Hi Elephant and all,
> Jonathan, sorry for the delay....
Actually, I think everyone is ignoring our little discussion. I myself find it
interesting and revealing.
>From everything else you've written, I think our world views are pretty
similar, so I am genuinely interested to get to the bottom of our disagreement
on Truth vs. Existence. Furthermore, I recognize your professional credentials
as a philosopher, and am trying to learn from you. (All I have is a
misleadingly named scientific research degree;-).
ELEPHANT:
> >> your claim that
> >> we can make an infinity of true and untrue statements about *what* we
> >> perceive is in fact false ...[cut to new post] because there is
> no existence to the (static) object apart from the statements we make about
> it. If objects are what they are in virtue of our intellectualisations
> ('object' being a term in grammar), then it follows that saying new things
> isn't describing the same object differently, but talking about something
> entirely different.
So when I say "that horse has four legs", and later "the horse is running",
I'm not describing the same object?
I sort of see your point, but it seems that the Greeks resolved change vs.
consistency even before Plato. The horse can sit down, and but it is still the
same horse.
ELEPHANT
> In connection with this problem I direct you to the
> following passages in Plato's Theaetetus: 187 - 190, and 208 - 209. Plato
> riducules the empiricist idea that what makes it still 'the same' object
> that we are judging differently about is that there is some special
> 'impression' which an object makes on our mental wax. In my opinion this
> ridicule is exactly what the confused empiricist point of veiw deserves. In
> my opinion, also, Kripke's account of the acquistion of "rigid designation"
> is no less laughable. You cannot appeal to causal interactions between
> objects in an account which is supposed to explain what it is to be an
> object or to be designated or be referred to.
I can't compete with your knowledge of Plato, and I agree that his forms vs.
appearances is relevant here. However, I remind you that Phaedrus of ZAMM ends
up treating Plato as a villain. Frankly, I doubt that any of us fully
understand what Plato really meant, but the effects of his writings on modern
man are definitely not all positive.
I am also ignorant about Kripke, and don't really understand your attack on
empiricism - the reference to "causal intereactions" makes it sound like an
attack on positivism, not empiricism. Please comment.
ELEPHANT:
> >> Existence, alteast with SQ entities like subjects and objects, is a
> >> consequence of our intellectualising in pursuit of quality.
> JONATHAN:
> > This view does not fit with the way Pirsig describes the experience of
sitting
> > on a hot stove.
>
> ELEPHANT:
> Why not? I always thought this was the *only* veiw that could fit with
> Pirsig's account of the experience of sitting on a hot stove. Could you say
> a bit more to help me out here - at the momnet you're just asserting that
> I'm contradicting Pirsig, and not telling me how it is that I'm supposed to
> be doing this.
I think that P. means simply that the "reality" of the experience comes into
existence before the intellectualization.
Only later comes he formulation of the experience into Object (hot stove) and
Subject (the unfortunate "experiencer").
> ELEPHANT:
> >> Existence, alteast with SQ entities like subjects and objects, is a
> >> consequence of our intellectualising in pursuit of quality.
>
> JONATHAN:
> > This is only a true if the division between subject and object is
considered a
> > PREREQUISITE for existence. That would seem to fit the definition of SOM.
I
> > believe that Pirsig has rejected this starting point repeatedly,
consistently
> > and unambigously in both of his novels.
>
> ELEPHANT:
> I just don't understand that comment at all. Obviously being an object or a
> subject is essential for SQ existence, because that's pretty much what being
> static amounts to.
I STRONGLY DISAGREE. The division between S and O is contextual. I am a
subject to myself, an object to you. Is "an experience" a subject or an
object, and if so, can it have an SQ existence (I say yes)? I still like to
think of DQ as potential and SQ as realized potential, with the REALization as
the cutting edge of existence (an ontology, if you like).
> In saying this I am, as Pirsig does, making the
> Static/Dynamic cut first, and the Subject/Object cut second (S/O isn't my
> "starting point" any more than it is Pirsig's. That I make the S/O cut
> doesn't make me a SOMist, any more than it makes Pirsig a SOMist. Do please
> explain (I repeat): exactly *how* am I at varients with Pirsig?
>
Pirsig certainly allows the S/O cut, but you are making it obligatory, and
furthermore, using it to underpin existence itself. As I said before (about
Truth), the S/O cut is a CONSEQUENCE of existence and not a cause.
Any clearer?
Respectfully yours,
Jonathan
(PS. To all lurkers - any comments?)
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