From: Steve Peterson (speterson@fast.net)
Date: Tue Oct 22 2002 - 16:25:52 BST
> Steve,
>
> Steve Peterson wrote:
>
> I guess I'm thinking that a rejection of all violence could be a response to
>> dynamic quality that cannot actually work in society as it currently is.
>
>
Scott:
> It will work, one just has to accept death as a possible consequence.
> Which, for some reason, is made easier by thinking an afterlife is
> likely (I say "for some reason" since, logically, those who don't
> believe in an afterlife should be the ones least concerned with dying,
> since there is no one to regret being dead, while those who believe in
> it assume an unending responsibility. But somehow it doesn't work out
> that way. Makes one wonder...).
>
Steve:
So... one can convince himself on the intellectual level that death does not
have any quality rating whatsoever for the individual, but pain certainly
has low biological quality. Allowing someone to steal from me has low
quality. There are probably lots of low quality consequences for me if I
reject violence.
I guess what you are saying is that all the ways in which the consequences
of rejecting violent responses have low quality are on lower levels than the
level on which I decide to reject violence. This is interestingly analogous
to the idea that my "reward in Heaven will be great." My experience of
rejecting violence may have low biological and social quality but will have
the reward of quality on a higher level.
But I know that there is no "heaven" for me where I only experience the
blessings of having intellectual quality. I must also face biological and
social aspects of my existence. I doubt whether my reward on the
intellectual level will always make up for what I lose on the biological and
social levels In all cases where I might decide between a violent and a
nonviolent response.
Does it make sense for me then to seek to maximize the quality of my
experience as an individual in a balance among the levels rather than
looking only to the highest level?
This would seem to be a utilitarian view of morality such as "the greatest
good for the greatest number" but instead I seek the greatest good for me.
In my opinion this is how everyone operates morally whether they realize it
or not. We try to do what's best for ourselves though we aren't all very
good at doing so. There may be a connection here to "know thyself."
Knowing yourself may mean knowing what will maximize the quality of your
experience.
Another possible resolution for the question of whether violence is always
immoral is to redefine violence or think of a new word that speaks to the
idea of wrongness containing what we think is wrong about most violence. I
note that Darrel often extends the idea of violence to behavior that is not
necessarily physical. We may also exclude certain physical interventions
from the definition of violence. At any rate, central to the issue is the
definition of violence.
Still seeking,
Steve
>
>>
>> Doesn't moq reject such static moral rules as saying all violence is wrong?
>
>
> In practice, it is not at all a static rule, since it is exceedingly
> rare. That is, for the typical person to decide to act under the rule
> that all violence is wrong is to aspire to something that will take a
> lot of DQ to make come about.
>
>
>> I recognize what King is saying as motivating high quality behavior and
>> motivated by DQ, and if everyone agreed that would be great, but what if...
>
>
> What if what? One chooses non-violence to show its moral superiority,
> not to wait for "everyone".
>
>
>>
>> When I say "work in society" I guess I am taking a utilitarian view. Is moq
>> utilitarian, deontological, or none of the above? I'm assuming none of the
>> above, but can someone contrast moq with these classical understandings of
>> morality?
>
>
> Well, the "greatest good for the greatest number" would seem to be a
> social level decree, as would Kant's Categorical Imperative (if that is
> what you mean by "deontological" -- correct me if I'm wrong). Here's an
> interesting Barfield quote that may be relevant (it's not about
> non-violence, but more about asserting individual/intellectual value
> over society's existing values):
>
> "It is in the nature of the case that, if at any point in time something
> like a *new* moral demand is made on humanity, moral judgments grow for
> a time double and confused. Thus...I spoke of certain "symptoms of
> iconoclasm", in the shape of a new willingness to apprehend
> symbolically. If I now maintain that these have a moral significance, I
> am at once in the difficulty that the scale of values I have set up not
> only does not correspond with the generally accepted scale of Christian
> moral values, but appears to cut right across it. There are plenty of
> people with a natural taste for dream-psychology, or for art or
> literature of a symbolical nature, for sacramentalism in religion, or
> for other things whose meaning cannot be grasped without a movement of
> the imagination, who are arrogant or self-centred or in other ways no
> better than they should be. And conversely there are prosaic, humdrum,
> literal souls before whose courage or goodness we are abashed. It is
> not a happy task to have to maintain that, from one point of view, and
> that an all-important one, the former must be accounted morally
> superior.... The 'needful' virtue is that which combats the besetting
> sin. And the besetting sin to-day is the sin of literalness, or
> idolatry." [pp 161-2]
>
> [Some of this is referring to stuff explained elsewhere in the book
> ("Saving the Appearances"), but I think the point is there. Of course,
> it is the same point as Pirsig's Brujo story.]
>
> - Scott
>
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