On 24 Mar 2002 at 17:27, Glenn Bradford wrote:
to Sam ("Elizaphanian") who had written
> >Whilst looking at mysticism in Pirsig, I reviewed the part early in
> >Lila where he chooses not to go down the mystical path, and instead
> >write a metaphysics. Two things:
> >- the first is that he is clear that writing a metaphysics is a
> >degenerate activity. Another way of putting that is to say that any
> >metaphysics that is created will inevitably be flawed, or, in
> >parallel with Godel's theorem, if you've got something which is
> >beautifully logically consistent it will be incomplete, or if it
> >(claims to be) complete, it will be inconsistent. It's not open to us
> >to be right about everything (that's why mystics leave perfection to
> >God).
Glenn:
> Pirsig says that writing a metaphysics is a degenerate activity and
> will be flawed, but the flaws he speaks of creep in because the
> intellectual "map" of reality described by a metaphysics falls short
> in depicting the "terrain" of reality. I don't think it's because of
> any parallel with Godel's theorem.
Hi Glenn and Sam.
I noticed the above from Sam, but having harped so much on the map/terrain
issue I decided not to mingle, but who can resist the metaphysics lure?
> If Godel's theorem applies to a metaphysics, it would mean that the
> "map of reality" itself is internally incomplete or inconsistent,
> which is a separate problem from the one of capturing the essence of a
> "terrain" sufficiently. However, the Godel problem is really an
> academic one - a problem in principle, not practicality. No one has
> shown that important theorems in arithmetic are blocked from proof
> because of Godel's theorem. Godel invented an ingenious
> self-referential statement to prove his theorem, but the statement
> itself is relevant only to Godel's theorem, not to the advancement of
> arithmetic.
There has been some talk about Gödel whenever some self-contradiction note
crept into our arguments - by this person too. Finally one who knows what it
says ....and understands its limitations. No sarcasm at all Glenn, I think you
say something important here, but first back to the opening about "writing
metaphysics". Even Pirsig makes it sound like it is a popular pastime among
philosophers, but who - before Pirsig - has undertaken such a task? I know of
no one - in the sense of pointing to an "old" metaphysics that the new was
supposed to replace.
This is what sets Pirsig miles apart. I have referred to Charles Peirce and his
"semiosis metaphysics" and have often pointed to the similarity between the
two, yet Peirce doesn't particularly call the present understanding a SOM, but
otherwise his MOS is helpful in understanding the MOQ. Many see the
German idealists - particularly Liebnitz and Hegel - as constructors of
metaphysics, but likewise they don't point to any faulty mind/matter
(S/O)universe.
Many want Pirsig to be ordinary, as if a modern William James or Northrop or
affirming their own pet writer/thinker, yes even Pirsig goes out of his way to
sound part of a tradition - no wonder taking his past into consideration, but the
MOQ is something unheard of and I wouldn't have invested so much in it if
weren't, I knew from the first moment.
> If a theorem in mathematics is shown to be inconsistent it is almost
> always due to a flaw in logic or some other miscalculation or
> misapplication of mathematics, not a consequence of Godel's thm.
> Godel's theorem can no more be trotted out and used as a blanket
> excuse for mistakes or incompetence in arithmetic as it can for a
> metaphysics (if indeed it even applies to grammars capable of
> describing a metaphysics).
Sounds plausible Glenn, but what do you think about the logic (flaw or not)
that has bothered me all the time, namely that of the MOQ claiming to be an
intellectual pattern and thus a creation of one of its own lesser parts. This
grated my logical nerve until I found a respite in the so-called SOL
interpretation: That the MoQ is something beyond intellect, which in this
context becomes SOM. This alleviates the logic bend but creates a loop, the
MOQ is itself! There is no terrain that a metaphysics is a map of; Its REALITY
itself, full stop. This last is "allowed" (in my logic) but not really satisfactory for
the down-to-earth- people who want it to be a better map.
To say that there is a "terrain" that the SOM divides into S/O and the MOQ
divides into DQ/SQ isn't really right, the Quality=Reality is an unheard of
postulate, nothing can prove it ...except it creating a world that makes sense.
Sam again:
> >- the second is that he indulges in writing a metaphysics because
> >it's fun. (I would also say that it can be practically useful - just
> >as mathematics can be useful even when it is imperfect).
> While it's apparent that some people join this forum because they
> enjoy arguing, I never thought Pirsig wrote Lila for the fun of it. If
> he had fun writing it, a sense of fun didn't shine through the prose.
> It's one of the most humorless novels I've read.
You are right, both about why people join and about Pirsig.
> He would probably say
> that he wrote Lila in part to answer his ZMM critics about the
> vagueness of his Quality ideas and to absorb all the psychic
> loneliness the SOM has wrought on him and provide the world with an
> alternative so that we need not suffer as he did. It doesn't seem he
> was motivated by fun, or even enjoyed the exercise once he got going.
This is also just right.
I became so interested after this remarkable post that I checked on your
earliest entries Glenn, and found that you joined in September 99. by
declaring the intellectual level a problem (within the MOQ) in the sense that it
broke the rule of "composition" (organisms composed of matter, societies
composed of organisms ...etc.) this I guess I protested back then, but you may
have had a new insight ...or?
IMO as always.
Bo
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