> And this is in an area where the much regarded Wittgenstein and my own
favourite Iris
> Murdoch have written books and books,
How odd that you should mention that. I have recently read 'Metaphysics as a
Guide to Morals' and noted that it has quite a few similarities with
Pirsig's Metaphysics of Quality - Murdoch takes her starting point by
dissolving the distinction between ethics and aesthetics (as otherwise
contained within the broader category of axiology) wherein art effectively
becomes a Platonic form of good. Conversely, Pirsig commences by dissolving
the distinction between aesthetics and ontology, returning to ethics in
Lila. Has Murdoch been discussed much on this list?
> [This is essentially the Wittgensteinian possition in the
> Tractatus, where value is a "That whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must
remain silent".
> Similarly, in my veiw (and Murdoch backs this up), Wittgenstein's
> Philosophical Investigations are an attempt to construct a picture of
> language minus the Quality "whereof we cannot speak" which is the constant
> spur to our active language use.]
Or to put that in the terminology favoured by linguistics, minus the
'difference.'
>But do you think that it can actually get to the mystical? Or,
>perhaps, is it rather the (flawed) attempt that counts and reveals: the
>strain and effort of it?
I don't think it can get to the mystical. Wittgenstein's attempt to strip
language of difference/quality (or, for that matter, the similar endeavours
of Tarski or Russell) is of limited value outside of his own thought. For
example, the discovery of a group of deaf children in Nicaragua who had
independently formed a grammatical system of signification, does a great
deal to validate the existence of an innate (genetic) drive to form
grammatical rules in language from a minimal input, but does little to
determine how that impulse manifests itself under normal circumstances
wherein the child is exposed to a fully-formed language. Similarly,
difference is an inherent feature of language use - hypothesising conditions
under which it is not present says little of language. To quote Rorty on
Derrida:
"Derrida thinks of Heidegger's attempt to express the ineffable as merely
the
latest and most frantic form of a vain struggle to break out of language by
finding words which take their meaning directly from the world, from
non-language."
Or in this case from any transcendental experience - a particularly
difficult case.
> Thinking is not designating at all, but rather understanding,
> grasping, 'possessing'. [EM p41]
And so, in greek, the word poet means 'maker.'
>Let's not forget, Pirsig wrote a novel not a philosophical treatise.
I rather thought Pirsig was at pains to state that Zen was not a novel in a
conventional sense?
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