R.Stillwell and All:
Robert asks, "First, where did you get this notion that atoms have
experiences? Did Pirsig say this?"
Yes, I got the notion from reading Lila. One very important aspect of
the MOQ's scheme is to replace SOM's causality with an act of
"value-ing". It seems linguistically awkward, but its just a way of
rethinking physics in a less mechanistic way. Instead of saying A causes
B, the MOQ says that B values pre-condition A. (Or some such
re-formulation.) Sorry I don't have a page number, but I'd bet someone
does, and I'd guess all of the older members have seen this idea. I'm
sure Pirsig never used the phrase "atom consciousness", but the
implication is that even inorganic patterns have evolved by way of
experience, instead of SOM's machine-like cause and effect. All four
levels have evolved in this same way.
Robert asks, "Second, by what mechanism does the choice of an atom enter
into my consciousness? I don't think atom consciousness solves the SO
dilemma -- it complicates it by adding more subjects...how can the
atom's experience interact with mine without there being a structure
linking us? Again reality remains dualistic -- experience and the
external structure"
Whoa! Your original question, asking "by what mechanism?", grows into a
monster of a query involving the solution to the SO dilemma! The MOQ
does claim to solve the problems with subject object metaphysics (SOM),
but your question asks me to reiterate the entire Lila project!
I mean that's what its all about, solving classic SOM traps like the
mind/body problem. (Not to mention his attack on amorality of scientific
objectivity.) The MOQ shows how seemingly un-solvable philosophical
problems like this are really just bad questions, questions based on
mistaken concepts. Pirsig doesn't tackle these questions by answering
them head-on, so much as he makes the questions disappear. They
dis-solve into meaninglessness.
But to say exactly how it all works would require much more than the
25-35 pages you've planned to produce. Solving the SO dilemma, as you
put it, is precisely what Pirsig claims to do with his MOQ. Its really,
really big.
To address the second question more directly, I'd simply say that in the
MOQ experience and structure are one and the same. Again, even inorganic
patterns have values and experiences, what you might call "atom
consciousness". Just as the "material" world is endowed with awareness,
cultures and philosophies are seen as having a structure, a purpose and
a rightness that is just as "solid", even if they aren't "material"
realities. Ideas are as real as rocks. How did Pirsig put it? Mind is
contained by matter and matter is contained by mind? Something like
that? Maybe someone can help with this page # too.
This is one of the ways to see how the mind/body problem disappears; If
matter and mind are seen as different levels of the same static quality,
then the split between them is healed. The material world, our physical
bodies, our language and culture, and our ideas and philosophies are all
made of static patterns of values and they've all evolved in the same
way, by the same "mechanism" if you like. All these static patterns have
been left in the wake of direct experience. The phenomenal world is the
very structure of experience. The world is made of captured knowledge,
so to speak.
I'm usually just annoyed when others do it, but I'm going to ask that
you read some posts that I wrote on this topic. Its not that I wish to
appear lazy, but I'm talking about 3 or 4 posts that add up to at least
a dozen pages. If you're interested in the mind/matter split and
Pirsig's solution to it, you might find some relevant ideas there. We
discussed the "self" as seen in the MOQ, and we did it in the
disciplined and deliberate forum so the posts are pretty well focused.
If you went to the archives you'd be looking for all my lilasquad posts
from July. I don't mean to suggest that mine are the only posts worth
reading, but I think they relate to your questions directly. You could
put them all together and make a paper titled, "How Pirsig's MOQ
dissolves the mind/body problem and creepy stuff like that" : - )
I'm awfully torn. Its hard to decide whether I should join Rich's
Romantic Platypi Association or join you as a big-time wrestler in a tag
team match. (And golly gee I'm such a sissy. I don't think I CAN hold
'em down.) I propose that we all band together and create an
international intellectual terrorist organization. We'll terrorize them
with Pirsig's value-centered philosophy. We'll leave nasty letters on
the steps of all the major capital buildings, harshly denouncing their
metaphysical systems. That oughtta shake 'em up! We'll create an
artificial shortage of ontological categories! Then we'll see how they
get along. We'll corner the global empirical data market! That'll bring
'em to their knees. (SFX: sinister laughter)
Robert also asks, "Are you asserting there is a "world" or "ultimate
reality" that is seperate from that which is perceived (however
unknowable that world is)? If so, how does one reconcile this with the
MOQ, which says there is only one thing."
But Robert, you ask this in response to my assertion that the MOQ makes
NO CLAIMS of knowledge about the nature of the ultimate reality. You are
correct in pointing out that the MOQ says there is only one thing, but
there is also a dualism. Pirsig has divided reality into two parts. One
is the world we can map and measure and define, also known as the four
levels of static patterns of Quality. I like to call it phenomenal
reality. (How closely the map matches the road is something we can never
really know, so we have to settle for what works. Hence we get Pirsig's
many-truths provisionality)
The other half of this dualism is the part we CAN NOT map, measure or
define. It is beyond words and concepts, it is an ineffable mystery,
also known as Dynamic Quality. Pirsig ended ZAAM without ever giving any
clear idea of what "Quality" really is. And he wrote Lila to provide at
least some definate answers, but DQ remains undefined. He points to it
alot, and even makes it the force behind creation, but only the static
patterns can really be conceptualized and defined.
I think its interesting to note that Pirsig's dualism puts all of known
reality on one side of the duality. The entire phenomenal universe is
made of static patterns of Quality and Dynamic Quality is what's left.
Can you imagine what's left when you take away the entire phenomenal
universe? Nope. It's beyond imagination. It's beyond language and the
intellect. Its DQ. So, yea there's only one thing, but there are two
distinctly different forms of that same thing; static and dynamic.
And Robert asked Roger and Rich, "Are you both asserting the MOQ is an
idealism?"
I don't mean to butt-in, but it seems that what I've written here could
also be construed as some kind of idealism. While there is the notion
that even inorganic "matter" has experience and limited awareness, I
don't think you could properly say atoms have ideas. Experience on that
level isn't like human experience and there is no intellect involved. It
follows that it isn't really an idea creating reality on that level,
rather it is "experience" in a different sense.
I like Emerson's expression, "Nature is mind precipitated."
David B.
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