Greetings,
Ele . . . er, Anon. I said that I take an entirely pragmatic approach to
ethical matters and that answers your question fully. And it clearly did
mean what it was 'supposed' to mean.
In terms of ethics, Pragmatism (in most forms) subscribes to the following.
Firstly it rejects certainty as a legitimate intellectual goal and thereby
avoids a dogmatic approach to morality. (Pirsig is nothing if not dogmatic
about his ethical system of levels, although in other respects he is
pragmatic). Secondly it is teleological to the core and so rejects the many
and varied deontological statements Pirsig makes about ethics, such as:
'That choice which is more dynamic . . . is more moral'.
'It's true for all people at all time'.
'It's scientifically immoral for everyone' (referring to eating meat and
with minor qualifications).
'The principle of human equality is an even higher form than the nation'.
etc . . . etc . . . !
As Pirsig is clearly a deontologist, and assuming Jonathan represents him
correctly, my initial point that, if you want to derive what we *ought* to
do from the *fact* of complexity, you need to give a good reason why you are
doing so, still stands in a way that it doesn't stand for those of us who
take an entirely pragmatic view of things.
Now as your irrelevant critique of my sound answer to your irrelevant
critique adds nothing, and as you are not prepared to argue for any of the
more bizarre points you previously made (e.g. that I want to establish
anti-quality as the primary empirical reality) I have nothing more to add to
this particularly discussion.
Should I make a trunk call and reverse the charge I wonder.
Struan
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