions' is that they are indeed what we all
use, but don't really make it to 'objective reality' status, as definitions
(i.e. description of the is/is not boundary of an entity, process or
concept) have to be related to context in such a way that entities, media,
concepts, etc outside the thing being defined have to have an influence on
the defined object. I mean there's no definition which can stand for
intrinsic values alone, without reference to extrinsic values.
I'm sorry, I've not put that very well; I'll go and sleep on it!
cheers
Peter Lennox
Hardwick House
tel: (0114) 2661509
e-mail: peter@lennox01.freeserve.co.uk
or:- ppl100@york.ac.uk
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