Hi Struan
Struan Hellier wrote:
>
> Greetings,
>
> I merely wanted to repeat my meta-ethical question about the position of the term 'good' in the MoQ.
> Anyone else interested in how it fits in with current ethical theory. Is it naturalistic,
> non-naturalistic, non-cognitive or something new? My own view is that it is a form of naturalism and
> yet I find it difficult to see how it escapes the naturalistic fallacy.
>
> Anyone able to help or are we all happy to think our metaphysics has value at the core, despite our
> reticence (or inability) to analyse, at a meta-ethical level, what we mean by that.
Let me ask you one thing Struan. If you were given such a meta-ethical answer as to why the MoQ
"has value at the core", how could we, or you, decide whether it's a good answer or not? Could
that be answered at a meta-meta-ethical level? And that answer? Would that be a good answer?
As you say, if good was the naturalistic "good", then it would fall into this trap, but the good
of MoQ is where the road ends. The MoQ has no need to justify why something good is good, because
that only leads to another good down the road. Of course, sometimes it's possible to justify one
good in terms of another good, but the point is that the MoQ refuses to use meta-metaphysics, not
because of fear of the fallacy trap, but because it recognizes the futility of it.
Actually, you do the same thing. You said: "metaphysics has value", there's no other way to
express it. We have to use words like good and "has value" because other words are derived
from them.
Magnus
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