On Fri, 11 Sep 1998, Bodvar Skutvik wrote:
> The term "feeling" is even more ambiguous than love (still worse in
> Norwegian where feeling and emotion are synonymous). However, one
> feels basic sensations (impulses you call it), one feels complex
> emotions and one even FEELS intellectual pleasure (by having a bright
> idea). My hunch is that "feeling" is direct experience of Dynamic
> Quality! Remember MOQ's most basic point: Experience=Quality.
>
> This is a test balloon:
> Without invoking SOM's sentient/non sentient platypus I think there
> is "feeling" (=experience of Quality) at all levels. What would keep
> the "little moral entities" we call matter particles from doing
> "wrong" if there's no feeling of bad or good? If not we have to
> revert to SOM's "forces of nature".
> There is definitely a lot of feeling at the
> Biological level, but here it is refined to bodily "sensation".
> What keeps an ant from leaving the hill except feeling bad in
> doing so? If not we have to revert to SOM's "instincts".
> At the Social level the dynamic experience is elevated
> further to "emotions", but the feeling of good or bad is as acute
> as ever.
> Finally, at the Intellectual level the value carrier
> "feeling" is Reason; one feels good when reasonable; elevated
> above (contemptuous) emotions and/or (low) sensations.
this is good, but i cringe at the whole carrier idea. carriers are
results of platypi, and i feel MOQ does away with them. let me say some
stuff:
i've been thinking about love lately. love and value seem to be very much
the same in MOQ. and with your last post, i now see Love, Value, and
Feeling as near-synonyms. mass loves mass--that's gravity. mass values
mass. mass feels good about mass. of course, value, feeling, and love
are very complex in humanland--after all, we are complex thinking things.
carriers must be avoided, so let me deal with them now, if you will.
interactions, sensations, emotions, and reason all are "things" that seem
to me to be intellectual patterns of value. they are all "idea"s, whether
a rock has the idea to value another rock (gravity), a human nerve has the
idea to respond to stimuli (sensation), R. Pirsig has the idea of loss
(sadness) with the death of his son, or a person like me has the idea that
the future will behave like the past (reason). since your carriers are
intellectual patterns of value, do you still want to use them as a special
set of "things"?
homepage - http://www.moq.org
queries - mailto:moq@moq.org
unsubscribe - mailto:majordomo@moq.org with UNSUBSCRIBE MOQ_DISCUSS in
body of email
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:02:33 BST