Andrea,
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-moq_discuss@venus.co.uk
> [mailto:owner-moq_discuss@venus.co.uk]On Behalf Of Andrea Sosio
> Sent: Thursday, 15 February 2001 6:21
> To: moq_discuss@moq.org
> Subject: Re: MD RE: Re: Heidegger
>
<snip>
> I'm a bit confused here. It is probably due to the fact that I regard
> emphasizing interpretation as something that is closely
> related to stating that truths are context-dependant,
uummm... more so that the truths validate the particular context and as such
that WHOLE system is interpreted as THE system and then GENERALISED,
attempts to make it 'universal'.
When discussing ontologies we naturally qualify them 'mine' 'yours' 'MH' etc
and that emphasises the LOCAL nature of identifying and asserting
ontologies.
which is
> probably not the
> case with MH. Anyway, since you often mention "childlike
> thinking", perhaps I
> can clear some of my perplexity if I just plain ask you whether
> you would regard
> all or most western philosophy to be childish in this sense.
>
Yes. The children grow up into adults who still play with toys :-) Western
traditions have supported the child-like perspective of a belief in an
infinite, eternal supply of resources etc.
'child' cultures use resources at an alarming rate and the attitude is part
of the education process and that is linked to the training of the eductors
etc
<snip>
> Then I miss the point twice, because it also seems to me that you
> are actually
> agreeing with my point. Since from your PoV MOQ is talking "about the same
> patterns using different words", from that PoV there is nothing
> you can say
> about MOQ that you couldn't as well say on any other discipline,
No, the patterns are GENERAL. I have stressed before that local nuances can
'add' some colour that any other discipline may not as yet have covered.
Thus analysis of MOQ can shed light on some other discipline and the
reverse. The template process can identify very quickly where that link is
and how to re-interpret it using MOQ lexicon or some other.
Since the template is across the species so all expressions act as
context-linked expressions of the 'pure' template; we get variations on a
general theme that we can use to refine the theme etc etc
The 'value' of the discipline is how much it can contribute vs other
disciplines. If the MOQ is 'correctly' structured then it can develop a
large following since it 'resonates' so well with the underlying template.
If it is 'poorly' structured then the template can act to point to areas of
weakness etc To go beyond the 'local' you need a cognitive mapping.
> or if you say
> anything about the MOQ, this will be, in a sense, at the "wrong"
> abstraction
> level. BTW, my overall perplexity towards a neurological-based approach to
> philosophy is that, although I agree that brain workings are,
> roughly speaking,
> the "implementation" of mind, the domain of discourse is
> different if you talk
> about brain and about mind. Comparing dogs and quarks is just as
> useless as
> comparing apples to oranges,
Wonderful example of 'BETWEEN' thinking; you are working from a cardinality
perspective - SIZE comparisons, I am talking 'WITHIN' thinking, an
ordinality perspective, SEQUENCE! :-)
so to speak, even if dogs happen to
> be somehow made
> up of quarks. Dogs are systems and a dog trainer is interested in emerging
> system properties, not in the properties of the subatomic
> particles dogs are
> made of.
Note your SIZE emphasis in your arguement. That is an error in that we are
talking about unconscious/preconscious distinctions that *directly* affect
your thinking and your expression.
(see Libet's work on conscious reactions to unconscious processes). IOW
levels just under consciousness and, as I have stated, we use the same
process in conscious expressions such that you can see where an arguement is
going :-)
Especially so if these are the same that comprise frogs,
> beetles, and
> rhynos. Speaking of universal, underlying thought structures, as
> you seem to do,
> is definitely interesting in its own right, but since these structures are
> common to MOQ and almost-anything-else, they have little
> relevance to someone
> who is interested in MOQ, where this interest relates to
> comparing MOQ to other
> disciplines and evaluating the *differences* between them.
>
At the underlying level there are no differences and that level of sameness
acts to guide the identification of the differences at the 'top' level. For
MOQ to 'work' to become accepted 'universally' it HAS to taken on a specific
form. Template can act to guide that. For ANY discipline if the form is
'correct' then the discipline will be accepted regardless of any 'truth'!
(flat earth beliefs, astrology etc)
> Chris (previous):
> In any discipline we will use 1:many dichotomisations, we will use the
> local/general dichotomy, the
> quantitative/qualitative dichotomy, the object/relationship
> dichotomy and so
> on. The particular terms all map
> to the SAME general set of feelings. Thus analysis of the concepts of
> 'local', 'quantitative', 'object' etc etc
> will bring out '1' type biases as compared to the concepts of
> 'general' or
> 'qualitative' or 'relationship' bring
> out the 'many' type biases.
> When we analyse the template in detail we find that we
> use the template
> at all scales of analysis. Thus
> your reference to "your picture is in fact *too* general, too
> much zoomed
> out, too much about the form of thought
> to be applicable to discuss issues at the much finer-grained
> level that we
> have in the MOQ" is in fact false.
>
> How so? It is probably imprecise, but I don't think it's false.
:-) I was being 'totalist' and so there is either TRUE or FALSE.
> One thing is
> talking about the MOQ in terms of recurring neurobiological-based thought
> patterns. One thing is adopting MOQ terminology and participate
> in a discussion
> to defend or attack propositions made in that terminology within the MOQ
> context, or attack MOQ itself from an extended
> general-metaphysics context. My
> opinion was that the neurobiological perspective cannot add much
> in this second
> kind of discussion, at least if it is (only) applied to the MOQ
> itself, from a
> MOQ- and metaphysics-external context.
>
The neurobiological perspective acts to GROUND the discipline. If you can
map neurological to cognitive to MOQ so you give the discipline 'depth'.
> Chris:
> The template was identifed at the general level and then
> refined in that the
> process of recursion leading to
> complexity/chaos and with this emerges the SAME GENERAL
> patterns with local
> nuances derived from the
> development of a context that can support them.
> These 'novel' expressions are in fact contained in the method that
> created them from the start, they do
> not 'pop' out of nowhere (as many seem to believe).
> What the material does bring out is illusions/delusions
> in thinking in
> that at times the so-called 'fine grain'
> is false based on fundamental misconceptions. Given the
> fundamentals,which
> allow for 'misconceptions' in
> that they can possible lead to a 'novel' survival path within a local
> context, we can work backwards and identify
> a 'better' path.
>
> This is pretty interesting, and I agree. Again, you seem to be doing
> meta-metaphysics here. I also whole heartedly agree that what we
> lack, and would
> benefit from, is such a meta-metaphysics prior to any
> metaphysics. Also, there
> is plenty of meta-metaphysics PoVs to choose from or adopt simultaneously
> (neurobiological, historical, etc.)
>
no.. historical and neurological are not 'equals', history develops OUT OF
the neurology (note the SEQUENCE emphasis). Hmmm.. this IS interesting in
your style of arguement reflect a more 'cardinal' perspective - 'set a'
compared to 'set b'; again a BETWEEN emphasis... do you notice this or is it
just me! :-)
<snip>
> Premise:
> - One who believes in logic as a means to establish absolute
> truth acts within
> the delusion that his/her logic is not a context, or is contextless, or is
> infinite-context. Common sense associates the idea of a context
> to a set of
> unspoken premises. The absolute-truth-supporter (let me call ATS
> this mythical
> figure) will claim that certain truths have no need for unspoken premises.
>
> My point, as regards context-dependence of truths, is that there
> really are
> underlying, unspoken "premises", although the idea of "premises" itself is
> misleading. Premises are assumed to be of the same nature of the
> propositions of
> which one may debate truthfulness. This is not actually my point,
> and I will use
> the term "premises" as an approximation. I feel these "premises"
> are hidden
> within language and the dynamics of language interpretation. My belief is
> supported by indirect arguments. I just look at the philosophy
> crytics. At the
> history of debates over what some philosopher "really" meant to
> say. Each such
> debate clearly reveal the cultural context where it took place.
> To me, it is
> naive to associate these differences in interpretation to "progress", like
> philosophical discussion is a purely logical process, and more
> recent thinkers
> comment Plato in a new way just because we have "discovered more" (either
> philosophically, historically, and so on). I see something much
> more subtle and
> unspeakable in the general being-another-context working behind
> the scenes, and
> much similar to the way my inconscious and your inconscious,
> being different,
> will always prevent us from understanding each other completely.
>
> Your point seems to be that "truth" is a name for a feeling of
> sameness. Nothing
> cannot feel true other than because it feels the same as
> something else - hence,
> there simply can be no end to the "implies" chain. (BTW, "it
> feels the same as"
> means a feeling of sameness or sameness of feelings? :-)
Always 1:many where the many is variable. Thus the ONE feeling to ONE or
more sameness identifications
This is
> thus a much
> more structural attack to the concept of truth than mine (which
> is admittedly
> just a feeling/opinion, so a very weak "attack" at all). I still
> feel your point
> is not proven, in my view, or more precisely, what I miss is to
> know how does
> this sameness feeling come up. Why some
> things feel the same and some don't.
Ownership. We can trace the source of the feeling to our animal ancestors
identifying their territory. The waypoint mapping technique discussed
previously is an acceptable source for the origin of the feeling of 'truth';
the feeling originates in identification of SELF, the same part of our brain
linked to single context, 'us' vs 'them' distinctions as well as the 'need'
to make clear, precise identifications.
best,
Chris.
------------------
Chris Lofting
websites:
http://www.eisa.net.au/~lofting
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