David B (and all)-
Good morning...
On 6/10/99 at 10:31 PM -0600, David Buchanan wrote:
> All moqers: I'm not sure if "human nature" is the right thread name.
I think I agree with you on this...
> That's it! Pirsig's explainations have appeared to some as contradictory
> because he can't say everything at once and there are no easy rules.
> There are only four levels of static patterns and five moral codes, but
> we "calculate" the morality using all of these nine elements in a single
> complex equation. Sometimes its simpler than that. Patients and germs
> figure easily. The civil war is another matter entirely.
...and this...
> ROGER recently said, "It is usually a HUGE mistake to try to equate any
> THING or behavior to a level" I disagree 100%. I think Pirsig gives us
> the levels (and codes) for a reason. Lila HB page 100 "The MOQ provides
> a better set of coordinates with which to interpet the world than does
> SOM because it is more inclusive." I repeat, "with which to interpet
> the world". That's the whole idea. That's what makes it pragmatically
> useful. (Redundancy for dramatic effect)
Pirsig also says (start of ch 12, p 172 in teal paperback):
"But although the four systems are exhaustive they are not exclusive. They
all operate at the same time and in ways that are almost independent of
each other."
which seems (by implication) to contradict David's point, but then on p 173:
"But now atoms and molecules are just one of four levels of static patterns
of quality and there is no intellectual requirement that any level dominate
the other three."
which not only directly supports David, but also implies that while things
can be acting in many levels at one time, not all things must act in every
level all of the time.
> ROGER also says, "Even a subatomic particle is as much an intellectal
> pattern as an inorganic one." I think this claim is confusing and not
> true. We have intellectual patterns about subatomic structures in both
> SOM and MOQ terms, but that ought not be confused with actual "thing" we
> refer to. Such thinking would even make the patient/germ debate too
> difficult to manage.
I also disagree with the quote attributed to Roger. It's clear in the
quote above that Pirsig does not believe that subatomic particles have
intellectual patterns. I agree that it is neither necessary nor practical
in terms of the MoQ for that to be true.
I think we easily confuse the ability to make a "choice" in MoQ terms with
"sentience" in SOM terms. Let me try to bring in something about this which
I posted about to the Lila Squad this week and apply it to this discussion.
(Yes, it's bad form to quote myself - my apologies...)
// from LS post on 6/9/99
As I understand it, the MoQ cannot exist without choice. When the MoQ
restates causation (A causes B) as preference (B values precondition A), we
must allow for the fact that A can lead to multiple outcomes, the most
likely of which is B, and that B can decide which preconditions are better.
How does one outcome occur over the others? Well, in SOM terms (we are
suspended in language after all), we could say that we allow for A to
choose between B and any available alternatives. We do not like saying that
a grape makes choices, but at the inorganic level it can be true. I will
not go into Pirsig's arguments for this or quantum theory here. If we
accept this fundamental principle (the reworking of causation in the MoQ)
than anything, any SPoV, has the ability to make choices.
This would make more sense if we were not caught up in SOM all of the time.
My point here is that "choice" does not imply sentience in terms of the MoQ
and it should not imply subject/object either, at least not any more than
"B values precondition A." That B values one thing over another implies
that B can make choices. Any other definition of choice is pure SOM.
//
The problem here, like there, centers around the definition/connotation of
choice, the definition/connotation of preference. In MoQ terms, anything
and everything has this ability. In anthropomorphic SOM terms, only
sentient (human?) life has this ability. If we still have one foot in
dualistic thinking, which is not completely invalid just inferior in some
contexts, we would say that this ability to make a choice implies sentience
or intellectual patterns.
In MoQ terms, this "choice" or "preference" is required for the moral
structure of reality. There cannot be good and bad or worse and better
choices without there being some real kind of choice. But choice is limited
to meaning that there are x possible outcomes and only one actual outcome.
That's all - there is no necessary implication of sentience with regard to
any static patterns of value involved.
> The MOQ is a map of reality and DQ is one of the largest features on it.
While I generally agree with you, I would not say it like that. The MoQ is
a map of reality and DQ is the area we have yet to explore or map. Maps are
metaphors after all, not the actual "thing" itself.
So, unless you believe we have explored everything and that the map is a
perfect metaphor, then you have to allow for the unknown (DQ).
> (All other things being equal, the most Dynamic is the most moral.)
>
> Which brings me back to the starting point; the explanatory power of the
> MOQ.
>
> When we use the levels and codes instead of SOM we almost have to
> rephrase the question. Instead of asking how moral is it or how good is
> it, we ought to ask how is it good or how is it moral. Pirsig is trying
> to make the case that everything is composed of quality and only that
> which has value exists. So when we examine any situation we ask "what
> values are at stake here? What kinds of static quality are in conflict?"
> The levels tell us there are different categories of good, as in "the
> adultry was good, but only according to biological level values".
> In that sense, everything has quality. Just like Lila herself. She had
> that kind of quality, if nothing else. "Intellectually, she was
> nowhere." For Lila, the intellect had no value and did not exist.
A very good explanation...thanks for the post!
Cheers,
Mark
________________________________________________________________________
Mark Brooks <mark@epiphanous.org> <http://www.epiphanous.org/>
How do you know who wrote this? <http://www.epiphanous.org/mark/pgp/>
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