From: Matt the Enraged Endorphin (mpkundert@students.wisc.edu)
Date: Mon Oct 14 2002 - 22:34:39 BST
Platt, Kevin,
KEVIN:
I think it's very clear that Pirsig knowingly indulges himself in the
very SOMish activity of defining a metaphysics to support his Quality
insight. The language of MOQ is very SOMish, IMO, and completely
susceptible to Matt's critique. There is definitely an inner-outer split
to the MOQ, but I think Pirsig knowingly and willingly subjects himself
to this duality for the sake of structuring his Morality arguments. He
admits that Quality can't be defined or analyzed, but can't seem to
resist the lure of using his "analytical knife" to do just what he says
is not a Quality activity--creating a metaphysics.
MATT:
This, I think, is perfectly correct and fairly uncontroversial. Pirsig
does admit to the general degeneracy of metaphysics, but goes ahead
anyways. I don't really fault him for this. In particular, in this
passage (Ch. 5 of Lila) Pirsig links metaphysics to very private acts:
getting drunk and picking up bar ladies. I like this, because I think that
Pirsig has every right to create a metaphysics as an act of self-creation,
which flows into the things I've been saying about the private-public
distinction.
But this is off-point. When I say that what Kevin says is uncontroversial,
I'm saying that what I'm saying is a bit more controversial. I don't want
to deflate what I'm saying just yet. What I'm saying is that Pirsig's
entire notion of Quality as brought out in ZMM is still infected with SOM.
Saying that Lila is the infected area is fairly uncontroversial in this
respect. He's making a metaphysics, of course he's infecting the system.
But I want to argue that the infection starts earlier. The language he
uses in ZMM still seems to bring up a SOM picture. Which brings me to Platt.
PLATT:
You're right if you accept the usual SOM premise that experience is
something a subject has.You're also right if you accept the premise of
"inner-outer tracks." But Pirsig denies your premises as well as those of
Kant, Plato, and all the rest.
Pirsig's premise is that experience is Reality, prior to any division,
especially the subject/object one that has prevailed down the ages. His
division or "first cut" (necessary for cognition and communication) is to
split universal experience (Quality-Reality) into Dynamic and static.
MATT:
This is what I would call the standard defence of Pirsig. This is Pirsig's
supposed premise recapitulated. What I'm saying is that when Pirsig says
this, he's still, even while thinking he's not, under a SOM spell.
So, when Platt says, "Experience prior to any inner-outer, subject-object
distinction, is the
ahistorical, universal foundation of the MOQ," this is the point at which I
deny that the MoQ has evaded SOM. To make claims for ahistoricalness and
universalness is to make SOMish claims. To follow Platt in saying that we
must correspond to this ahistorical, universal Quality is to ressurect the
spectare of SOM (at least, I'm pretty sure this is what you've been
saying). You can only do this by already assuming an appearence-reality
distinction.
To add to my critique, I would draw your attention to Ch 5 and 6 of ZMM,
the chapters in which Pirsig begins his description of the romantic-classic
division. This division is, firstly, very Kantian. One of Kant's
divisions was between intuition (romantic) and understanding (classic).
When Pirsig describes "immediate surface impressions [as] essential for
primary understanding," Pirsig could be quoting straight out of the
Critique of Pure Reason. In particular, the classic mode of viewing things
views itself as reality, and the romantic mode as appearance. You can hear
the naive scientist saying, "The atomic structure of the table is the real
table, not your sense impressions of it." Pirsig wants to counter both the
classic, square privileging of reality and the romantic privileging of
appearance. In other words, Pirsig wants to counter SOM. However, when we
turn the classic-romantic lens back on the rudimentary metaphysical
hierarchy that Pirsig sets up in Ch 20 (much like Pirsig's own analysis of
analysis, turning reason back on its self), what appears is an
appearance-reality distinction. Reality is now Quality an the appearances
of Quality are either romatic or classic. There is still a reality behind
the appearances that is privileged and that we must correspond to. This
supports Platt's claim for ahistoricalness and universalness, but it is
also caught in an appearance-reality distinction aka SOM.
So, sure, Quality is Reality prior to any division. It is Reality, "out
there," behind the appearances of any division. This is where Pirsig's
mysticism comes in. A mystic believes in the appearance-reality
distinction, otherwise he wouldn't think of language as obscuring anything.
So, in sum, what I am saying is that Pirsig both denies and affirms the
very divisions he talks about. He denies the SOM premises I brought out in
my narrative and then in the next breath affirms them.
Matt
p.s. Thank you Platt, Kevin, Sam, and John for the kinds words and to
anyone else who may be thinking them. Though at times I may sound
apocalyptic, I find that most of the time I'm simply too weak-willed to
stay away, and despite things I say to the contrary, I'll come back,
probably sooner than it sounds.
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