Re: MD truth and reality

From: Platt Holden (pholden@sc.rr.com)
Date: Fri Jan 25 2002 - 15:24:14 GMT


Hi Rick,

> RICK:
> Regardless, what I meant was that while those quotes 'mention' truth,
> they don't 'explain' truth. Simply saying 'truth is an Intellectual
> pattern' doesn't tell us what 'truth' is as Pirsig names several dozen
> Intellectual patterns in LILA. And while that second quote 'defines' the
> 'tests for truth', it also doesn't explain what the 'truth' is... for that,
> you have to go to the quote on p.114 (the one I had in the last post).

Not surprisingly we disagree on what constitutes a definition. But that
particular argument has been going on for centuries. I doubt if we can
settle it here.

> Interstingly enough, if by 'economy of explanation' Pirsig is referring
> to Occam's razor I think you'll find that many scientists would strongly
> disagree with him about it being a criterion for 'truth'. Very often, the
> simplest explanation is NOT the correct one.

Oh? Did you say "correct?" Meaning absolute? If not, how can you
disagree with Pirsig? Today's "correct" complicated explanation may
become tomorrow's more correct simple one. Some scientists, for
instance, consider String Theory is too complicated and too ugly to be
true.

> > PLATT:
> > But if your reference to "systematic" means "logical," and "fact" means
> > "agreement with experience," then indeed we are of like mind and there
> > can be group hugs all around.
>
> RICK:
> Then lets break out the huggin' brother... because this is almost
> precisely what I mean. By 'systematic', I do mean logical... that is,
> 'facts' within a particular truth-system of interpretation must agree with
> each other... if they don't than either the fact is wrong, or some
> interpretitive premise of the system is wrong.
> And while I would probably list 'agreement with experience' as a
> criterion for a 'fact' I wouldn't use that a defintion of the term. Rather,
> I would define a fact as an as-of-yet irrefutable opinion which offers no
> guarantees of remaining so in the future (that is, they are 'provisional',
> like Pirsig says of truths).

Oh geez, we were almost there--huggin' I mean. It's "opinion" that
bothers me. My dictionary says opinion means "belief resting on
grounds insufficient to product certainty." So I take you believe there are
no certain facts, that everything is up for possible refutation, i.e., you
buy into the illogical, self-contradictory stance that "no one can be
certain of anything." And we were so close. . . (-:

> This theory of provisional truth is not original to Pirsig (not even
> close), it's a time-honored view argumentation theorists. As Pirsig was a
> rhetoric professor, I've no doubt that it from this source that he
> appropriated the theory.

Since by your own account "time-honored" doesn't mean valid, I take it
this theory is also provisional. Or are some theories more provisional
than others?

Are these last hurdles between us and a hug insurmountable?

Platt

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