All
Struan
Just to let you know that you have verfied my initial scepticism about
your apparent kind words and complete "agreement" with my latest
posting. I would also like to join those who find your contributions
here of value. I find them of value in several ways.
First, they are an ongoing verification of a portrait of a type of
academic intellectual attitude and action which Pirsig painted in a
number of places in both books. I direct your attention to the
Dusenberry portrait, the anthro portraits, and most particularly the
Chairman portrait. When I compare the pictures Pirsig paints to the
one's you do it leads me to conclude that there is a verifiable school
or genre in this vein which he has accurately captured.
Second, when navigating it is very helpful to have a fixed point of
reference, such as a dim distant star, upon which one progress can be
gauged. Though I would concur with the recent post that your "blinking
off and on" at will disqualifies you as ideal candidate.
Third, as we move in to investigate the brush strokes made by Pirig's
straw we find subtle patterns which illuminate our "agreed upon"
differences in the role of philosophy. Your "adjunct" to science
position is,of course, an traditional and ancient one. It started before
there was "science" per se, when all was philosophy. From Greek times
forward through Newton, Bacon, Descartes, and even recently as James or
even Popper a great deal of philosophy was created by people who often
spent a great deal, or period, of time actually "doing" science. And as
such their philosophy was an adjunct to, or a way to, try and help them
and others square their experiences in science with the overall scheme
of things. If we look at the current situation we find that as things
evolved over time greater and greater specialization and professionalism
led to a point now where very few "philosophers" have any direct
experience in science nor the inclination, training, attitude, or
aptitude for it. Nor is this new. James word for it was "scholasticism"
and I'm sure there are many other sources of verification. Possibly you
could share with us your field of "sciencific endeavor" that consumes a
greater deal of your time to which your philosophy is an 'adjunct'. (Of
course it would be nice if you could site verifable sources like peer
reviewed publications, industry awards, patent applications and awards,
Nobel prizes etc.)
Glen,
I assure you it's not a retreat just my current attempt to try and find
some common ground of understanding and in doing so progress. But
empirically I find no first person references like "I",meaning Pirsig,
in either book. As I recall in Lila there is the narrator, Phaedrus,
Lila, Riegel, Bill, and a few others who's names I can't recall. Which
one of these is that "Pirsig" who "does a lot more than 'point to
possible' paths for further inquiry." When you pick one, and only one,
as I think most here have in some manner or another have verified that
Pirsig is a single individual,
then please explain to me how you verfied that the "person" you picked
is "Pirsig" and not one of the others. And if you say,"All" how is this
not logically inconsistant? Or are you going to use the "multple
personality" insanity claim and if so, How do you propose to verify that?
Charging grey one with red eyes,
Like members of your ilk I'm not rushing anywhere. I'm willing to
concede some people contend that both books are logically inconsistent,
contain strawpeople, are rigourously unoriginal, and these contentions,
in part, have some merit. While still contending that these claims in no
way totally impune or damage the obvious good or quality contained in
them. This is 'good' futher is evidenced by the initial and ongoing
attraction that even the most ardent detractors cannot deny or they
would not be here.
Platt,
Thanks for your consistent and timely refutation of the "Art of
Selective Quotation."
Jonathan
I also agree with you, agreeing with Struan, that the examples used are
not the best and are ,in part, logically inconsistant. But Struan's
claim of "absolutism' is pure hokum as your post and Platts quote point
out.(And I see as I get ready to post this Struan concedes the point,
Yea consensus! a milestone or is it millstone?) Here's another one
which speaks to the dynamic and changing nature of morals.
> Morality is not a simple set of rules. It's a very complex struggle of conflicting patterns of values. This conflict is the residue of evolution. As new patterns evolve they come into conflict with old ones. Each stage of evolution creates in its wake a wash of problems.
> Pirsig, Robert M., Lila. An inquiry into morals. New York (Bantam Books) 1991, 163
Now if the claim was "unoriginality" we might concede some merit, for if
we could turn to James in " The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life"
and find many strikingly similar arguments such as:
"We all help to determine the content of ethical philosophy so far as we
contribute to the race's moral life. In other words, there can be no
final truth in ethics any more than in physics, until the last man has
had his experience, and had his say. In one case as in the other,
however, the hypotheses which we now make while waiting, and the acts to
which they prompt us, are among the indispensable conditions which
determine what that 'say' shall be."
A morphology for the quotationally challenged:
The race's moral life is a very complexed struggle of conflicting
patterns of value. There can be no final truth in ethics because as new
patterns evolve they come in conflict with old ones creating a wash of
new problems. Thus until the last man has had his experience and his
say we are forever dependant on our current hypotheses and the acts to
which they prompts us. Because they are some of the indispensable
conditions which determine what that 'say' shall be.
>From this we can then continue to just what hypothesis Pirsig proposes.
He proposes that there is a stable four level hierarchies of morals
which are to some degree both independent from and dependent on each
other. In the latest Straun/Elephant exchange the term "taxomony" was
introduced. I believe that hierarchy is a better term because the
primary definition of taxonomy refer to "the classifying of objects" And
I can find 'no-one' who classifies "morals" as "objects"
As each higher level evolved, a higher level of rights and freedoms
evolved. Along with these higher levels of freedom came a higher level
of obligations. But these obligations were not and are not 'absolutes'
they are 'oughts'. For instance, over time and with experience the moral
law "You ought not jump off high places" evolved. Now this is not an
'absolute' law, if you wish you may violate it. (If the moral laws of
society don't catch you.) But when you do, you defer to the lower
level moral inorganic law of physics which predicates that you will
accelerate at "x" feet per second per second to your probable demise. If
we move on to the highest of high sciences quantum mechanics we find our
experiences indicate that if we set up an experiment just this way we
'ought' to find just this results. And, in all probablity we will. But
sometimes we won't. So we 'ought' to find, and you 'ought' to die and
you probably will, but you just might not. And we can accept this and
move on to exploring the useful and practical consequences of these
experiences forming appropiate moral laws that reflect this, changing
them when they don't. But when someone proposes to the "philosophers" a
hypothesis which might help explain these disparate cases more clearly
it is rigourously unoriginal, inconsistant, dangerous, and bad. This I
just can't fathom.
But I'm sure Struan will help me.
3WD
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