Dear Bo,
In your 10/4 9:46 +0200 posting you refer to Pirsig:
'I have chosen to focus on the part where Pirsig speaks about each level
starting as a pattern of the lower "going off on a purpose of its own",
which I find more true moqish than the hardware/software analogy.'
The exact quote is:
'A primary occupation of every level of evolution seems to be offering
freedom to lower levels of evolution. But as the higher level gets more
sophisticated it goes off on purposes of its own.' ('Lila' chapter 12).
Pirsig didn't write (there) that a level (or a pattern) starts as a pattern
of a lower level!
It seems to me that you need another foundation for your idea that the
evolution of value levels is a more or less gradual development and that
every new type of patterns of values starts as a pattern of values of the
previous type and can only be recognized as a new type in retrospect. 'Lila'
may not be clear enough about the discreteness of levels and the borders
between them, butPirsig's annotations in 'Lila's child' are unequivocal.
In August 1997 you appear to have written to the Lila Squad: 'As to the
vague borderline between the different static levels I would say that this
doesn't endanger the Quality idea.'
Pirsig comments:
'This seems to be a recurrent objection to the MOQ, It occurs, I think,
because I didn't get into enough detail on these borders. I'll try to do so
now as questions of vagueness come up. Life is matter that has been
configured by DNA. The distinction is very sharp. In the MOQ all organisms
are objective. They exist in the material world. All societies are
subjective. They exist in the mental world. Again, the distinction is very
sharp. For example, the "President of the U.S." is a social pattern. No
objective scientific instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from
anyone else.'
And when you add:
'No one can tell where matter ends and life begins, or where an organism
ends and a society starts (a body can be regarded as a society of cells),
nor the difference between communal cooperation and cultural activities.'
Pirsig comments:
'This is a stretch that seems to destroy the meaning of the word "society."
one could say "an atom is a society of electrons and protons", but that
weakens the meaning of the word without gaining anything.'
Pirsig wrote nowhere that a new level starts 'in the service of its parent
level'. Even if 'offering freedom to lower levels' with some stretching of
meaning can be rephrased as 'serving lower levels', it can never mean that a
new level starts as a PART of a lower level. You are free to entertain this
idea, but you can't found it in the ideas of Pirsig, I think.
You wrote now:
'The lower level will claim "ownership" far into the higher, yes, in fact it
NEVER recognizes any upper level, but we from a MOQ p.o.v.sees this.'
I don't think we should antropomorphize levels (or patterns). Levels (or
patterns) can't 'claim' or 'recognize' anything. Only humans can.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
MOQ.ORG - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
MD Queries - horse@darkstar.uk.net
To unsubscribe from moq_discuss follow the instructions at:
http://www.moq.org/md/subscribe.html
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:02:09 BST