Part 2
The question of course of wether then ' reality ' ' exists ' or not is rather
silly/ fallacious and useless. It is impossible to prove either way because
the very thing I use to know that is inself the thing whose ability to know
that produces the impossibility to do that...our brain.
However in a sense the existence of memes can ' t than be prooven either.
Why do good things for other people if you think they don ' t really exist,
are merely part of your imagination; and why should we hand in wallets
found on the street if neither the street, the wallet nor the person suppo-
singly owning the wallet does memetical exist, does not correspond
with my reality !?
What is then the purpose of the search into memetics if I can have memes
which deny the existence of other people and even deny their memes !?
What is the purpose of our/ my cultural environment if firstly culture as we/
I know it, don ' t really exist and secondly why should we/ I bother at all if all
what exists is merely a mirror image of our/ my mind !?
Anyway, ideas can have the same underlying form as f. e. morphogenetic
fields. In the same sense that those came (ex- hypothesis) into being,
ideas can have their base in the unconscious mind, and thus no fixed
grounding.
The concept of an idea ( if there is one ) would be simply ' from its own
case '. Therfor it can be demonstrated that ' reality ' does not possess
any logical scope in reference to the ' ideas ' we all have.
That is, uniformation ( all ideas are intented units of the internal structure
of ( a ) reality is greatly depending on the content/ context and is thus
partly due ( if we decompose the structure) to cognitive and evolutionary
processes within the a single individual.
Such conclusions are the result of three philosophical pre- suppositions,
A_ that what I know is certainly the content of my own mind ( memes)
B_ that there is no conceptual or logically necessary link between the
mental and the physical ( the idea that there has to be no logical link
between the memetical activity of my mind and the behavioural disposi-
tions of my body) and
C_ that the ( memetical) experiences of a given person are necessarily
private to that person ( Idit Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
( These reflections can be prooven wrong, but those conclusions are of
no importance to this article.)
These pre- suppositions are making it indeed the collectiviness, the
sameness very hard_ in a sense it don 't really exists, but where in the
first place is the problem ( if we ever can talk about one ) of collectiviness/
sameness coming from !?
End of part Two
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