RE: MD Quality and information theory

From: Jonathan B. Marder (jonathan.marder@newmail.net)
Date: Tue Jan 15 2002 - 17:17:17 GMT


Hi Marco, Magnus, Patrick and all,

Marco, the fact that you have translated some of the MoQ web site into
Italian puts you in the unique position of having carefully read both
Magnus's and my own essays. Thus I greatly value your input. I think
that your sketch of new value patterns emerging from lower levels is
exactly right, and very much in line with what Pirsig wrote on the
relationship between computer software and hardware.

I think that Magnus's "need" to introduce a quantum level into the MoQ
reveals his essentially classical approach of reductionism and
causality. This is inevitable as long as he tries to pin down some
absolute reality out there waiting for him to discover it. This is very
clear from what he writes

MAGNUS (14 Jan 2002)
>Anyway, I would *not* enjoy one moment of merely trying to construct an
>artificial division of reality. I'm trying to *find* the division
that's
>already there. That is, I'm trying to find the metaphysics of our
reality.

That's just my point Magnus. Where are those divisions? Show them to us!

JONATHAN
> Some patterns are easy to classify, but some are too close to
> the boundary [platypi]

MAGNUS
>I also found plenty of them before I straightened out my view of the
MoQ.
>See my essay.

Magnus, that's all very well if you stick to your own examples, but what
about new problems that arise. Do you remember the "Walking is a social
skill" thread from Oct 1999
(http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/9910/index.html). At the
time I was deliberately trying to show that there is no absolute way to
make a division between social and biological patterns. I'd be genuinely
interested in your position on this particular example.

Regarding the specific argument about the need for a quantum level,
Patrick had some interesting comments:

> JONATHAN [nerves transmit signals] without any reference to the fact
that the
> signal may be part of a complicated mathematical calculation, or
> simply
> the signal for a full rectum.
> I don't think we need to go down to quantum mechanics to explain this.

PATRICK
>Irritating example, but you've made your point clear. Surely the brain
>processes information and acts accordingly in some circumstances
>unconsciously, but to be aware of thing you really need QM.

This is the reductionist approach - if you can't find the answer in the
neuronal circuits, dig down deeper to their quantum chemistry.
IMO this is the wrong route. What would a quantum pattern for awareness
look like? I've seen several discussions about nerves which made
extensive use of quantum mechanics jargon, but I've yet to see a real
quantum mechanical EXPLANATION of neurology or psychology.
Also note, that if awareness is dependent on quantum patterns, it is
absolutely dependent on the quantum behaviour of carbon, hydrogen,
oxygen, nitrogen, sulphur and a few other types of atom. This means that
it would be absolutely impossible to recreate an aware system
artificially using silicon chips and copper wire. The same goes for
intelligence.

PATRICK [cont] <<<
The point
is, in your story you leave out such a thing as awareness, you only talk
about neurotransmitters and spiking and whatever. But we DO have
awareness.>>>

I agree, but I also think that the neurons ARE aware on a certain
cellular level, but this very much depends on what you mean by awareness
(see the extensive "Atomic awareness" discussion from last year
(http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/0103/index.html and
http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/0104/index.html
I think that normal human awareness is an emergent property - you won't
see it in the individual bits and bytes of neuronal function.
To make my point, let me ask, is society aware? If so, is there any
human alive who can claim to have access to this awareness? Even more
pointedly, is the stock market aware? Surely you understand the
consequences if an individual had access to the awareness of the stock
market.

PATRICK
<<< After a collision between particles, you can
have two photons emitting from it in opposite directions. And if you
measure one photon's spin, the other one *instantaneously* obtains the
exact opposite spin. O what a mystery; faster than light communication .
But isn't it a mystery than that we can picture such an event, and
indeed comprehend it? We can picture in our minds those photons in
slow-motion emitting from the source, and see them *instantaneously*
obtain opposite spins. How can we do that? That alone suggest that the
mind entails nonlocality somehow.>>>

Patrick, I think it is good to consider real scientific puzzles like the
famous one you mention. Scientists still argue about this particular
one, but IMO the real solution is that neither the wave description nor
the particle description of electromagnetic radiation entirely capture
the essence of what the radiation really is. Thus, there are
contradictions.

...<<<
But okay, here's Hodgson's argument in a slightly different form: Could
you imagine just one 'grandmother'-neuron representing this picture of
these instantaneous events? I think not. So there must be different
neurons in the brain responsible for representing the picture of the
*instantaneous* events in your mind: We can at one moment be aware of
multiple things, and different *spatially seperated* neuronal events
(whatever those may be) must be responsible for that, as I just argued.
So to make our one visual eye and one mind, you need the same so-called
mysterious *instantaneous* correlations as with the *spatially
seperated* photons. The mind entails nonlocality.
Okay, please let me know if *anyone* gets this point. I would surely
appreciate it if I've been able to put across Hodgson's argument. It
can't be so hard, can it? I don't understand why some people are having
such difficulties to understand this. >>>

I think I do understand the argument, but note that you start from the
unstated assumption that there is something absolute and distinct about
proximity vs. non-locality. The implication is that this is an example
of a "division that's already there" (to quote Magnus - see above).
I state that the very concept of non-locality comes from a particular
way of looking at the world.

JONATHAN
> If you follow the movements of a single gas molecule among many, you
> will not be able to tell anything about the movements of the
> population as a whole. [snip] diffusion is an
> emergent property, a pattern in the population but not the individual.

PATRICK
>Yes, that's the standard reply. Believe me, I know. I don't feel like
>getting into this now.

It certainly is not the reply that you would get from the average
person. It takes a fair understanding of thermodynamics to fully
appreciate the point.

PATRICK
>But let me ask you this: Is a gas an emergent
>thing to itself? Does a gas have a first-person point of view?

I can't commune with gas molecules, so can't answer your question. I
think the question has no real meaning.

>Or does a gas only exist in our minds? You can conclude the latter, and
most
>people would like to disagree with that, and so do I. But I think a
>chair only exists in our minds. A chair surely isn't a chair for
itself.
>But what is it, in itself? I don't know.
>Please, let me know if I've made some sense. I would surely appreciate
>some mutual understanding of some sort.

The CONCEPT of a gas, or of a chair certainly does exist in our minds
Patrick, you make your point well and eloquently, and I hope I am doing
as well in answering.

Thanks for the discussion (and to everyone who reads it, and especially
those who can offer new insights).

Take care,

Jonathan

MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net

To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html



This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:01:46 BST