Platt and all,
A useful summary, Platt. For myself I am a bit unhappy to be seen as
straddling the MOQ/SOM divide, though on reflection I may come to see that
as a compliment. Some brief comments.
On Glenn: "For Glenn DQ is a myth that's identified with all that is
mysterious and then called an explanation." If this is Glenn's position I
strongly agree. I more and more see DQ as meaningless as Pirsig presents it,
other than as a pointer to the immediacy and primacy of our experiences of
quality. I see my stance as more and more parallel to William James. In that
sense I agree with Pirsig that the MOQ "is a form of pragmatism ... which
says the test of the true is the good ...[as evidenced in] direct everyday
experience." (Lila Ch 29)
Platt's take is that "DQ is as good an explanation as any science offers for
original events that result in new patterns, such as self-consciousness
emerging from neuronic jitters and life from pond scum." I take the point,
in one sense, though a term that can mean almost anything one likes is not
terribly explanatory, in my view.
On Magnus, quoting SODV: "Quality is not a thing. It is an event. It
is the event at which the subject becomes aware of the object. And
because without objects there can be no subject, quality is the event at
which awareness of both subjects and objects is made possible.
Quality is not just the result of a collision between subject and object.
The very existence of subject and object themselves is deduced from
the Quality event." Then Magnus is reported to state that "each pattern is a
subject from its own point of view." I find the SODV attitude pretty
realistic, but would argue that only patterns resident in living things can
sensibly be regarded as "subjects", and that probably only a few of those
would qualify. Indeed, one of my battles in these debates has been to honour
the subject as 'agent', even if the unified 'little man' in the head is
simplistic.
Wilber, in A Theory of Everything, says, "the importance of the self as the
navigator of the great River of Life should not be overlooked. It appears
that the self is not a monolithic entity but rather a society of selves with
a center of gravity, which acts to bind the multiple waves, states, streams
and realms into something of a unified organization; the disruption of this
organization, at any of its general stages, can result in pathology." (p54)
This at least picks up on themes I find significant.
Bo seems well represented, to me, by the words "Bo admits to "having had
some 'Phaedrus experience' of (his) own" and has "accepted the Quality idea"
that puts one "in a different universe" where the ancient divisions of
observer/world, mind/matter, ideas/reality and map/terrain simply don't
exist and therefore can't be used to argue against the MOQ." While Bo seems
unimpressed by the mystic message, as best I can understand his position it
seems to stem from more of an 'enlightenment' experience than from a
reasoned metaphysics. But possibly this is doing him an injustice.
While I largely agree with your summary of my position, Platt, I am, as you
know, divided by my instinctive attraction to the mystic understanding of
how the subject/object divide might be transcended, while currently having
very little experience on which I might base a stronger argument. In other
words, I am attracted intellectually and emotionally by the 'lure' of
quality in mystic accounts, yet have not encountered such quality in my own
experiences, nor do I know that they are actually possible for me. In a
sense I have a foot in both camps. I attempt to remain pragmatic in this
uncomfortable position.
I will be interested in other reactions to your balanced review.
John B
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