Hi Platt & Squad
On 22 Dec 99, at 22:40, Platt Holden wrote:
> Horse, your recent contributions to the discussion are like a breath of fresh
> air. I cannot hope to match the depth and breadth of your answers to my
> questions. You make a good case for “context” as opposed to
> “contextualism” and define “relativism” in a way that clarifies what makes it
> different from your context approach to moral issues.
Cheers Platt. The main barrier to understanding on this list is the terminology we use when
expressing our ideas and I take my share of the blame for this.
> Regarding my question about universal moral truths, I thought your example
> of the doctor letting loose germs on the patient who didn’t want to live was a
> bit of a stretch, and I’m still a bit befuddled by the subtle distinctions you
> make between “circumstances,” “context” and “environment.” But these are
> relatively (-: minor quibbles compared to a major consensus we’ve reached.
I'll try and clear this up then. In the germ/patient example the quote in question:
"...given a value-centered Metaphysics of Quality, it is absolutely, scientifically moral for a
doctor to prefer the patient. This is not just an arbitrary social convention that should apply
to some doctors but not to all doctors, or to some cultures but not all cultures. It's true for all
people at all times, now and forever, a moral pattern of reality as real as H2O. We're at last
dealing with morals on the basis of reason."
is preceeded by:
"In general, given a choice between two courses to follow and all other things being equal,
that choice which is more Dynamic, that is, at a higher level of evolution, is more moral. An
example of this is the statement that, 'It's more moral for a Doctor to kill a germ than to allow
the germ to kill his patient.' The germ wants to live. The patient wants to live. But the patient
has moral precedence because he's at a higher level of evolution."
In keeping with the over-simplification created by the phrase "all other things being equal"
(see my post of 31 Jan 1999) the key phrase here is:
"The germ wants to live. The patient wants to live."
This creates the context within which the Doctor make a moral judgement and quite
correctly will choose the patient. The patient has moral precedence over the germ. But
change one word and the context changes:
"The germ wants to live. The patient wants to die."
Now it is a case of the Patient exercising moral precedence over the Doctor. The patient has
the right (Intellectual Value) to self-determination and may choose to die. When he instructs
the Doctor, either verbally, by living-will or by proxy that he wishes to die the Doctor is not
then acting morally if he ignores the Patients wishes and favours the Patient over the germ.
You could alter the context again by discovering the patient is not 'mentally competent' and
the outcome may be different. Or maybe other circumstances come to light which further
complicate the situation and subsequently the correct moral choice changes.
> HORSE:
> I’m not saying we don’t have free will but I would prefer that this belief can be
> shown to be supported by the MoQ and if not what is the alternative. Can we
> show this to be the case due to our experience? Is there something in a
> value-based hierarchy such as the MoQ that provides at least a reasonable
> basis for belief in free will? (Later) Altruism and free will seem to be co-
> dependent.
>
> PLATT:
> As I argued before, morals and free will go together. You can’t have one
> without the other.
I agree completely, which is why it is so important to show how the MoQ supports free will.
> I define free will as the ability to choose between alternative actions. It is
> freedom of choice that makes morals relevant to our world.
But the above seems to be circular reasoning. Freedom of choice is necessary in order that
moral decisions are valid but moral decisions are only valid if we have free will which gives us
the freedom to choose.
>
> Pirsig defines free will as “the philosophic doctrine that man makes choices
> independent of the atoms of his body.” He further states, “If the belief in free
> will is abandoned, morality must seemingly also be abandoned under a
> subject-object metaphysics. If man follows the cause-and-effect laws of
> substance, then man cannot really CHOOSE between right and wrong.”
> (Emphasis added) (Lila, Chap 12.)
Agreed. Even if we reject determinism in favour of a statistical or indeterministic (quantum
theory) system then we can still say little about Free Will as neither a statistical
methodology or random events support the concept of choice. This whole approach needs to
go.
>
> He then cites the ubiquitous nature of choice at all levels of the MoQ, as in
> the following examples:
>
> “The chemistry of life is the chemistry of carbon. What distinguishes all the
> species of plants and animals is, in the final analysis, differences in the way
> carbon atoms CHOOSE to bond.” (Chap. 11.)
>
> “On the other hand, the shift in cell reproduction from mitosis to meiosis to
> permit sexual CHOICE and allow huge DNA diversification is a Dynamic
> advance. (Chap. 11.)
>
> “A bacterium gets no CHOICE in what its progeny are going to be, but a
> queen been gets to select from thousands of drones. That selection is
> Dynamic. In all sexual selection, Lila CHOOSES, Dynamically, the individual
> she wants to project into the future.” (Chap. 15.)
>
> I agree that the free will assumption as well as other fundamental premises
> on which we base our beliefs ought to be revealed and examined. But it
> seems to me the assumption of free will goes hand in hand with the concept
> of morals, and I would be interested in what “other possibilities” you think
> there might be.
The first thing that is necessary is to dump the idea of causality as foundational which is
inherent in a Materialistic, deterministic, cause and effect doctrine (Jonathan has provided an
excellent paper on this in "The End of Causality" at the MoQ site) in favour of a contributory
or participative view of reality which I believe the MoQ supports.
In this scheme it is contribution to and participation in the world which creates reality not the
rigid physical laws of matter. Ilya Prigogine's ideas on dissipative structures and Maturana
and Varela's Santiago theory seem to support this view.
An objective and absolute view of a functioning universe goes out the window to be replaced
by the idea of participation in an indivisible whole. In a participatory structure we are
influenced by events which contribute to but do not determine our actions. The degree to
which freedom of choice is possible depends upon the complexity of any part of the overall
system as the greater the complexity the greater the number of possible outcomes which
increases the scope for choice. A cell is more complex than an atom, whilst an organism is
more complex than a cell etc.
I'm still working on this as a possible approach so I don't have a pat answer to the question
"does this approach unequivocally support free will". It does seem to mesh reasonably with
the MoQ in that an increase in complexity relates to an increase in value/morality.
I've got lots more reading to do yet so don't expect an answer in the near future - but at least
it's a start.
> There’s much more in your 21 Dec post deserving of comment, but since I
> generally agree with most of it, I’d like to move on to your 22 Dec. post to
> Walter
Which seems to be a reasonable place to end this post. I've moved the rest of your
comments and questions to the "Bottom Up Morality" thread which I shall start on after I've
had some sleep and attended to some pressing family type activities.
Horse
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