Wim, John, All
> My (30/10 15:28 +0100) disappointment with Wilber's thinking (for
> being based in a metaphysics which presupposes controversial
> parts) is indeed based in the Popperian idea that a more testable
> hypothesis is better than a less testable one. I am not clear
> however what point you are trying to make with your posting of
> 2/11 11:01 -0500.
> (On the other hand, I am
> disappointed with Wilber's thinking -as reproduced by Frank
> Visser- in that it is based in a metaphysics which presupposes
> and therefore takes beyond the realm of rational testing a lot of
> the most controversial parts: the existence of a spectrum of
> consciousness that is rooted in different irreducable spheres of
> reality.)
The Popperian idea or point I was trying to convey is from his 1958
essay titled "Metaphysics and Criticizability" were he argues that
fundamental philosophical (and metaphysical) concepts such as
determinism, idealism, irrationalism, voluntarism, and nihilism are all
irrefutable. "Although [he] considers each one of these five theories to
be false"
His most basic claim of "testability" is that a hypothesis be
falsifiable. Which requires that the hypothesis be a "restricted"
existential statement because, "A strict or pure existential statement
applies to the whole universe, and it is irrefutable simply because
there can be no method by which it could be refuted. For even if we were
able to search our entire universe... [the proof, one way or another ]
might always be hiding in a place where we were not looking."
He then goes on to characterize theories as three types:
"First, logical and mathematical theories"
"Second, empirical and scientific theories"
"Third, philosophical or metaphysical theories"
He claims that only the first and second are ammenable to "testablity"
or "falsifiablity" by empirical or logical methods but that the third
type may be rationally criticized none the less because, "In other words
every rational theory, no matter whether scientific or philosophical, is
rational in so far as it tries to solve certain problems. A theory is
comprehensible and reasonable only in its relation to a given problem
situation and it can be rationally discussed only by discussing this
relation. ... Now if we look upon a theory as a proposed solution to a
set of problems, then the theory immediately lends itself to critical
discussion-even if it is non-empirical and irrefutable."
And in the end I think his rational criteria at the third
(philosophical) level for selecting one theory over another circles
back around to a basic MoQ criteria "Is it Good?"
If we read on in the essay Popper suggests, " For we can asked the
questions such as: Does it solve the problem? Does it solve it better
that other theories? Has it perhaps merely shifted the problem? Is the
solution simple? Is it fruitful? Does it perhaps contradict other
philosophical theories needed for solving other problems?"
So when you ask for some kind of "rational testing... of the most
controversial parts" of a metaphysics, Popper suggests that "good"
critical discussion is all you can reasonably and rationally expect to
get. And that this is "Good" enought.
3WD
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