>===== Original Message From moq_discuss@moq.org =====
>\
ERIN:
Let's say someone who believed the world was flat (KNOWLEDGE?) was just given
some evidence that the world is round (INFORMATION?). Wouldn't INFORMATION
increase the certainty of some knowledge (world is round) while decreasing the
certainty of other knowledge (world is flat)?
ROGER:
>The opinion that the word is flat would lead to error. At least some
>predictions based upon this would fail. Any social organization (Us vs USSR
>let's say) or intellectual pattern that espoused a flat earth would be at a
>serious disadvantage... especially when launching satellites.
>
>ERIN >No of course they are not equal. But because you are basing your
>predictions on a range of possiblities isn't it still part of knowledge?
>
>ROG:
>Your initial question seemed to contend that within my definition knowledge
>does not increase when we learn something of value, if we drop something of
>lower value ie gain in knowledge of round earth comes at expense of knowledge
>of flat earth. I disagree that this is the effect. The effect is to gain
>knowledge of an idea with value AND to gain knowledge of an idea with low
>value. You learn of two theories and their relative values. Knowledge and
>survival/quality increase. This relates to my comments to Horse. Even
>knowledge of noise is knowledge, as you know where the noise is/isn't.
>
ERIN: Isn't my first statement saying that? It is the weights of the knowledge
that change (certainty= weight) not a replacement of knowledge. So
information would lead to a change in weights of knowledge, right?
>ERIN:
>In the website Cybernetica Principia that you had mentioned I came across an
>article that expresses what I was trying to say. The article is called
>"knowledge and will" Isn't your definition crossing the boundary into will a
>wee bit much (although I do see how both are related).
>
>ROG:
>This article always gets me confused. It seems that Heylighen jumps in with
>both feet into the Cartesian world of I/not I. I refuse to follow him there.
>He separates out the selection mechanism from knowledge and then gets right
>back into the SOM trap. Free will determinism, subject/object etc.
>
>Certainly I agree that the SOM division can be made and can be of value, but
>it's limitations are well known. I lean more toward there being no
>fundamental division between I/Not I and Knowledge/will. So, in answer to
>your Q, YES my definition of knowledge crosses firmly into the realm where
>western philosophers would carve out "will". I make no such carving.
>
>I understand the customary SOM divisions above, but disagree that they are
>fundamental. I DO NOT THINK OF KNOWLEDGE JUST AS A REPRESENTATION IN THE
>MIND. I think of knowledge as that which increases value. The best train
>destination is that which will increase your ability to
>survive/thrive/learn/etc.
>
ERIN: I see what you are saying. I want to go look up an article that talks
about the difference of cognition (thinking) vs metacognition (thinking about
thinking). The author states that Descartes whould have said metacognition
rather than cognito in the phrase "i think therefore i am".
He then talks about it is the same organ that is doing both so there should be
no division.
HMMM (the author's idea applies to us) what if knowledge = cognitive map
(SQ); will = process of updating? exploring? that map (DQ)
I absolutely agree that there doesn't have to be a division BUT I still think
your definition is capturing the WILL better than KNOWLEDGE
ERIN
>
>
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