Matt,
A minor point in your post, but one that pushes one of my buttons. You say:
"Part of being a nominalist is the realization that words are but tools
and people can (and must) find their own tools."
While I've gotten a lot from Rorty, I think his avowal of nominalism is
self-contradictory on his part. To be a nominalist is to assume that
there is a non-verbal reality, something for one's words to be about,
and so one starts on the slippery slope back to a correspondence theory
of truth -- and so SOM. This isn't to say that there isn't reality
beyond the words of English, Hopi, and all other languages, but to
realize that nothing we can experience isn't in some sense conventional,
part of a system of signs.
Please consider this as orthogonal to what you actually said, which I
agree with, namely that we can and should adjust our verbal tools. Which
brings me to what I consider the most interesting question raised by
Rorty and others of his ilk. If we can be ironic considering our final
vocabulary, then have we perhaps actually arrived at a final truth? Not
final in the sense that one must agree with it, since one has the choice
to reject irony and pursue some fundamentalism or other, or just ignore
it. But final in that one realizes it takes the steam out of the
Philosophical (in Rorty's sense) method of loving wisdom. Which, in my
opinion, indicates a turn to the theological, to make sense of the
revelation of those who have for millenia been pointing out the same
thing as Rorty, namely the differential mystics. Not to make sense of
mystic vision, but of a self and universe in which both are "just words".
- Scott
Matt the Enraged Endorphin wrote:
> Bo,
>
> I couldn't help but smile through most of your message. Your
> incorrigibility is impressive. My only wish is to have been a bit more
> persuasive.
>
> Alas, though, one of my many flaws is the dismay I feel at being
> misunderstood. Naturally, this is, perhaps, part and parcel with being
> redescribed.
>
> Bo: "Everybody seem[s] to read books and then return to the forum insisting
> that the MOQ is to be seen through the eyes of the last read author."
>
> Though redescription is impossible to circumvent (heh, catch the irony
> there), I will object to this forced redescription. The intent is to
> redescribe me as someone who wants to force everyone to see the real,
> ultimate, Platonic Truth (capital "T" and all). This, I feel, is fairly
> unjustified considering everything I have said. In the original
> "Confessions" post I said: "... I've been reading a lot of Rorty lately and
> I've finally come to a realization: Pirsig was doing to me what Plato did
> to Pirsig. For Pirsig, Plato created the Western philosophical nightmare
> called Professional Philosophy, amongst other things. But through Rorty's
> eyes I'm finding that Pirsig is attempting the same thing, rather than
> really fundamentally changing anything. To turn Pirsig's eloquent phrase
> back on him, the halo is gone from Pirsig's head. This is not to say that
> I'm still not an avid Pirsig supporter. But I'm finding
> that the better parts of Pirsig are to be found in ZMM, not Lila. What
> Rorty has given me is the tools necessary to see and to enunciate what I've
> disliked about Pirsig, without throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
> And though Rorty gave Pirsig the short shrift, I implore you not to do the
> same to Rorty. Rorty has a lot to offer Pirsig and vice versa."
>
> In particular, "This is not to say that I'm still not an avid Pirsig
> supporter," "without throwing out the baby with the bathwater," and "Rorty
> has a lot to offer Pirsig and vice versa," which implies that Pirsig has a
> lot to offer Rorty. I can see how you might think I would demand everyone
> to read Rorty if they are truly to understand Pirsig. However, that would
> undermine my own project, namely: "...the feeling that people need to reach
> their own conclusions, work through their own problems, think it through
> themselves, etc. This philosophical individualism finds voice in the
> incorrigibility of a persons final vocabulary. If a person cannot be forced
> by Reason into a new belief, [which they cannot] then they must be
> persuaded to think it through themselves." Part of being a nominalist is
> the realization that words are but tools and people can (and must) find
> their own tools. I use some Rorty's. I also use some of Pirsig's. But
> part of being an ironist is being able to rearrange your toolbox when you
> find something useful.
>
> Bo: "I repeat that "objectivity" alone isn't Intellect, yet your
> formulation ..."calls for logical argument? Who doesn't? Above you used
> "rational argument" and I like that one better, as said the MOQ is "out of
> Intellect" and will (have to) use its rationality, but under its own control."
>
> I do use "logic," "rational," and "reason" all fairly interchangably,
> though I wouldn't presume to think that everyone does or force everyone to
> do so. However, you asked who doesn't call for logical argument: I for
> one. Rorty for two. And the early Pirsig in ZMM for three. All of this
> is still sitting outlined in the original "Confessions" post.
>
> To add something of substance here, I would pull out Bo's statement
> "meeting Pirsig through ZAMM and later LILA and the full-fledged MOQ
> brought it all to order inside a new system greater than religion and
> science!!" This is where I think Pirsig went wrong. The transition from
> ZMM to Lila is Pirsig's transition from edifying philosopher to systematic
> philosopher (not that he didn't show tendencies of both in both books).
> Pirsig created some very helpful tools in ZMM including "Quality," the
> "romantic/classical" division, and the "Church of Reason," among others.
> In Lila, however, Pirsig moved from trying to dissolve the Kantian value
> spheres (Art, Science, and Morality) to trying to re-systematize them or,
> as Bo says, "brought it all to order inside a new system greater than
> religion and science!!" Pirsig, in Lila, attempts to repudiate the Kantian
> system of philosophy all the while continuing the Kantian project of
> systematizing.
>
> In fact, Pirsig's ambivalent relation to Kant is possibly one of the most
> interesting facets about Pirsig's thought. We find Pirsig openly borrowing
> some of Kant's tools and making some of the same fundamental moves as the
> master chess player. (Its worth pointing out at least one: Kant's first
> cut of Reality is between phenomena and noumena. Phenomena was the
> definable stuff science was interested. Noumena is undefinable. Sound
> familiar?) And yet, at least in ZMM, Pirsig's project is almost entirely
> anti-Kantian. Essentially, what I want to say is that Pirsig is being a
> good philosopher when he is edifying and recontextualizing, not when he's
> systematic and logically arguing. Pirsig the Rhetorician and Cultural
> Critic, not Pirsig the Platonic Dialectician.
>
> Matt
>
>
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