Robert,
I feel it may be worthwhile on both mine and your behalf for me to clarify
my position. I apologize if this response appears overdue, however I wanted
to take the time to perfect it. Before I begin, allow me to say that I
think it is excellent that you are skeptical of Pirsig's work and thus show
an interest in what I like to call pure metaphysics. Pure metaphysics, to
me, is concerned ONLY with what the divisions of reality are and how they
relate to one another. Unfortunately, we often ponder other things, such as
insanity or rhetoric, and draw upon conclusions that rest on an already
formulated system, a system that necessarily has flaws (this practice is
often considered, at least by Pirsig, under the umbrella of metaphysics.
For this reason I like to designate the term pure metaphysics in regards to
the traditional, more narrow study of the divisions of reality). I think it
is needed that more individuals question the pure metaphysics of a system,
even though these other studies are easier and more practical. If this
concentration allows us only to propel this juggernaught of understanding a
relatively small length, then so be it. As I am sure all of us would agree,
we should concern ourselves with the quality of our formulations, more
narrowly the intellectual quality, not necessarily the quantity. With that
said, I shall begin:
Let us assume, for the time being, that, as you and I have both been saying,
there are two parts to reality: mind and matter. To offer a critique of
relation with simply this or even in response to your previous posts would
be ignorant, for not yet has there been offered a critique of definition.
Once the two terms are satisfactorily defined, without contradiction, there
can then be questioning surround their relation. On that same note, to
reject any non-scientific ideas would also be ignorant, for philosophy
clearly transcends mere science in every way. I say these things to justify
my approach to your ideas in relation to some of the others hitherto
provided.
You have said, as have many before you, that knowledge, which is something
belonging to mind, comes from experience of matter, which, you seem to
imply, comes by the senses. However, you then say that because of the
mind's faculties of understanding it is able to infer with some certainty
that the outside world is, apart from the mind, as it appears. If I am
wrong in this perception, please correct me, for this is the precise point
at which we disagree.
We must accept that there are certain things that we know independent of
sensuous experience or a priori. For example, to use Kant's (whose
arguments this is based) initial example, if a man were to undermine his
house, he would not have to wait for it to fall to know that it would in
fact do so. We say he knows this a priori. What gives rise to this idea is
certainly experience, however this knowledge exists altogether separate from
any particular experience, even though it indeed does relate to it.
Once conceding to this, one realizes that knowledge a priori is responsible
for quite a bit. Consider causality: Nowhere in pure experience do we see
in an effect its cause. The cause and effect have no external relationship,
rather one a priori. We apply this idea to the sensory data we receive to
make it understandable. The same goes for time, space, relation, substance,
and so-on. These ideas, fundamentally detached from sensuous experience in
themselves, apply themselves to experience and produce objects as we know
them, NOT AS THEY ARE. Now obviously this explanation is very short and may
even be worded incorrectly as to show errors. This is likely, for such
things often do pass me by, so I recommend reading Kant, as you say you
shall, and just as well reading Hume, who essentially showed the flaws
empiricism (or dualistic empiricism, as you call it) has.
So we have tings dependant on the way in which we organize them through such
things as space, time, causality and so-on. The implication of this is that
the external wold, that is the world we sense beyond ourselves, has no known
substance. An object, AS WE KNOW IT, exists in our mind. Not just the
knowledge of an object, that's not idealism and that's not what I'm saying,
but everything about that object. What's left in the outside world is an
undefined mass with undefined properties. It is the stimulus for all mind
activity, and indeed is an interracial part to experience, but no less
undefined.
One may ask if our knowledge is necessarily false? I say yes and no. It is
false in that it does not reflect what we actually receive through the
senses. However, it is true in its existence in our mind. As Pirsig writes
on pg. 118,
"Hume['s] motorcycle [the one outside of ourselves] ... provides ... [us]
with no evidence whatsoever for such concepts as causation. ...
Kant says ... we have in our minds a very real a priori motorcycle whose
existence we have no reason to doubt, whose reality can be confirmed at any
time."
With this, I should relate things more directly to what you have been
saying. Forgive me if I seem to beat the obvious to death, however I suffer
from this terrible flaw of never knowing what my reader is experiencing.
Hence occasionally I will go on too much, but more commonly go on too
little. Anyway, you first say,
>I think I agree with what
>you are saying. "Any object
>relies on our mind totally."
>I could reword it to say
>"knowledge of any object
>relies on inference from the
>mind's experiences."
>
>I only disagree in thinking
>"how does this contradict what
>I am saying".
Whether the two quotes are contradictory I must honestly admit I cannot
determine. The language in both quotes is very technical, relying on
reasoning far detached from the actual words in themselves. To provide a
relevant analysis would be altogether fruitless. I would like to take a few
lines from other places in your writings and use them to show what our
difference is, as it seems to be a large one.
> There is the experience
> AND the external form/
> structure separate from
> experience but verified
> by experience.
There is a structure that stimulates our mind and initiates experience,
however that separate has no way of being verified by the mind.
> Suppose, for example (gloom alert), there was no experience because
> everyone died. This dualism says that there would still remain bunch > of
dead bodies (external structure) around. We can not know this,
> but it is reasonable to assume. I can't deny that to perceive
> reality, it must be perceived.
This assumption is indeed natural in that most people think this way. But
as most people pre-Copernican thought the sun orbited us, the natural way of
thinking isn't always correct. The assumption of form in any sort of world
OUTSIDE of ourselves is not reasonable. If the self disappears, all form
disappears. The only exception, at least according to the MOQ, is pure,
untouched quality.
> The duality only comes from
>intellectual assumption of an
>external structure. But this
>assumption does not mean the
>intellect is wrong. I'm over
>99% certain that there actually
>*is* a computer which I am using
>to type this message -- not just
>the perception of a computer.
An assumption indeed, but one that is necessarily wrong. Intellect is
founded upon principles which in themselves blind us to what we are truly
experiencing. I am 100% sure there is actually a computer that I am typing
on, however its position in the ultimate scheme of things is subordinate to
myself.
I think this illustrates my point well enough, however I still have a few
things to ask and say.
> I can't deny that to perceive
>reality, it must be perceived.
Your statement's truth is in the fact that the predicate is contained in the
subject. I agree with you for that, but what exactly do you mean?
> If think that your "pre-organic"
>and my "duality" are the similar,
>but I get out of the level mess.
By creating the term "pre-inorganic" (not pre-organic) I am attempting to
fit these a priori intuitions into the MOQ. This is an effort that I now
see as somewhat misplaced. Maybe at a later date I will expand on the
compatibilities and overall conception I have about how dualism relates to
the MOQ. For now I wish to leave the arguments presented in this post as
they are.
> Your post reinforces the meaning behind the catechism: Dualistic
> empiricism. Not empirical dualism!
Indeed, I agree with the most general concept Dualistic empiricism, as I am
sure the MOQ does too, however disagrees upon the finer points, points
nonetheless crucial to the implications and nature of the system.
Before I conclude, I have one last question. In what context do you use the
term intuition? You use it more often than most people I know, and I am
thus interested in how you see it.
I must apologize again if I have not discussed the implications of our
ideas, such as whether the "self" can be reduced to scientific knowledge,
however, for the reasons outlined in the introduction, I do not see it as a
fruitful study as its conclusions are probably false. Thank you for your
time, and, if you are not too busy responding to all of the other rebuttals,
please respond to mine,
Ryan
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