Platt,
>Perhaps you feel, however, as I do that we’re in danger of straying too
>far away from the purpose of this site, namely, to discuss Pirsig’s
>metaphysics. I’m sure there are other sites devoted to Rorty where a
>discussion like those we’ve had lately would be more appropriate.
Yes, I agree wholeheartedly. Sometimes I do tend to stray further far
afield than I'd like to without any mention of Pirsig.
I find your list invaluable, by the way. I'm always curious as to how
others would recapitulate what I write and such efforts are usually quite
instrumental in self-critique.
>Ideas and values you and Pirsig agree on:
>
>Metaphysics a menu, map
>Openness to new experiences and ideas
>Seeking freshness
>Seeking quietude
>Striving for excellence
>The high value of freedom
>Uncovering hidden assumptions
Certainly all of these (with the replacement of "narrative" for
"metaphysics") I can agree with. And when Squonk says, "The last on this
list may lead to recontextualisation," I think he's absolutely right.
Recontextualization is the way in which we can lay bare differences and
than choose which context is of higher value. Recontextualization is a
fancy name for something as simple as "an accountant recontextualizing the
figures on a corporate income tax return, provoked to do so by the thought
that a certain depreciable item might plausibly be listed on Schedule H
rather than on Schedule M." ("Inquiry as Recontextualization: An
Anti-Dualist Account of Interpretation")
>Positions you take that Pirsig doesn’t agree with:
>
>Anti-intellectualism, anti-rationalism
>DQ and not DQ = Quality
>Must resist the Good, True, God, Reason, Science
>Nothing interesting about correspondence truth
I'm not sure what the first one refers to. The second one, I'm not quite
sure either. The third one I agree with insofar as we understand it as
"resisting the temptation to construct ahistorical notions of the Good,
True, Reason, and Science" (which I think is what you were alluding to by
capatializing the words). The fourth one I certainly agree with. However,
the only cavaet I would place is that Pirsig doesn't talk a lot about a
correspondence theory of truth. His theory of truth, if anything, is
closer to pragmatism's. If your getting a correspondence theory out of his
three criteria for truth, then I would remind you that he says "agreement
with experience," which is different then having a full-blown theory of
correspondence. Pragmatism is perfectly able to agree with experience.
>Ideas you present that Pirsig says nothing about.
>
>Aesthetic axis
>Biconditional
>Contextualization
>Final vocabularies
>Historicism
>Ironists
>Narratives
>Nominalists
>Oedipal cycle
>Poeticization
>Solidarity
>Vocabulary proliferation
Pirsig certainly doesn't use any of these exact words. However, I don't
think my strong misreading of Pirsig is completely out of line. For
instance, I think if we take Dynamic Quality and start seeing what it
implies in other vocabularies, I think some of the things that pop out are
vocabulary proliferation. When you take the static/Dynamic interplay you
get the Oedipal cycle, historicism, final vocabulaires, and particularly
the ironist stance towards final vocabularies. And when you take his
philosophy as a whole it leads to a poeticization of society and he fits
quite well in the American aesthetic axis. And I agree with Squonk's
assesment that recontextualization also pops out of Pirsig's philosophy.
>Where it appears we can go forward arm and arm without hesitation is
>in our passion for freedom and for bringing to light those elusive
>assumptions that so many blithely ignore, to their own and society’s
>detriment.
This I wholeheartedly and sincerely agree with.
Matt
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