> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-moq_discuss@venus.co.uk
> [mailto:owner-moq_discuss@venus.co.uk]On Behalf Of Andrea Sosio
> Sent: Wednesday, 14 February 2001 8:29
> To: moq_discuss@moq.org
> Subject: MD: Re: Heidegger
>
>
> Hi Chris,
>
> thanks a lot for the pretty much articulated and complete reply.
> Which again
> leaves me with some questions :)
>
> Chris:
>
> >thanks for the comments, I here address your questions/points in reverse
> order... :-) In passing note that the >MOQ-Pirsig object/subject dichotomy
> reflects object-oriented thinking whereas the MOQ-Pirsig emphasis
> on quality
> >and discernement reflects more relational thinking.
>
> >(1) Nazis, Heidegger, heavy-metal ontologies vs 'truth'.
> >I think these all occupy the same general space mentally. This
> space covers
> 'truth', quantitative precision. The >emphasis is on precise, clear,
> identification; the 'point' or the 'dot', the ONE. The stronger
> the emphasis
> >to identify precisely so the stronger the behaviour to take no
> prisoners :-)
>
> Here and in the following of (1), you go through a very detailed and rich
> picture of heavy-metal ontologies. Right from the start, it seems
> that you would
> include in this class of ontologies all those that insist on precision and
> (absolute, non-local) truth. This would include most philosophical systems
> appeared insofar, wouldn't it (check the belief in A.T. of many
> subscribers of
> this list, followers to diverse western philosophers). Also, I am
> curious how
> does Heidegger fit in here, given the importance he gives to
> interpretation and
> finiteness of being. (I would have thought Heidegger was
> *against* the idea of
> absolute, precise truth).
>
Heidegger was concerned with the 'pureness' of being as are most western
philosophers. Any emphasis on ontology is immediately tied to single context
thinking, there is a degree of fascism in all of us :-) That part of us that
is single context is also that part of us that asserts a *particular*
interpretation, the 'true' interpretation, the 'one' over all others, and
with that process comes a lot of aspects all of which relate to single
context, objectification, precision, the 'dot' and so on all very LOCAL
concepts.
Emphasising the importance of interpretation forces a single context
perspective and with that 'pops up' us vs them distinctions etc etc
Heidegger's attraction to the artist more than the scientist reflected his
attraction to 'the one'. That attraction can easly lead to 'tolerance' of a
context that was also interested in establishing 'the one'.
> Chris:
> >Once identified the identification holds 'forever' (eternal).
> there is thus an
> emphasis to SAMENESS, a dislike of >contextual change but an attraction to
> 'newness', new toys, dislike of left-overs [all very robust, forceful,
> >'male' :-) and at the same time 'child'-like] The 'newness'
> emphasis also ties
> to the 'one', the latest and so best of
> >something I know of or have.
>
> [...]
> Yes. BTW, absolute truths are eternal truths. That doesn't add
> anything in a
> sense;
it just emphasises one of the aspects of single context thinking, a GROUND,
a START position with no end and so an archetypal bias that includes time as
being 'eternal'. Children think like this when they are 3 or 4.
but I think the idea of eternal truths (absolute w.r.t.
> time) is possibly
> even hardly defendable than that of contextless truths (absolute w.r.t.
> contexts).
>
:-) in single context thinking the fundamentalism associated with it
entangles the text/context distinctions, 'all is one' emphasis and so a
source for 'contextless' truths e.g. '1'. Perhaps it is more that the
context is IMPLICITLY considered as infinite and so ignorable, no matter
what context, '1' is '1'. This favours 'purist' thinking.
<snip>
> your picture is in fact *too* general, too much zoomed out, too
> much about the
> form of thought to be applicable to discuss issues at the much
> finer-grained
> level that we have in the MOQ - perhaps you're looking on
> philosophy from too
> far to even distinguish the MOQ as something different from
> something else,
> except maybe qualifying it as more relational than other metaphysics.
>
Then you miss the point -- what I talk about IS general in that it is
neurology based and we use metaphors to particularise. In MOQ or any other
discipline all your expressions are pre-determined in form, you are talking
about the SAME patterns using DIFFERENT words. There is an emphasis on the
words being the meaning, they are not, they are the carriers of meaning, a
meaning FELT by us all and created by the processing of object/relationship
distinctions.
Since as a species we all use the SAME template to assert 'meaning', then to
identify 'truths' you need to look at the methodology used to derive it and
that is not fundmentally based on the use of logic or rhetoric etc since
these are linked to unconscious associations of words to feelings and in
particular the set of feelings contained by the method of analysis of the
brain and that method is making object/relationship distinctions and
applying the distinctions recursively to get more 'detail'.
MOQ is an implicit structure reflecting the patterns of object/relationship
distinctions as made by the brain. The particularisation process links the
MOQ with a lexicon of seemingly MOQ-only terminologies and so terms that
objectify MOQ, turn it into a discipline.
BUT the words are just sounds/symbols that point to the SAME feelings; in
all disciplines the FEELING of wholeness is generally the same. Local
nuances allow for variations, 'novel' associations etc but the feeling is
the same.
In any discipline we will use 1:many dichotomisations, we will use the
local/general dichotomy, the quantitative/qualitative dichotomy, the
object/relationship dichotomy and so on. The particular terms all map to the
SAME general set of feelings. Thus analysis of the concepts of 'local',
'quantitative', 'object' etc etc will bring out '1' type biases as compared
to the concepts of 'general' or 'qualitative' or 'relationship' bring out
the 'many' type biases.
When we analyse the template in detail we find that we use the template at
all scales of analysis. Thus your reference to "your picture is in fact
*too* general, too much zoomed out, too much about the form of thought to be
applicable to discuss issues at the much finer-grained level that we have in
the MOQ" is in fact false.
The template was identifed at the general level and then refined in that the
process of recursion leading to complexity/chaos and with this emerges the
SAME GENERAL patterns with local nuances derived from the development of a
context that can support them.
These 'novel' expressions are in fact contained in the method that created
them from the start, they do not 'pop' out of nowhere (as many seem to
believe).
What the material does bring out is illusions/delusions in thinking in that
at times the so-called 'fine grain' is false based on fundamental
misconceptions. Given the fundamentals,which allow for 'misconceptions' in
that they can possible lead to a 'novel' survival path within a local
context, we can work backwards and identify a 'better' path.
> (It really seems to be as much zoomed out as zoomed in, as I will
> say below, of
> course it is the same - zoom in onto basic principles of the
> brain = zoom out
> onto general shapes of thoughts).
There is a structure in all of this. Initial distinctions are A/~A,
oppositional. Keep going and the next distinction introduces
particular/general patterns that combined with the A/~A distinctions lead to
an emerging cooperative emphasis. Next level of distinction deals with
energy usage, proactive/reactive dichotomy.
>
>
<snip>
> The "flocking" concept seems to me roughly equivalent to the idea
> of emerging
> properties in systems theory (isn't it?), unless you mean
> neighborhood in a
> strictly geometric terms, as I believe was meant in the
> "original" use of the
> term flocking for migrating gnus, birds, etc. A part of the system always
> interacts with (is influenced by) only some other parts of the system
> (neighborhood). Applying this to truth... that appears
> interesting because it
> throws the (usual) concept of (human-intellectual) truth in the
> social realm,
> where I also believe it belongs.
>
Yes... but there is the retention of individual 'truths'. The flocking
behavior, based on making local distinctions, allows for the emergence of
patterns that are not directly linked to individuals. These patterns can
become 'socal' truths, 'univeral' truths if they become strongly
established, if the context can support them over long timespans.
> Chris:
> >The entanglement of the local/non-local in the form of our brain
> hemispheres
> etc combined with the oscillation process >in our brain that helps us to
> 'collapse' BOTH/AND states into EITHER/OR states introduces
> 'fleeting' truths --
>
> >something is there and then it is gone...but it WAS there, absolutely :-)
> >Overall the assertion of an absolute truth outside of the local
> is not possible
> using the traditional methods we use to >analyse. The moment we move into
> non-local analysis so there is a loss of resolution at the explicit, local
> >level, we have to identify by implication and in heavy-metal
> ontologies that is
> not satisfactory! :-) Note that the shift >from local to
> non-local is a shift
> from precision to approximation and we get concepts such as the
> Uncertainty
> >Principle or the Incompleteness theorem. As such these can be
> applied to truth
> determination especially when we try to >step out of the local
> box. Imagine the
> brain as a huge eye. This brain, like the eye, consists of a
> highly precision
> >oriented, high detail, FM-like bandwidth, 'center' (called the fovea)
> surrounded by a low bandwidth (AM-like), rough >detail but good
> pattern matching
> (edge detection etc) part (Called the parafovea). Imagine
> overlaid on this is a
> >giant ear with the same components, one part high detail and the
> other rough.
>
> >
> > LOCAL distinctions fall within the range of the detail - the
> fovea for the
> > eye; non-local falls into the range of the parafovea. Non-local
> will thus
> > always be 'fuzzy', distorted, out of focus but also informative
> (e.g. use of
> > peripheral
> > vision to pick up forms that the fovea misses). Now abstract these
> > distinctions to information processing in general where the
> neural parts of
> > the sensory cortices are also used in abstract thought. Do you 'get the
> > picture'? :-)
>
> As a single comment on your specific positions, it seems to me,
> you are not
> proving (provide arguments) that precise non-local reasoning is
> impossible (or
> perhaps that it is an absurd concept).
In our current methodology it isnt. The closest we come to non-local
reasoning is intuitions, based on experience. The precision of local
thinking is linked to the determination of SAMENESS and sameness is not
precisely determinable in non-local realms. It is like the distinction of
syntax, of CORRECT order vs grammar that is more correct FORM based on the
linking of various elements to produce a good paragraph etc etc
Consider Cantor's demonstration of transfinite numbers. Ordinal transfinites
have a totally different arithmatic than Cardinal transfinites. The Cardinal
transfinites, derived from the concept of sets, deals with SIZE, with
exagerations of differences. There is no ordinality in this and to reason
you need ordinality. (logic has order IF A then B, spoken/written word has
ORDER, left-to-right, or right-to-left.) These properties, of ordinality and
cardinality in transfinites reflect a more LOCAL bias to ordinality since
you need PRECISION, an object, a discrete, emphasis. Sets etc are not so
'ordered' (until you get into ordered pairs etc this reflects our mental
oscillations where we use both biases in our maps).
Cardinality is more associated with non-local thinking, it is like a field
of 'random' dots of varying sizes, there is no rigid order, but there are
possible 'patterns', intuitive 'spreads' of dots that suggest 'something'.
'traditional' logic, mathematics, object assertion, syntax processing are
all tied to a more LOCAL perspective but within these we also find
local/non-local distinctions, the discrete/continuous dichotomy.
The fundamental distinction in the context of reasoning is that reasoning
MUST HAVE ORDINALITY. Non local reasoning is more intuitive and as such is
not really accepted as 'reasoning' :-) Note how an intuitive identification
is an indentification that reflects RESONANCE. This is very wave-like and
the non-local IS the realm of waves.
>From a neurological perspective, that part of our mind associated with
ordinality happens to be that part of our mind that favours internal
linkage; the formation of the 'one', coming to a POINT.
That part of our mind that is more cardinal in expression happens to be that
part of the mind associated with external linkage; the joining of the POINTS
and so an emphasis of the space in-between the dots as well as the
exageration of aspects of dots.
I will stop here, there is a bit to consider in the above and I hope the
above shines some light on local vs non-local reasoning etc
Best,
------------------
Chris Lofting
websites:
http://www.eisa.net.au/~lofting
http://www.ozemail.com.au/~ddiamond
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