Hi all,
===========
postmodernism
===========
Platt,
this split rationalists vs. humanists is as old as the western philosophy. IMHO
saying that the question "How should we live?" is postmodern is a bit
misleading. As reaction to the Aristotelian rationalism , during the Hellenistic
age, we had Stoicism, Epicureans, Cynicism. Those philosophers, often deriving
part of their thoughts from the Sophists, had exactly humankind and ethics as
their focus.
Actually, the (IMO wrong) split between rationalists and humanists went along
the whole history of western thought. Sometimes there is the prominence of the
scientific view, sometimes there is the prominence of the humanistic view. Maybe
the MOQ is an attempt to reconcile this views: it is highly empirical, but
assumes value as the primal empirical experience, claiming, for that, to be more
inclusive than the S/O thinking. Probably, from a SOMish viewpoint, Pirsig is
closer to postmodernism (the accusation of emotivism) but really IMHO there's a
difference. The MOQ finds ethical answers for the human activity without falling
in relativism.
> Second, Pirsig doesn't identify postmodernism as a separate thought
> system on a par with SOM as does the author of the paper noted
> above, making me wonder how he (Pirsig) would treat the
> postmodernist emphasis on values and whether he would find
> postmodernist thought morally bankrupt in spite of the lip service it
> pays to qualities over quantification.
Yes, but in any case it seems to me that the MOQ has nothing to deal with
postmodern relativisms. Actually, Pirsig starts from the Empiricists (from the
Occam's razor up to William James). IMO his focus on the scientific view and the
SOM is because he identifies the SOMish thinking as the winner along the
centuries, and because he also is more rationalist than relativist... so he
feels the need to fight the similar.
> Personally I find postmodernism distasteful, primarily because of its
> leftist, socialist, utopian agenda. And I find nothing in the MOQ too
> support the postmodern paradigm. But I could be wrong.
Personally, I find postmodernism distasteful. But saying that it is leftist and
socialist is a bit strange, after you have put both Marx and Nietzsche on this
side. A Socialist Nietzsche is somewhat bizarre. On the other hand, the very
rationalist Enlightenment seems also leftist, isn't it? I think that relativisms
arise periodically in answer to the SOMish (value free) failures. What I don't
like in postmodern ages, is the usual replacement of science and rationalism
with occultism, irrationality and cultural relativism. Anyway, as of course
those things don't work, cyclically the rational thinking takes again the scene.
========
meta-levels
========
Bo:
> We have discussed this before Marco, haven't we?
Oh yes Bo, and hope you are not too angry with this Latin tormenter :-)
> My concession to your view is that the Q-idea
> IS an intellectual pattern, but in the
> process of "starting on a purpose of its own".
Yes, Bo, and on this point we had a sort of (weak) agreement. I was answering to
the (IMO wrong) idea of a meta-level. I see a big danger of elitism in this sort
of custom to see the MOQ as *superior*, and the SOM as *blind*. And your
argument of the logical knot in answer to Platt falls IMHO in this wrong custom.
Platt wrote:
> My question is: As a general principle would be correct to
> state that whatever we recognize and give a name to, such
> as "subject" and "object," can only be accomplished from
> a level higher than what is recognized and named?
hmmmm. I see that Bo does not agree on that, but, yes, IMO "giving things a
name" is an intellectual activity. But IMO there's no need of a meta-level.
Intellect has in its availability all what's below and all what's at its level.
My example of the links on a PC was trying to show that reason doesn't work like
the inorganic level and that the box analogy is misleading.
> In other words, is it correct to assume that the existence
> of a meta-intellect is necessary in order for us to recognize
> and discuss Q-intellect (reason)?
So, as we are right now discussing the meta-level, are we on a meta-meta-level?
:-) Intellect is recursive, so there's no need of a meta level to discuss
reason. I can describe your ideas, and you can describe my ideas. No boxes, just
links... and no logical problems.
The box logic is IMO very objective. It is perfect to discuss the physical
properties of matter, but it becomes a disaster in the attempt to investigate
the upper levels. Cultures and worldviews have no mass or weight, and no *box*
will contain them.
John showed lately, quoting Wilber, " Hegel maintained that the central defining
characteristic of Reason (vision-logic) was its capacity to unify opposites and
see identity in difference." Yes. I think this shows that we don't need larger
boxes to contain different concepts. We just need a wider view.
Thank you all
Marco
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