Diana McPartlin (diana@asiantravel.com)
Mon, 6 Oct 1997 19:00:08 +0100
Magnus Berg wrote:
> Descriptions of the behaviors of the levels are as good as any other
> approach to definitions of the levels. As long as an observation can be
> categorized into one level using these descriptions, I think it's better
> than no descriptions.
Good. I think descriptions are worthwhile too. Perhaps a starting point for
the FAQ would be to explain the levels by description and example.
I realize that descriptions and examples are a form of definition, but it's
too easy for someone to come along (as Magnus did) and point out that these
are not precisely definitions in the sense of a formal statement of the
meaning or significance of a word. It is this type of formal statement that
I believe is impossible.
Pirsig compares establishing metaphysics to planning a chess strategy. If
you start off by saying "here are the definitions of the four levels" sooner
or later your opponent is going to point out that they are not precise
definitions. And then you are going to have to say "yeah well descriptions
and examples are kinda like definitions." You would be in a far stronger
position if you called them "descriptions and examples" right from the
start.
It's okay to use the word "definition" casually amongst ourselves but for
the purposes of a FAQ or catechism we need to be as precise as possible in
our use of language.
> > Second I want to answer Magnus' point that even if we can't define
> > individual phenomena we should at least be able to define the types of
> > phenomena that belong to each level. But the only thing that all the
> > phenomena that belong to the biological level have in common is that
> > they are biological value. Same for the other levels.
>
> This sounds way too mystic to me. So, are we just going to sit around
> a ring, smoking pot, and saying: "Look, a bird! That's biological huh?"
om
> Pirsig split everything (every thing that is) into four categories. The
> reason (I think) was to enable us to intellectualize what we *can*
> intellectualize and leave the rest to DQ, without feeling inadequate
> because we can't grasp DQ.
Yes I agree that the reason was to enable us to intellectualize reality.
But just because we can't experience biological experience intellectually it
doesn't mean that we can't identify it and classify it.
Doug pointed out that Pirsig struggled to define Quality in ZMM. But
Pirsig's concern was both that he couldn't define Quality and that he
couldn't come up with a reason for *why he couldn't define it*. Our
difficulty in defining biological quality is fundamentally different. First
we can "define" it biologically, we just can't define it intellectually.
Second, we have a perfectly good reason for why not.
(nb my biological definition of the taste of chocolate would be to shove a
piece in your mouth;-)
> > You can come up with definitions of sorts eg Biological value are
> > those phenomena that are experienced biologically. But obviously that
> > doesn't help much. You can also come up with synonyms of sorts eg
> > Biological value is life or biological value is that which propagates
> > life. But then you just have to define life...
>
> That's why I never use neither biology nor life in my attempts
> to define the second level
I don't think there's anything wrong with using these words in a casual
sense. Biology and life are the closest words we have for biological value.
These are useful words for pointing the way to biological value. You just
have to make it clear that they are not definitions.
> > To recap, I believe Bodvar agreed with me that an artificial, say,
> > lung in a human body was biological value, even though it may also be
> > considered inorganic value.
>
> Patterns of all levels still have all attributes from the lower levels.
> I have mass, colour, gravity etc., although I'm not daily considered
> to be inorganic.
>
> > From this I see no reason why a warm coat,
> > good pair of shoes or indeed an ergonomically designed chair cannot
> > also be considered biological value.
>
> If you really mean this, we're really starting to understand each other.
> A human with a warm coat and a good pair of shoes is a society (a
> composition of organic patterns) that can better withstand cold
> weather than a human without them. Therefore, the coat and the
> shoes (and the human) are organic patterns to that society.
Sorry, no, a warm coat in a cold climate would be biological because it
keeps the person alive - thus propagating biological value. No social value
here. (Unless it was a designer coat)
> > I guess what I'm really getting at, though, is whether biological
> > value is something akin to "life" or something akin to "those
> > phenomena that propagate life".
>
> Now *you* are doing it. You can't define something in terms of
> something else that is equally undefined. I know you're not
> trying to actually define it, but just to have a general idea
> or something. Those alternatives both refer to life, and a
> decision on what alterantive to choose depends on what you
> regard as life.
Yes, I'm just trying to have a general idea. That's why I said "something
akin to" and put "life" in quotation marks.
However I'm perfectly sure that what you regard as life is the same as what
I regard as life. Even if we can't define it, it doesn't mean that we don't
know what it is and it doesn't mean that we aren't talking about the same
thing.
Diana
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