Hi Matt:
Thanks for a most elucidating post about Rorty vis-a-vis the MOQ. We
agree on much more than I thought at first, especially as regards the
legitimacy of morally-based criticism of cultures (and by implication,
individual behavior) past and present.
Regarding "irrationality," I use it pejoratively because to me it means
"unintelligent," that is, behavior that, if universalized, would cause a drop
down a moral level or two, such as an unwillingness to resist totalitarian
governments. I do not associate irrationality with DQ, so I disagree that one
must become irrational to "proliferate new metaphors or Dynamic Quality"
as you seem to suggest. Dynamic Quality, as pure, direct experience,
is prior to any intellectualizing, whether deemed irrational or not. If you had
said postmodernism fosters and celebrates beauty, we would instantly agree.
But I have yet to see that Rorty or any other postmodernist (or post-
Philosophy celebrant) focus on beauty as an organizing principle.
Perhaps I have a misconception about this, too.
> I don't think Rorty
> would personally accept Pirsig's Quality thesis. I think it would be too
> metaphysical for him. However, that won't stop me from binding the two
> together in an elucidating fashion. For instance, I think the Quality
> thesis breaks down into a very simple, "everything makes choices."
I would make an important addendum to your breakdown of Pirsig's
thesis, namely, "Everything makes choices, and some choices are
better than others." Without the notion of "betterness" the MOQ is
neutered.
> We know
> everything makes choices and the patterns of these choices creates the
> contingent order in the world today. When put this way, I think Rorty
> would find it palatable and I think it is a point of contact between the
> two, a place to colligate them and emphasize the pragmatic, historicist
> side of Pirsig, rather than the systematic, Platonic, foundationalist side.
Would Rorty would also go for the "betterness" part? I wonder.
Thanks for the discussion, Matt. I've learned much about the Rortyian
view. There seems to be many points of connection between him and
Pirsig. But the basic "the world is moral order" assumption that carries
the MOQ is something I suspect Rorty would cast aside as being "not
philosophically interesting" just as he considers the correspondence
theory of truth to be passe. Am I right? This is not to toss out any of
the points of agreement between Pirsig and Rorty you have so
eloquently described.
Platt
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