Hi Magnus and Squad
The last shall be first:
> As usual, all this makes no sense whatsoever with a MoQ viewed as a one-
> dimensional map.
I really don't have the faintest idea what you mean by a one dimensional map
as no such thing exists, as far as I'm aware, but I think this ties in with your
(completely incorrect) belief that my view of the MoQ is one-dimensional, as
you have stated in a previous post. Whilst I don't for a moment expect you,
or anyone else, to agree with me you seem to have failed to understand
my view and as a consequence you are misrepresenting me completely. If
this were not the case you would see that my view is not one-dimensional
but multi-dimensional. We seem to have divergent views of the MoQ neither
of which is necessarily 'right' or 'wrong', merely different.
> The fuss, at least my fuss, is about talking about the MoQ as secondary.
In one sense the MoQ _IS_ secondary - to Quality! This is why in the past I have
warned about distinguishing between the MoQ and Quality. To reiterate, the MoQ
is PART of Quality. The way it gets talked about here sometimes, anyone would
think that the MoQ and Quality are the same thing
> When you talk about the MoQ as a map, you also bump the MoQ down from the
> place as a first philosophy to a secondary philosophy. Your new first
> philosophy is that of maps vs. 'reality'.
A map is a way of recording information in order to share knowledge. It records
where you've been and allows others to use this information as a guide. The
greater part of the MoQ has yet to be discovered. In this sense I agree with you
that the MoQ itself is not strictly a map. The MoQ is, more strictly, Intellectual
patterns of value, but these PoV's need to be conveyed from person to person, as
Pirsig did with Lila to get the process started. The means of information
transmission - language, writing etc. - creates public access to the IntPoV's of
the MoQ.
>The metaphysics part of the MoQ
> becomes completely useless since it's only a map anyway. And I more than
> ever understand Struan's arguments that the MoQ (viewed as a map) looks
> like emotivism. When you say that the MoQ is a map, you also say that
> everything that will be morally judged will first be interpreted using
> this map. THEN, you use the map of the four levels to make moral
> judgements, emotivism-in-a-box.
>
> Am I getting through here, or am I being cryptic as usual?
No. I think I see what you mean, but there is a fine degree of interpretation here.
What I would say is that the MoQ as IntPoV's exist seperately for each person.
One reads Lila, discusses the MoQ on this mailing list, contemplates what has
been read etc.and builds up a model of the MoQ. This model is in turn created
and modified by IntPoV's. A model is a more complex form of the type MAP and
is multi-dimensional - you could substitute view or belief or some other word for
model but you come back to the same place. When it comes to describing the
model that has been constructed you have to drop down a level to social symbols
- i.e. language. So the Metaphysics part of the MoQ is still perfectly valid and is
what each person works with in order to understand various aspects of Quality. It
seems to be the means of transmission that is faulty - which is often the case as
a degree of noise will always be present in any form of communication.
> You said:
> > I don't agree that reality is something that we are not able to experience - it is all
> > that we are able to experience.
>
> Right. But reality is also what ALL SPoVs are able to experience, not just IntPoVs.
> I know at least Jonathan disagrees with this, but everything else that makes the MoQ
> valuable depends on it.
Perhaps the different types of experience should be stressed here. A rock or a
floppy disk does not 'experience' its world in the same way that a human being
does (I would presume). But I don't think it is unreasonable to say, from a
particular viewpoint, that a rock can experience its world - maybe 'interact with'
would be a better phrase.
>
> > If someone can come up with a way of letting me experience exactly what
> > another experiences then I will be quite happy to drop language altogether as it
> > will then be redundant. Until then I'll keep looking at my map and comparing it
> > with everyone elses.
>
> The intellectual level is the only level that is able to reference itself, which
> would make it possible for everyone to have the same intellectual experience. But
> since it is dependent on the language of the social level, we can't escape
> language.
I'm not too sure about this. It's a moot point I suppose but in order to have the
same intellectual experience the initial starting point and subsequent experiences
would have to be identical. If this were the case then for intellectual experiences
to be the same there would be no difference in value. In other words they would be
indistiguishable from each other which they don't appear to be.
>
> All other levels are unable to reference itself or make exact copies, (the
> physical equivalent would be Heisenberg's uncertainty principle), so we can't
> have identical experiences of such patterns.
Which is probably a good thing as otherwise DQ might have a hard time.
Horse
"Making history, it turned out, was quite easy.
It was what got written down.
It was as simple as that!"
Sir Sam Vimes.
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