Hi Platt, Ken, David B. and all,
Platt, I very much enjoyed your post, and agree with most of it.
What I disagree about is that MoQ itself is a moral compass.
On this I take issue with Pirsig himself.
Pirsig thinks so.
PLATT
> Ken stated the key quote from Lila that unequivocally positions the
> MOQ as providing a moral compass:
>
> "In general, given a choice of two courses to follow and all other
> things being equal, that choice which is more dynamic, that is, at a
> higher level of evolution is more moral."
>
How do we define the dynamic choice. I suppose it is the path never taken
before, but how can that take precedence over the tried and tested? I am
reminded of the scoring system in duplicate bridge which gives a bonus to
the
pair who reaches an "equivalent" contract which is different from the
contract reached by every competing
pair playing that hand. This places a value on uniqueness.
There is nothing wrong in this per se.
But should uniqueness always be valued? Should we "value" the actions of a
loner who lets loose with an automatic weapon in a supermarket". This
strikes me as wrong.
I can't believe that's what Pirsig means.
However, let's not forget Pirsig's get-out clause - there's nothing moral
about a higher level destroying the lower levels on which is built. That
principal rules out certain "more dynamic" choices. In the end, the MoQ
doesn't really tell us how to make that judgement.
PLATT
> Jonathan objects to the notion that the MOQ can be used as a
> moral guide. He believes that our moral compass "is the same
> moral sense that has been with us since man first appeared on this
> planet." I understand this to mean that man has an innate moral
> sense, similar to Rousseau's belief that civilisation corrupts the
> basic goodness of man.
That sounds reasonable, though I wasn't specifically referring to Rousseau.
Furthermore, I regard it as more of an axiom than a judgement i.e. I don't
judge man's instincts to be moral, but derive morality from man's instincts.
You should also remember the sentence I followed with:
>>What has changed is that we've learned to
>>extrapolate a long way from action to consequences, and
>>thus are able to apply that morality much more intelligently.
PLATT
> Where do others turn for moral guidance?
> In the Western World the church, represented by ministers, priests
> and rabbis, stands as the highest and most widely accepted moral
> authority. Many believe the Ten Commandments and the Golden
> rule are the only moral compass one needs.
Do rules/laws constitute morality? IMO they do, but indirectly. I don't have
a MORAL belief in the speed limit. Maybe there are good arguments for
driving 10% faster, or perhaps slower. However, in very many cases I defer
that judgement. I believe that it is moral to drive safely, and one way to
do that is to follow rules established from experience and precedent.
I also believe that one is obliged to break rules when one's conscience
dictates. Actually, the Israeli Army has a bizarre and ironic rule by which
one is *forbidden* from obeying an "illegal" order from a superior officer.
This came about as a result of a horrible and bloody incident at Kfar
Kassem, when the soldiers responsible were denied the defence of "following
orders".
In real life it's all very complicated. I don't see how the MoQ provides a
compass to navigate, though it seems to agree that we need one.
> Then there are the relativists, particularly popular in academia, who
> hold that one can make meaningful moral decisions only in the
> social context in which a moral problem occurs. Sharing one's wife
> with an overnight guest may be right in an Eskimo igloo, but not in
> Wichita, Kansas. Also popular in academia are the contextualists
> who, like the relativists, hold that moral decisions can only be
> decided within a specific situation. "Don't steal" is OK as a general
> guideline, but must be abandoned if the unique situation calls for it.
> (Also called "situation ethics.")
I don't see a problem with this. Is it immoral when a man steals a loaf of
bread to feed his starving children?
[snip]
> That the relativists and contextualists have pretty much made a
> mess of things is hardly debatable, symbolized (as a recent U.S
> News editorial says) "by college students who can't bring
> themselves to criticize the Holocaust." Among many students
> today, to be "judgmental" is a sin, the irony of which escapes
> them.
I completely agree. Relativism is used as an excuse for a multitude of sins.
Usually a lot of deceit and self-deceit is involved e.g. pretending that the
situation is distinguished because of a few minor details, when the wider
context remains the same.
(Dave B. - here you have a new opening to attack Truman's A-bomb decision.
Was the situation "special" or not?)
[snip]
PLATT
> Morality from pure philosophy has pretty much come a cropper due
> to the suspicion, confirmed by recent history, that any point of view
> can be rationalized.
Beautifully put. That's why Pirsig puts values first. Philosophy should come
from morality, not the other way round!
[snip]
>On the other hand, ancient religious texts, both East
> and West, offer authentic instructions about how man must act to
> survive and thrive, based on experiences handed down by word of
> mouth from earliest times. If you're looking for the moral lessons of
> man's history before philosophy was born, you'll find them in the
> Bible and the writings of Eastern holy men.
>
> What of man's innate moral compass?
The oral and written traditions have carried forward that compass. However,
like all transcriptions, it is open to corruption
>Based on the historical
> record, I have little reason to think man is basically good. Without
> societal or religious restraints--the fear of punishment--murder, rape
> and pillaging quickly becomes the prevailing lifestyle.
But why separate "man" from man's social systems? That is the mistake.
The social patterns would never have consolidated if they didn't serve some
human need.
It's ALL mankind.
[snip]
PLATT
> Unfortunately, I fear [the MoQ] will suffer the fate of philosophies
before it,
> not only as Jonathan says because of it's complexity and invitation
> to varying interpretation, but because its fails to produce an
> emotional as well as a cerebral response.
That's the point of ZAMM. Emotions and feelings matter!!!!!
For me ZAMM is an integral part of the MoQ equation.
> In the MOQ, a mother's
> sacrifice for her child or a father's loyalty to the tribe are
> categorized as mere biological functions.
1. Are they?
2. Should they be?
> I'm afraid a morality that
> denies a high position to fundamental feelings will never catch on. "I
> feel your pain" strikes a deep responsive chord in the human
> breast, but apparently not in Pirsig's. And perhaps that's the crux
> of Jonathan's objection.
>
Platt, I think we are in fairly close agreement. My overall "feeling" is
that this is what Pirsig means, despite his sometimes contradictory attempts
to explain it.
Jonathan
P.S. Ken raises some interesting points on the origins of quality. I'd like
to address this when I have more time.
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