MD Organismic MOQ

From: John Beasley (beasley@qld.cc)
Date: Tue Aug 31 1999 - 11:54:20 BST


Dear Davids and others following this thread,

David B first. It is good that you are focussing on one specific issue, and
thanks for taking the
time to clarify your thinking for me. I agree this is a crucial issue, and
you have at least made
clear where we differ. I am not sure I can sway your opinion on this, but
will try. Your
statements of what you take to be my position are pretty accurate, though we
may be using
some terms differently, so its always hard to be sure.

To grossly over-simplify your arguments, you appear to be saying two things.
First, that
mysticism and dynamic quality share "a radical shift away from ordinary modes of
consciousness", and second, that the biological level is solely a static
level, "and so its hard
to imagine that the biological could be dynamic or mystical".

I would like to tackle the second point first. Pirsig introduces his key
statement "that Quality
is the primary empirical reality of the world" (Lila Ch 5) with the example
of the hot stove. Of
this he says "The value itself is an experience", and later, "It [this
value] is more real than the
stove". Now it seems clear to me that this is a dynamic biological
experience. Judgements
and descriptions of this experience are properly defined as static, but the
experience itself is
dynamic. Subjects and objects (of which the stove is one) are also static
derivatives from the
experience, and Pirsig rightly insists that the value in the experience is
prior to any division
into subject and object. "Between the subject and the object lies the value".

Now all this is problematical only to human beings who have the intellectual
equipment to
create notions of subject and object, and use language to name objects such
as stoves. A
great many living organisms can react to the negative value of experiencing
contact with a
hot stove in the same way that a person would; by withdrawing. Their
experience has been
no less dynamic, but they are spared the complexities of thought which so
complicates things
for us. Do you challenge the ability of 'lower' organisms to experience value?

So not only am I asserting that organisms other than humans can experience
dynamic quality
or value through biological experiences, but that for most this is indeed
their only form of
dynamic experience.

Now to your first point. You are correct in seeing a strand in Pirsig's
writing that equates
mysticism with various shifts in consciousness. I can understand your
assertion that "the
MOQ is basically a metaphysics of mysticism", and "that a drug-induced
mystical experience
could become the basis for a serious metaphysics". And yes, I am skeptical.

Perhaps I need to explain how I view this. It seems to me that human beings
inhabit a
number of discrete 'universes'. I like the idea that the structure of the
brain is itself indicative
of these different realms, though it probably does not matter if this is an
over simplification.
So the 'reptilian' brain operates to rapidly orient the organism to respond
to threats or
opportunities in the environment. The senses do have a role here, for
without them all
organisms would simply blunder about until they met their deaths. But the
senses do not
equate to experience. Experience, and Pirsig is emphatic on this point, is
the encounter with
value, with quality. The value is in the interaction, the experience, the
encounter. It is
inexplicable (just as the color red is inexplicable) in purely physical
terms. The senses are at
least partly explicable in terms of receptors and neurons, and so on.

But human beings are also social animals, and share with a number of other
species the
enlarged 'mammalian' brain that enables complex social interactions to
develop. Lyall
Watson asserts in "Dark Nature" that amongst our nearest relatives, the
chimpanzees, more
deaths are caused by other chimpanzees than by predation or illness or
starvation. To
survive, highly honed social skills are essential. But social codes are
often in conflict with
biological imperatives. One of the consequences of this mismatch between
'universes' is that
organisms learn to deny their awareness at a biological level in order to
maintain the social
code. So we attempt to appear cheerful at a party, no matter how depressed
we may feel
inside. We disguise our anger with the boss to retain a job, and so on. This
denial is not just
play-acting, and the loss can be almost total, witness the number of men who
learnt as
youngsters not to cry, and now to all practical intent cannot cry.

The hugely enlarged cerebral cortex that accompanies the development of
language, logic,
temporal awareness, and so on, that distinguishes our species from all
others, also comes at
a huge cost. Obsessions, phobias, projections, fantasies, and neuroses share
a common
feature - the distortion of experience to fit the various mental constructs
which drive them.
The ability to remember and to imagine allows the creation of all sorts of
pseudo realities that
become more real than our biological experiences. So people will suffer loss
or death for the
sake of ideals, or religious faith, or ideologies. And these beliefs as they
become more
individualistic also become more alienating. Of course there is a plus side
to all this. The
development of science and technology has only occurred because of these
abilities. But the
secret loneliness of which Pirsig writes is a consequence of the loss of the
assured social
values of the Victorian era, and their replacement by the values of the
intellect.

What the mystic craves is a return to the unity of preconceptual, presocial
experience. This
can be expressed in intellectual terms as seeking a unifying spiritual
reality, but in practical
terms the various paths to mystic experience (and some would challenge their
effectiveness)
tend to agree upon stilling the over-busy mind, and regaining the lost
simplicity of organismic
experience. Some quite directly focus upon an object such as a vase, and the
attempt to just
see what is, rather than read into the viewing the distortions caused by the
social and
intellectual levels. Others aim for an existence where one does what needs
to be done with
awareness, living in the moment. I would be the first to concede that there
are many other
strands to mysticism, and while I claim no mystic experience myself, from my
reading in this
area I am inclined to suspect that there is not just one mystic state or
experience, but many.

Your understanding of dynamic quality suggests it is separate from and
different from
ordinary everyday experience. My view is that it is always potentially
present in everyday
experience, but our 'higher' level social and intellectual constructs are
actually responsible
for muting or destroying our potential to make contact with the dynamic in
the everyday
biological sphere. To put this differently, when I live in my intellect I
cease to live in the real
world where I can experience dynamic quality. The quality of the dynamic in
the intellectual
sphere (a meta-quality?) it seems to me is inferior to the quality of the
dynamic at other
levels, but I certainly argue that dynamic quality occurs in at least the
three higher levels.

In my other article on the forum I explore the way quality varies at the
different levels. I do not
believe quality is unified as Pirsig seems to want, and so I cannot accept
the attempt to paint
quality as some sort of primal essence (your primary empirical reality)
which mystics are
more in touch with than the rest of us. I am happy to believe that mystics
do encounter
different mental states, but by restricting rather than expanding
consciousness. This is
somewhat paradoxical, but it seems to be the case.

David L. You speak as an insider who has experience of the mystic level. I
would be
interested in your reaction to the above. You suggest that mystic
transcendence is freer than
the biological, social and intellectual levels. I am not sure that I see a
hierarchy which
increases freedom as we move up the levels, though that may be true. What I
perceive is
that the supposed freedom comes at a cost, and that cost is usually in a
loss of contact with
the dynamic at other levels. I am not saying this is necessarily the case,
just that it commonly
is.

Must close,

John B

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