Folks-
Hey there.
You'll have to forgive me...I need to combine some responses in this thread
into one post or I'll end up posting more than four times today. I don't
want to get in trouble for violating the rules, you know.
On 6/12/99 at 6:25 PM -0400, RISKYBIZ9@aol.com wrote:
> I never meant that subatomic particles HAVE intellectual patterns. They
> ARE intellectual patterns. Pirsig BTW is quite clear on this.
Well, in that sense, every pattern is an "intellectual" one. Static
patterns are patterns of knowledge after all...the "known" versus the
"unknown"...the "experienced" versus the "unexperienced."
I agree that what we call subatomic particles are just conceptualization of
reality, just as we are just conceptualizations of reality.
(I'm still working on my LS reply to you...perhaps late today it will show
up on MD.)
On 6/12/99 at 9:11 PM -0500, Clark wrote:
> In my view the universe was deterministic from the start and is still
> deterministic. The path that produced us is good because there was no
> reference point for bad in the universe until humanity (sentience)came
> along. Since we evolved from this "good" universe then, as Platt says, we
> are embedded in and surrounded by "good".
I think that Pirsig would say that the universe is both deterministic
(static) and free (dynamic) and that it always has been. The second to last
paragraph of chapter 11 of Lila has a good piece on this, but I haven't
quoted it.
I agree with you that, while we might not hurt the universe by damaging the
biosphere, we can and are certainly making things harder for ourselves.
On 6/13/99 at 1:59 PM -0500, drose wrote:
> Preference, for instance, dictates choice of color. Do I prefer blue or
> red? Conscience governs the action of the individual with regard to his
> interaction with society. Preference becomes weighted with social level
> consideration. I may prefer red, but the society in which I live
> believes wearing red is morally repugnant so I choose blue, or some
> other color, instead. This is admittedly simplistic, but illustrative.
Well, at first I was going to shy away from this debate on color. I do
believe that if I prefer blue that is a moral choice. After all, every
SPoV, including my color preference, is a moral judgement according to the
MoQ.
Lila (pp.180-181 teal paperback):
"It [MoQ] says that even at the most fundamental level of the universe,
static patterns of value and moral judgements are identical. The "Laws of
Nature" are moral laws."
Anyway, if you prefer <G>, I can use "values" instead of "prefers." It is a
better word in keeping with the MoQ. Hydrogen values the bond to oxygen to
make water after all and that act, with regard to the MoQ, is a moral one
(see same paragraph in Lila as above quote).
> The choice of the amoeba is still no real choice.
I shouldn't have continued with the amoeba example. It was a poor choice on
my part. An electron, however, is better suited to my point. There is no
good predictor as to where any given electron will be at any given time. My
interpretation of this is that the electron *chooses*, in MoQ terms, where
the best location is for the moment.
(Lila teal, p 181)
"The question of whether an electron does a certain thing because it
has to or because it wants to is completely irrelevant to the data of
what the electron does."
> Yes, it can, if we are to assume that animals that live in groups are
> social level animals.
Sorry, that was a mistake on my part. I should have said "any member of
the society."
After all, the brujo *was* a member of the society and enacted that change.
> Humans consist of all four levels. We are, arguably, the only species in
> the universe that can make reasoned decisions concerning the morality of
> any situation and affect the outcome of the situation.
While we might be the only species that can make *reasoned decisions*, that
does not mean we are the only SPoVs able to make decisions about the
quality (morality) of a situation. The hot stove is just as low-quality
(immoral) for the cat as it is for me. She will certainly decide to jump
off of it.
(Lila teal, p 180)
"The Metaphysics of Quality says that if moral judgements are essentially
assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground-stuff of the
world, then moral judgements are the fundamental ground-stuff of the world."
(Lila teal, p 181)
"So what Phaedrus was saying was that not just life, but everything, is an
ethical activity. It is nothing else. When inorganic patterns of reality
create life the Metaphysics of Quality postulates that they've done so
because it's "better" and that this definition of "betterness" -- this
beginning response to Dynamic Quality -- is an elementary unit of ethics
upon which all right and wrong can be based."
What this comes down to is the fact that, moral decisions are not necessary
reasoned or rational. Therefore, moral decisions do not require sentience.
> Ants operate in three of the levels. The social structure of the ant is
> not dynamic, except in the course of evolution. No ant can decide to
> usurp the power of the queen and set up a kingdom.
On the contrary, an ant could and would promptly be killed. Also, future
queen ants do just this sort of usurping, culminating in regicide, do they
not?
> I believe that comes down to the ultimately unknowable. Prime Mover?
> God? Random accident in an alternate universe? It's here whether or not
> we can say how, as Platt so eloquently wrote. I did not say that change
> was not possible in the other levels, I maintain that an outside
> catalyst is required.
Yes, granted...but that does not need to be humans or sentient in any way,
shape, or form. It could be pure Dynamic Quality as Pirsig describes in
the above quote.
Anyway, I wasn't asking about how the universe was created, but rather how
life was created. Pirsig states that inorganic patterns created life
because it's "better."
> I don't see how you could take free will out of the intellectual level.
> I think "values" - (A "values" B) - and "choice" - (A "chooses" B) - are
> two entirely different concepts.
Well, what is your definition of free will? If it's an ability to choose
and electrons can choose and I can choose and animals can choose (all found
in that section in Lila), then all of those items have free will. I think
my definition of free will as a measure of Dynamic-ness fits better in the
MoQ then a human-centric one. It also seems more consistent with how Pirsig
seems to redefine choice in the MoQ.
But hey, I could be dead wrong...
Cheers,
Mark
________________________________________________________________________
Mark Brooks <mark@epiphanous.org> <http://www.epiphanous.org/>
How do you know who wrote this? <http://www.epiphanous.org/mark/pgp/>
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