Hi Struan 'n' All
Sorry for the delay in the reply to the Question of Good etc. But I'm
having to study for OU and other stuff at the same time and I wanted
to give this some serious consideration before I sent it off. Anyway ...
On 25 May 99, at 8:13, Struan Hellier wrote:
> Ken, I almost go along with Horse's definition but, being slightly worried
> about having the term 'things' in it (and of course the MoQ claims that
> good possesses 'things' rather than vice versa) would phrase it thus:
Quality posesses things - we haven't yet shown that Quality and
good are identical and there is no mention of this in Lila. I was
describing the common definition - as per Moore - rather than a
definition in MOQ terms. Still, no problem.
On 25 May 99, at 8:48, Magnus Berg wrote:
> As you say, if good was the naturalistic "good", then it would fall
> into this trap, but the good of MoQ is where the road ends. The
> MoQ has no need to justify why something good is good, because
> that only leads to another good down the road.
On 25 May 99, at 16:34, Struan Hellier wrote:
> Which is precisely the position of G.E Moore and the non-
> naturalists. ("If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good
> is good and there is an end to the matter").
>
> As you seem to espouse a non-naturalist ethic, Magnus, may I
> ask you how you discern this 'good?' Intuition perhaps? Horse
> pointed out that this whole question derives from the fact/value
> debate which brings me to the second question. Can we ascertain
> what is good from empirical evidence? If we can, then how?
> Equally, if we can, then how does this square with non-naturalism?
The first place to start, I think, is by looking at the second question
(in the third person??? :) ) - the fact/value problem or deriving 'ought
from 'is'. In other words, how do we derive a moral conclusion from
non-moral premises. Part of this can be accounted for within the
MOQ, which takes as a basic premiss that morality is the basis of
reality. In these terms any utterance is a moral utterance (language
is created by Social/Intellectual Value and is inherently moral) so
any premiss, by definition, is part of a moral framework. So any
premiss is a moral premiss and consequently a conclusion drawn
from these premisses can be a valid moral conclusion assuming that
the premisses support the conclusion.But we should really look at
the fact/value problem as seen from a non-Pirsigian point of view.
This seems to have started, at least for Moore and the Positivists,
with Hume and, I think, "A Treatise on Human Nature". Referring to
proofs of the being of God:
"... when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual
copulations of propositions "is" and "is not", I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an "ought" or "ought not" ... as
this "ought" or "ought not" expresses some new relation or
affirmation it is necessary that it be observed and explained; and at
the same time a reason should be given for what seems altogether
inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others
which are entirely different from it."
The above is often provided as a proof of non-cognitivism and a
refutation of naturalism (which is odd - Hume was a Naturalist!!!).
But, what is normally ignored is that Hume is simply making a point
about logic. You can't get out what you don't put in. If no moral
(ought) statements appear in the premisses then it is logically
invalid to include a moral (ought) statement in the conclusion. Fair
enough! I also can't provide a conclusion regarding dolphins from
premisses that do not refer to dolphins - but would not worry too
much about a fact/dolphin problem!!! It is the conservativeness of
logic that creates the problem not a problem of ethical autonomy.
The problem is one of inference (what can/cannot be inferred) and not
reduction.
One of the underlying propositions in the MOQ is that the
physical(inorganic?) order of the universe is also the moral order. If
the physical order of the universe is the moral order then what comes
from that physical order is also a moral order. So the biological,
social and intellecual orders are also moral orders. Any statement
about the world in these terms is a moral statement so a conclusion
derived from these statements is a valid conclusion as per the normal
rules of logical inference.
As Struan has mentioned Moore's position regarding good, and
Moore's position is solidly emotivist, I'd like to say something about
it. When Moore states:
"If I am asked "What is good", my answer is that good is good and
there's an end of the matter. Or if I am asked "How can good be
defined?", my answer is that it cannot be defined and that is all I
have to say about it."
he is making an emotivist claim.
A very similar claim is made within the MOQ - but in relation to
Dynamic Quality. DQ is not defined nor is it definable. Neither is it
reducible. But in relation to Static Quality a completely different
claim can be made which is certainly Naturalistic as Static Quality
can be and is defineable and reducible. The Static aspect of Quality
is cognitivist, whilst the Dynamic aspect is Intuitionist.
Accordingly, where Naturalism takes ethical knowledge to be
empirical and ethical concepts to concern natural (static) phenomena
the MOQ agrees. Where Intuitionism denies that ethical knowledge
is properly modelled on science and mathematics - but in respect of
DQ - the MOQ also agrees. There is no problem here given the
appropriate context. As I have stated a number of times in the past,
there is a Fuzzy aspect to the MOQ and I think it comes through
most clearly in relation to the Cognitivist/Intuitionist aspects of its
approach to Morality.
On 26 May 99, at 19:54, Struan Hellier wrote:
> 1) Is this, "direct everyday experience," synonymous with intuition?
>
> 2) Can we ascertain what is good from empirical evidence?
>
> 3) If we can, then how?
>
> 4) How does Q2 & 3 square with non-naturalism?
1) In terms of DQ or the Quality Event - Yes. DQ is, as many have
pointed out, 'mystic' in nature and is not defineable, scientific,
mathematical or reducible. This does not mean however, that it is
necessarily non-empirical - which is obvious.
2) In terms of SQ and beginning with the basic premiss that "the
physical order of the universe is also the moral order of the universe" -
Yes. It is reducible, defineable and discernible.
4) As above they are two aspects of the same thing. They are not
necessarily contradictory - given their fuzzy nature - and the fuzzy
nature of certain aspects of the MOQ.
My apologies for not having covered the Naturalistic Fallacy as yet,
but this post is getting long, I'm knackered and I've still got to have a
shower and do a couple of hours studying. I'll get onto this in another
post.
Horse
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