Hello everyone
Long time no write!
I came across John Beasley's "Creating an Organismic Metaphysics of Quality"
yesterday while browsing moq_discuss and read it over several times before
coming back today and re reading. Having some free time now, I have several
comments I'd like to share; first, great job John! Very well written and
engaging in style. I might not necessarily agree with your conclusions, as
you will see, but this in no way detracts from value in your paper. While I
have many comments, I will start here as this seems foundational to
disagreements I have.
John wrote:
When Pirsig says "a thing that has no value does not exist", he is
overstating his case. At a fundamental level all language can be seen as
carrying static value. Most words only form from experiences of value.
According to his logic, if there was no value for me in a word, it would not
become part of my vocabulary. However some words seem clearly functional
without value - the word the will do as an example. The fills a grammatical
role in language, but as a word it is empty of content and equally empty of
value. You might argue it has a grammatical or syntactical value, but this
is to apply a different standard. The value Pirsig implies is the primary
value arising out of dynamic experience. To now move in the reverse
direction, is it not at least possible that there may be some 'things' which
we do experience as existing, but function like the word 'the' as a
component of our ordering of experience, without value? If so, it seems a
fundamental statement of Pirsig's metaphysics is flawed. To me it seems the
word "the" is itself sufficient refutation. It may well be that a whole
class of mathematical and logical terms, for example, are of this type. Or
can you explain for me how I might distinguish the values of seventeen and
eighteen respectively? (from essay - Creating an Organismic Metaphysics of
Quality)
Dan:
Hi John
Pirsig's MOQ principle "a thing that has no value does not exist" seems
related to Niels Bohr's framework of complementarity which itself contains
very deep complexities pertaining to why it is we must neglect "hidden
variables" or "quantum of action" in order for (unambiguous) value to arise
from observation. To say Pirsig overstates his case here is to ignore this
vital link to forming agreements with MOQ and complementarity. If anything,
I would say Pirsig doesn't state his principle emphatically enough. Your
statement of "the" as being without value seems to indicate this.
"The" refers implicitly to object as existing separately from subject. Value
in "the" resides not in words but in conceptual agreements we as users of
(english) language have formed with our reality. "The" implicitly contains
value pertaining to external reality existing as something "real" and "out
there" and aids in formulating unambiguous agreements of objectivity. Yet
"the" is not necessary to english language and is grossly overused by most
everyone. While this seemingly contradicts "the" as having value, I like to
view this as indicative of implicate value easily overlooked.
On value, if something costs $18 and you only have $17 in your pocket,
distinguishing value is not difficult. However, delving deeper, implicate
subject/object value contained in words like "the", "good", "bad",
"positive", "negative", all referring to subjectively objectified
situations, all seem to lose meaning (value) in Pirsig's MOQ. One of my
favorite authors, R. Buckminster Fuller writes:
"Science's discovery of fundamental complementarity has frequently
occasioned individual scientist's realization that the word 'negative' used
as the opposite of 'positive' is at best carelessly and misinformedly
employed. Since complementarity is essential to the success of eternally
regenerative Universe, the phenomenon identified as the opposite of
'positive' cannot be 'negative', nor can it be 'bad', since the interopposed
phenomena known heretofore as 'good' and 'bad' are essential to 100%
eternally regenerative Universe. They are both 'good' for Universe."
(Critical Path, foreword)
By comparing Pirsig's MOQ and Bohr's framework of complementarity as
complete and unitary descriptions of experience/observation I believe
further understanding can be reached as to just what Pirsig's value-centered
universe means. However this also entails fundamentally shifting our
perspective by learning whole new intellectual patterns of value, requiring
much effort and time. I also agree with Avid that higher value is acheived
in disagreements rather than in agreements and I look forward to your
comments on them, John.
Struan writes:
For what it is worth . . . . . . .
John, that is a profoundly impressive piece of work and I am seriously
looking forward to the debate
which must arise from it. Your meta-ethical critique especially is
beautifully put, and when I read,
"The problem here is how to understand the terms morality and value," my
face lit up as I have
banging on about this for months and getting mainly blank looks. I hope that
everyone will take a
couple of hours (at least) over this in order that we might dig deep into
the foundations of a
metaphysics which claims value at the core. Unless we understand what we
mean when we say that, we
are in big trouble. Your statement "C. "Most organisms encounter the world
through experiences of
positive and negative value, and what does not have value for them is not
experienced, hence is not
encountered," is an interesting, coherent and adept resolution but it does,
as you say, limit the
scope of the metaphysics. I wonder if anyone can remove that limitation and
broaden it back out
again. These meta-ethical issues have been swept under the carpet for too
long and I thank you for
bringing them back out.
Dan:
Hi Struan
By using foundational value-situations, Pirsig effectively eliminates any
reference to 'good' or 'bad', 'positive' or 'negative' situations and
instead seems to institute scales of value, from low to high. Instead of
saying "sitting on a hot stove is bad" Pirsig states it to be low-value,
which does not necessarily equate with 'bad' or 'negative' unless taken as
subjective.
John's statement:
"C. Most organisms encounter the world through experiences of
positive and negative value, and what does not have value for them is not
experienced, hence is not
encountered."
Dan:
Firstly, I feel this imposes antropocentric viewpoints upon that which
cannot be experienced, namely, another consciousness. Our universe is
encountered through experience, this is undeniable. Secondly, Pirsig's MOQ
states experience is Quality. Whether said experiences are 'good' or 'bad'
is completely irrelevant, for as Bucky Fuller says, "they are both 'good'
for Universe." Thirdly, I feel distinct airs of subjectivity blowing through
your words here as in "for them." For instance, one negative experience
might be thought of as sticking needles in my eye. Yet eye surgery may
require just such action for it would seem to contain higher value than
going blind. By using such words as 'positive' and 'negative' we are sinking
into relativism and not advancing Pirsig's more expansive MOQ.
Well, it's Good to be back! Any comments are appreciated.
Best wishes
Dan (glove)
"Learn as if you were following someone whom you could not catch up to, as
though it were someone you were frightened of losing." (Anonymous)
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