Hi all !
This is a bit of personal mail between Bodvar and myself that he thought
might deserve publication. Well, I'll let you judge this.
The argument was : are emotions part of the social level (Bodvar's PoV)
or the biological (my PoV) ?
Denis Poisson wrote:
>
> Hi, Bodvar,
>
> B. Skutvik wrote:
> >
> > Denis!
> > We do not agree fully, but explaining one's own view often helps
> > clarifying it to oneself. I have long struggled with this aspect of
> > the quality idea and alternate between finding it an unnecessary
> > complication and a great improvement ... that is, the basic idea
> > needs no improvement merely a refinement, something that will make it
> > less vulnerable. If you follow the discussion you'll see how many
> > traps and "paradoxes" people are capable of discovering.
>
> Yeah, sometime I feel a bit discouraged by how many inconsistencies I am
> able to find in my own understanding of the MoQ, and how many paradoxes
> I'm unable to clarify, but remembering that a perfect metaphysics
> doesn't exists helps me (well, a little) to go on.
>
> > I wrote (quoting Pirsig) :
> > > "In the Metaphysics of Quality 'causation' is a metaphysical term that
> > > can be replaced by 'value'. To say that 'A causes B' or to say that 'B
> > > values precondition A' is to say the same thing. The difference is one
> > > of words only."
> >
> > > If we follow this argument to its logical conclusion, it basically
> > > states that apart from believing the scientific truth to be absolute (a
> > > belief that few scientists have, anyway) nothing really has to change in
> > > our understanding of the inorganic-biological levels, or in the methods
> > > used to discover them. In fact, Pirsig even says that SOM thinking was
> > > actually right in its desire to free the intellectual level from the
> > > interference of the biological and social levels in its search for the
> > > laws of nature. Under the MoQ, I think we should adopt a concept similar
> > > to objectivity, that we might call "non-interference of the levels".
>
> You answered :
> >
> > Exactly. Allow me an aside here. I have - besides the present
> > - forwarded the idea that Subject/Object metaphysics may be
> > regarded as the intellectual level of the MOQ itself. For, what is
> > REASON other than the value of distinguishing between objectivity and
> > subjectivity? That way SOM is no longer an alien metaphysics but an
> > integrated part of the MOQ. (if the acronym SOLAQI should pop up it
> > means: subject-object-logic-as-Q-intellect).
> >
>
> This idea has in fact many interesting points, but I wonder if you do
> not push it a tad too far. That we are able to think of ourselves as
> separates entities seems a good starting point for the rise of reason
> (but I still think of this term in a vague sense of social/intellectual
> levels thrown together - SOM mind if you will), but to define REASON
> (your definition of it - ie. the Intellectual level) as Subject-Object
> Logic seems, well, a bit too occidental to me.
> Since S/O logic is a discovery that can be historically and
> geographically located in Greece, 500 years BC, it would mean that
> basically, other civilizations never had an Intellectual level at all
> prior to this, and that until the 19th century it was the sole
> possession of western (and muslim) civilization ! That would also mean
> that by becoming a colonial power, the countries of Europe allowed the
> rest of the world to access the next evolutionary level (how nice of us
> !!!).
>
> I find that a bit hard to swallow. In my opinion, the existence of an
> oriental philosophy (buddhism, taoism) implies an intellectual level at
> work, and that, with your interpretation, would mean that there are two
> kinds of intellectual levels, that didn't grow from the same root. I
> think we should delve further than that to find the *real* root of the
> Intellectual level (the machine code, if you will).
>
> Our contribution to the world is more humble, I think. What we gave to
> the world at large is the notion that the Intellectual level should be
> superior to the Social (a notion many civilizations still have
> difficulties to swallow). That's all, and that's already a lot.
>
> Nevertheless, what I find good in your idea is that the S/O division is
> in some way the reason for the rise of the intellectual level. I'm not
> an anthropologist, but I suspect that every civilization express this
> concept in one form or another.
>
> > Back to the issue at hand.
> >
> > > Thus, if we want the MoQ to have any utility (and recognition) we have
> > > to define what we believe to be the basic blocks of the upper two levels
> > > , to discover the "machine code" between b/s and s/i levels, and then to
> > > develop theories and models for them. These probably won't be
> > > deterministic in the way i/b levels are (if we forget sub-atomic
> > > physics), but that shouldn't stop us. Once we understand these levels
> > > better, the chances of wrongful interference will lessen as a result.
> >
> > Agreed. I too would have liked to delve into this field, but it looks
> > like we are out-voted.
> >
>
> True, but it was a close shave. I think we'll have better luck next
> month.
>
> > > So to come back to your Interaction - Sensation - Emotion - Reason
> > > sequence, I think we can rightly talk about Interaction at the Inorganic
> > > level. It looks like a useful concept to me, and as long as we remember
> > > that we are only building a model, a static intellectual pattern, there
> > > is no need to branch off into epistemological battles.
> > > But, after that our opinions differ.
> >
> > > You seem to think that emotions grow out of sensations, while I see no
> > > reason to believe this at all (when I feel sad, or fearful, bodily
> > > sensations grow out of this emotion, not the reverse). If this isn't
> > > your point (your sequence isn't an evolutionary sequence) then I still
> > > fail to see why you would think this sequence would parallel the
> > > evolutionary scale of Pirsig.
> >
> > Does a bodily sensation grow out of emotions? All creatures sense,
> > even the simplest, but do they "emote" (is that a word? The problem
> > with English is the ambiguity of the term "feel". No better in
> > Norwegian for that matter, how is it in French?). In my view the pain
> > from being beaten is something more fundamental that the "pain" from
> > watching another person being beaten. The first is
> > biological/sensational the last social/emotional.
>
> Well, we have two french terms, but unfortunately, they overlap.
> "Sentir" is used for physical sensations (the five senses, pain,
> pleasure, etc.), "ressentir" for emotions, but also for the former. The
> interesting thing (which might bring water to your watermill, as we say)
> is that "ressentir" means (etymologically) to *re-feel* (to feel twice)
> which might mean that emotions are more abstracted than sensations, but
> I feel this is a heritage from SOM thinking. We put a distance between
> ourselves and our emotions, because they do not originate from an "real"
> (material) source. That might be the reason for your argument.
>
> BTW, I think no sensation or emotion is totally free from the
> interference of mind. When I was a teenager (12 or 13) I once touched a
> hot radiator in school, and instinctively withdrew my hand from it. I
> grew interested to see if I could divorce the sensation (dynamic
> perception) from the notion of pain (static interpretation), put my hand
> back on the radiator, and left it there, concentrating on the sensation
> *only*. After a while, the notion that I was feeling pain disappeared,
> leaving only the hot/cold tingling sensation in my hand, which wasn't
> either agreable or disagreable, it just *was*.
> Finally noticing that people were looking at me strangely, I withdrew my
> hand again, and after a while, losing my concentration, the pain
> resurfaced. The sensation didn't change, I just grew aware that it was
> pain I was feeling, that's all. In fact, after that I didn't give it
> much importance, and it soon faded.
> The false lesson in this is that our mind can divorce us from the real
> world, but in fact I think this experience only divorced me from the
> static interpretation of the sensation, leaving the dynamic sensation
> bare. When we burn ourselves, we get a sensation that we are
> (biologically) wired to recoil from, and then we interpret it as pain
> (an intellectual construct, after all), but the sensation in and of
> itself isn't pain, it's just a sensation. Mystics often talk about the
> notion of good and evil disapearing when enlightenment sets in, leaving
> only pure awareness (Quality).
>
> I think this is true at every level, we always filter and deform what we
> feel, giving it good or bad interpretation, that aren't really there. So
> feeling some pain as less real than others is probably IMHO just an
> interpretation of what you're really feeling.
>
> When my last affair (to which I accorded great importance) ended, I felt
> great pain (and had a lot of physical reactions : difficulty to breathe,
> acceleration of the pulse, watering of the eyes, hypernervous condition,
> etc.), more perhaps that it deserved, and definitely more than any
> recent physical pain I've felt (the last one of this latter type was
> when my mother accidentally put a hot frying pan in my hand, so that
> must tell you something).
>
> My point is, I put great importance (value) in a romantic relation, and
> it hurt me badly (don't cry, I've recovered ;) ), but very little in my
> burned hand, and the pain didn't last more than a few minutes (but my
> hand still was a bit oversensitive for two days). So, the two sensations
> having similar biological effects, I think they have basically the same
> origin. The difference we feel is only one of how much value we put in
> it. On a more grisly note, torturers often know that heightening the
> expectation of pain often makes it more unbearable to their victims :
> they are so sure that the pain will be unbearable that it *becomes* so.
> Amerindians, perhaps more in touch with the immediateness of experience,
> had a reputation for being able to endure great pain without faltering.
>
> >
> > Of course emotions have a modifying effect upon sensations,
> > it's a part of the MOQ doctrine that the upper level interferes with
> > the lower.
> >
>
> My example also illustrates this point, but in a different light. It was
> not my emotions that altered my feelings, but the static value I put in
> them both that altered my dynamic perception of them. If I had let go of
> the static value of my ill-fated romance, my pain would have been
> lessened (as it happened later).
>
> > > After all, why shouldn't we put both sensation and emotion under
> > > the biological label?
> >
> > For the reason that a huge part of the biological realm obviously
> > don't have the capability to show emotions except primates that live
> > in"societies". The more complex the social interaction the more
> > pronounced the emotions. It is of course very crude with many
> > species. Yet, when dogs snarls or cats raise the bristles it is a
> > signal that their opponent interpret as potential pain. In other
> > words: emotion is abstracted* sensation
> >
> > * [The term 'abstract' is of course SOM infested (as opposite to
> > what is concrete) but in the above context the next level is not less
> > real than the lower.]
> >
>
> I think it's more than SOM infested... it's owned by it. ;^)
> But to counter your example, cats are far less social creatures than
> dogs are, but they don't seem to exhibit less emotional range than dogs
> do.
>
> > > advanced emotion = reason. Hmm... I'd like you to develop this branch of
> > > your reasoning a bit further, because I have a hunch that until we find
> > > out more about the top-two levels, most research into this field will be
> > > a bit like groping in the dark.
> >
> > As above: abstracted emotion = REASON! The Q idea is that all
> > value levels evolved away from their original purpose and became
> > a value of its own. The abstraction idea shows how sensation became
> > so "advanced" that it took leave of its biological roots and became
> > social value (the members of a wolf pack demonstrate by BODY signals
> > what the SOCIAL position is) and likewise; SOCIAL signals
> > became more and more subtle, until they could be regarded as REASON
> >
>
> Another interpretation might go like this : inside a level, they are
> scales of evolution, as Pirsig justification of vegetarianism shows, and
> while there is good reason to believe emotions are more evolved than
> sensations (only higher mammals seem to possess them, but don't forget
> the green flash), nothing in the MoQ forces them to be in another level.
> So, the social level might have used these advanced sensations to build
> itself, like the biological level used the carbon atom properties to
> build itself, but I don't see you arguing than carbon is in the
> biological level. :)
> Also, just as life could have chosen another element (and it did : I
> read that some life forms far under the sea aren't based on
> carbon-hydrogen combinations. I think it was worms that live near
> undersea volcanos), social evolution has sometimes grown from instinct
> rather than emotions (like ants).
>
> > > For me, a dog defending its cubs regardless of pain is protecting a
> > > social pattern and overriding biological sensation okay. But is it an
> > > emotion that makes him do that, or an atavistic instinct ?
> >
> > "Instinct" is SOM's catch-all phrase. What makes a dog defend its
> > cubs is certainly a social instinct (or pattern - the same that makes
> > us defend our children). However, at the human scale the social
> > "instincts" have grown to include a lot of causes (family, tribe,
> > country) and become so complex that we call it love, patriotism
> > etc.
> >
>
> That isn't true, social instinct is nearly an oxymoron when applied to
> humans. Social codes are learned, not inherent in us. We have very
> low-level social instincts : a slight desire to protect our children,
> which seems nearly absent in men, the need for others (gregarious
> instinct), some hierarchical instinct, that's about all that can be
> defined as "social". The example below shows that "instinct" is very
> real and not a "SOM's catch-all phrase". While it has been used
> inapproprietly sometimes, it is mainly because we do not understand (and
> until this century, never had much interest in) the social level as an
> intellectual field of research.
>
> I think the main social root is the imitative instinct, displayed in
> young cubs or children games, that unables them to grasp the social
> intricacies of their societies. Humans also use education and language,
> but it is a evolution (inside the social level) upon the basic responses
> of most primates.
> As such, the human social level is mostly acquired, and reinforced with
> social notions of guilt, punishment and law. Other mammals, like dogs,
> have less of a choice when it comes to defending their youngsters, while
> we can (and unfortunately often do) run instead of endangering our lives
> for our children.
>
> > > A french biologist, Henri Laborit, has found out that the image of a hawk over
> > > freshly-hatched chicken produces an immediate response : lie down and
> > > play dead. Since this obviously cannot have been learned, it must be a
> > > kind of biological program, encoded somewhere in chicken DNA. The
> > > frontier between social and biological behaviour seems to vary according
> > > to species : some offspring are born with a lot of immediate knowledge,
> > > some others, like humans, with very little. This, obviously, is an
> > > advantage : the social level is much more dynamic than the biological. A
> > > needed change might take a million years if it is to change at the
> > > biological level, and only a few generations if at the social.
> >
> > Highly interesting, but "programmed" is similar to instincts. Human
> > babies are obviously both socially and even intellectually
> > programmed, and no doubt there are genes for those abilities and yet
> > aren't "biological" in a MOQ sense - - - no more than biology is
> > inorganic even if life is composed of matter. All value levels build
> > upon the lower one.
> >
>
> In fact I must correct my example. I remembered that I read this fact in
> "The Masks of God : Primitive Mythology", from J. Campbell, not in
> Laborit. In fact, the latter studied the cases of savage children (among
> other things, like hierarchical dynamics in social circles) and
> consistently proved that the child nervous system doesn't develop fully
> when deprived of human contact. Like a muscle that isn't used, it
> atrophies. Babies aren't intellectually or socially programmed, they
> just have the potential for programmation (a hard disk and a BIOS, if
> you want). If no programmation is done, the potential fades. The
> potential is biological, not social. The social level is a program that
> our biological nervous system *runs*. It is why I believe it is mostly
> acquired, and humans *don't* acquire emotions (but I accept that they
> are probably even further developped by the social level, because it
> *needs* them to reinforce social bonds, love being a good example), in
> fact they often have to repress some of them (like greed or anger) for
> the social good.
>
> The social level is ruthless in its use of emotions : it heightens the
> ones it needs, and stunts or repress those than endanger it. It is not
> composed of them, but of behaviours that have the force of tradition, of
> tales that exhalts the behaviours it values and of laws that repress
> those it doesn't, of ceremonies that heightens the emotions it wants
> (fear, aggressivity, a sense of community or respect for the leader, it
> depends on the ceremonies). Emotions are only the dynamic forces behind
> such behaviours, not the behaviours themselves. They are at the frontier
> of the b/s levels, but still mostly on the biological side.
>
> > > Hope you're doing good (and looking for answers to the universe riddles,
> > > it makes life interesting) :)
> >
> > I am constantly (regrettably :-)). There will certainly be many
> > opportunities for us to exchange views, but this is probable as much
> > as you can stand in one serving.
> >
> > Over to you.
> > Bo
>
> This was a long post, I hope I'm not overstreching your indulgence or
> patience, and that I've clarified my position enough. I think it is
> consistent, but any flaw you notice will be welcome.
>
> Sorry for the personal elements in this, I understand the rhetorical
> difficulties of attacking something that one might find emotionally
> charged, but don't worry, I can be a cold unemotional objective bastard
> when the mood strikes me, so don't feel restrained in your answer, I
> won't feel offended. Really. ;)
>
> Signed :
> The Cold Fish
>
> O
> o
> .
> -(:O)-
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