Dear David B.,
Further with another bit of disagreement between us: our different
interpretations of the 'social' and 'intellectual' levels. To explain (not
support!) my association of ideological conflict (and the ideas that
conflict) primarily with the intellectual level, I quoted Pirsig (out of
context) from footnote 45 in (my present version) of Lila's Child:
'I think the conflicts mentioned here are intellectual conflicts in which
one side clings to an intellectual justification of existing social patterns
and the other side intellectually opposes the existing social patterns.'
You wrote 25/5 13:13 -0600:
'I'd guess that Pirsig is referring to a battle between a Victorian,
reactionary or conservative and a intellectual of the SOM variety.'
The context of the footnote was however:
'To me there are three glaring examples in Lila of the social level being
aware of the intellectual level:
1. Pirsig’s extended discussion on the battle between the Zuni priests and
the brujo. The social immune system was “aware” of the new intellectual
pattern threat to their control by the brujo’s new ideas.
2. Pirsig’s brief mention of the same thing happening to Joan of Arc.
3. Pirsig’s brief mention of the same thing happening to Galileo. This
example certainly juxtaposes the Catholic Church condemning Galileo for his
intellectual threat to their “non-intellectual flat earth-centric”
traditional social patterns. Many within the Church then and now condemn
intellectual freedom of belief and/or thought.
I see these as examples of a lower level keenly aware of a higher level. I
also think there are other examples of other levels, too.'
I don't agree with you that 'the quote also shows that social level values
are asserted in political debate'.
It's only the intellectual justifications of social patterns of values that
are expressed in these conflicts. Using Maggie's clear-cut differentiation:
intellectual values are expressed in choice, social values are expressed in
imitation. To the extent that people are parroting each other (especially
those with more social status) political debate also expresses social
values, but on that level the (reactionary, conservative, liberal,
progressive etc.) content of the ideas they parrot is irrelevant.
So also: the content of myths is intellectual according to me. Their
preservation however is largely due not to choice of higher quality content
over lower quality content, but to imitation and repetition.
You wrote 8/6 18:16 -0600:
'Wilber's map actually has 13 levels. I think that Wilber's map matches
Pirsig pretty well. The reason Wilber has more levels is just because his
map has more detail.'
If I am correctly informed Wilber's map of levels changes with almost every
book he writes and with the different quadrants of holarchies he describes.
For me this and his higher amount of levels is still because his map
subdivides Pirsig's intellectual level. If 'Wilber's first two level are
where atoms and then molecules form', that is because he projects
consciousness (as 'prehension') down to even the most simple of holons. His
levels that pertain to the consciousness of humans are clearly more relevant
to us than those that pertain to the consciousness of molecules, to that of
organisms in general and even to that of social holons, for we don't
identify at all with the molecules that comprise our body, relatively seldom
with our living bodies and in this age and (Western) culture at least we
tend to stress our individual uniqueness more than our membership of social
wholes.
You wrote 9/6 13:05 -0600:
'I get the impression that too many people here assume that any thought is
intellectual, but this is a mistake. I think Bo is quite right in asserting
that such an assumption puts us right back into the SOM soup, reintroduces
the mind/body problem and creates a number of other problems. Pirsig and
Wilber both insist that there are realities BETWEEN biology and intellect.
This is were social level thinking fits. This is where Wilber's archaic,
magic and mythic thinking fits.'
I confess to be of the opinion that the most useful distinction between MoQ
based social and intellectual levels makes every thought intellectual. I
think that there is plenty of room between what you call 'social thinking'
(Wilber's archaic, magic and mythic thinking included) and the biological
level of hard-wired and bio-chemically mediated reactions and interactions,
if you follow my suggestion of associating the social level with unconscious
imitation. Associating the intellectual level with consciousness and
thinking does NOT put us back into the SOM soup etc.. Rather it creates much
more clarity about the boundary between the social and intellectual level
than you (and Bodvar) do.
As for the 'the historic emergence of, transition toward and dominance by
the intellectual level':
In your 2/6 10:22 -0600 reply you don't reflect on my 2/6 10:24 +0200
suggestion to look into my distinction between and description of primary
and secondary intellectual progress. To me that seems a much clearer way of
explaining history than 'emergence/transition toward/dominance by'.
According to me the intellectual level (conscious choice) started with the
first 'static latch' of ideas/thoughts that could motivate choice between
behavioral options. This first 'static latch' employed language and/or
rituals, which also had a role in social patterns of values (unconscious
imitation). From this first beginning onward the intellectual level has
always been autonomous (even if dependent on the existence of social
patterns of values). The role of intellectual patterns of values (patterns
created by conscious choices of people, the patterns recognizable in their
motivations for these) in enhancing the success (social status) of some
social actors as against others and therefore in preserving certain social
patterns of values (with more rather than less role differentiation) is
recognizable earlier in history (if we look backwards and imagine how people
must have lived when the intellectual level had just emerged) than its
'going off on purposes of its own' (secondary intellectual progress).
Secondary intellectual progress also started with the very first 'static
latch' of intellectual values however.
People/societies/cultures don't/didn't 'transcend' from 'social' toward
'intellectual', but rather developed intellectual patterns of values in
addition to social patterns of values. Nowadays people have both. Even the
most rational, modern human behaves largely unconsciously and is still part
of social patterns of values even if he/she identifies almost exclusively
with the small part of his behavior that he/she has consciously chosen and
motivated.
Intellectual patterns of values don't dominate social patterns of values,
but rather guide them and limit their extreme behavioral consequences by
making a small part of them conscious (by 'justifying' and reflecting on
behavior that originates in unconscious imitation).
I don't agree with all that Pirsig wrote in 'Lila' or elsewhere on the
boundary between the social and intellectual levels. It lacks clarity in my
opinion.
With friendly greetings,
Wim
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