Roger,
In response to Platt's counterargument to my earlier points, you say "a
major benefit of the MOQ is that it is a metaphysics that can logically
derive a 'ought' from an 'is'. What exists is quality/value, and therefore
values of all types -- including morals -- are legitimate, rational,
logically consistent fields of inquiry."
Basically I agree with you, and certainly see this as Pirsig's big
contribution to metaphysics. However, as I pointed out before, Pirsig
recognises more than one 'source' of quality/value, and so the apparent
simplicity of his system is lost. In the hot stove example, Pirsig makes
clear that "low quality ... is an experience". In my view this is a summary
of one of his understandings of quality. It is profound, and probably has
never been stated so simply before, but it is hardly novel. Paul Goodman was
arguing something very similar in the late 1940s. And of course Pirsig
himself acknowledges his debt to Eastern mystic traditions dating back
thousands of years.
When Pirsig argues, though, that intellectuals must temper their quality to
the well-being of the social realm, he introduces a new standard. This is
not an experiential awareness of quality. This is a reasoned debate about
whether or not the proposed idea will support social values against
biological values or vice versa, and then a 'moral' imperative to act in
support of the social. Different ball game entirely. And when at the end of
Lila he suggests "if you manage to absorb it [Karma] and not pass it on,
that's the highest moral conduct of all", he is pointing to yet a third
yardstick for defining what is good, that seems remarkably close to
traditional Christian theology.
You respond that "the intellectual solution is to find patterns that are in
harmony across the greatest span and depth. With depth in this case
redefined in MOQ terms. The problem is solvable with the proper model.
(Which in our case is a combination of Pirsig's MOQ and Wilber's span/depth
idea) This is morality."
I again tend to agree with you, but yet again I wonder do you see the point
I am making about the different realms of quality that Pirsig seems to refer
to, and seemingly gets away with due to having hypnotised us into accepting
that quality cannot be defined? I am arguing that by setting up different
understandings of how quality is perceived, he also allows for conflicts
between these different understandings of quality. And when a situation
arises where I have a real 'eureka' insight, a top quality idea that excites
me, and I just know it is quality - how then do I turn around and check its
support for social values as against biological values. They are two
different ways of being in the world. And if they clash, which is right?
So I'm not disagreeing with your synthesis of Pirsig and Wilber, which is
fair enough. But our topic is to separate "patterns of higher quality", and
I'm arguing that Pirsig himself points to three different understandings of
what these might be, and they are not always going to be compatible.
John B
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