Greetings,
Horse:
"As has been pointed out (by David Lind most recently), description is not definition. Along
with the label Quality are certain attributes which are characteristic of Quality. To say what
Quality is like is not to say what Quality is. If you have experienced something then you
may be able to say what it is like but not necessarily precisely what it is. It is the "what-it-is-
likeness" that is worthwhile discussing. Anyway, as with all metaphysical fundamental
reality constructors, if they are the primary how can they be defined - this would require
some form of pre-primary constructor!!!!"
We have no evidence of what it is like. The evidence presented so far conflates distinct uses of the
term 'quality' or 'value' as we have seen and will see again in the next paragraph.
Horse:
"But anything with Value subtracted becomes meaningless whatever form of reasoning one
uses. This goes not only for Value in the MoQ sense but also in the more traditional sense.
It is in the more traditional sense that there are greater problems with the term Value as can
be seen in the whole Intrinsic/Instrumental Value debate. There are those who insist that
Value is purely instrumental, is subjective and cannot exist outside of the confines of the
human mind - one such creature ( a philosophy lecturer whose name escapes me) spent the
best part of 2 hours attempting to disabuse myself and others of the existence of Intrinsic
Value - insisting that Value without a human Valuer is a fiction."
If that is what your philosophy lecturer said then he misunderstands the debate badly. Intrinsic
value is simply applied to something worth having for its own sake (i.e. pleasure) while
instrumental value is something which, though not necessarily good in itself, leads to goodness
(i.e. money). I don't see that there are any problems with the term 'value' in this, 'traditional
sense,' and I don't see how that has backed up your argument that, "anything with Value subtracted
becomes meaningless whatever form of reasoning one uses." Clearly if one uses the reasoning of the
I/IVD, then a crow bar has no value (either intrinsic or instrumental) in a padded cell - its value
has been subtracted. It is also clearly able to exist outside the confines of the human mind (at
least as much as anything is). Now, transport that crowbar to a building site and it has enormous
instrumental value - again, outside the confines of the human mind. This same line of reasoning can
be applied to other spheres of existence with equal veracity. For an oak tree, a good soil has
instrumental value. For a chimpanzee, play presumably has intrinsic and instrumental value. For most
species copulation has both, etc.
So what is this problem with the term value that the moq clears up here? I do not see it.
Horse:
"Good and Moral are not identical (as are Quality and Value) but, as I've said before, are co-
dependent. As far as I can see this damages the MoQ not one iota. What this says is that
where reality is necessarily moral it is not the case that what exists is good. The major
problem here is getting past the traditional meaning of what is and is not moral and
understanding what the MoQ detemines as moral - THEY ARE NOT THE SAME THING."
<snip>
"A basic principle of the MoQ is Quality=Value=Morality"
Good is an evaluation. OK, fair enough. If the moq defines quality, morality and value as the same,
then obviously they will, a priori and as far as the moq is concerned, be the same. How and why you
make the leap between value and morality to make them identical is beyond me. As Pirsig writes, it
sounds, "peculiar, awkward and unnecessary," and the following preposterous nonsense about chemistry
professors in Chapter 12 does nothing to back it up. I will stick with the definition of morality as
being concerned with the goodness and badness of human behaviour as I can see no possible advantage
in doing otherwise. If I ever come across a problem with the traditional use of terms like morality
and value, then I will have another look at it. Your Intrinsic/Instrumental Value debate and
following appeal to it for veracity of the moq seems to me to be a perfect example of what I termed,
"clarifying misconceptions with other misconceptions and thus clarifying nothing."
-------------------------------------------
Jon, an exposition of my philosophy simply isn't going to happen here because it clearly would be
outside the charter. I am nowhere near arrogant enough to think that anyone wants to hear about the
Metaphysics of Struan. Nice to hear the opposite view though as that is precisely what I have been
accused of doing here in the past by others. Defending myself against both extremes makes me think
that I have it just about right. If you want to know where I stand on any particular issue then
have a look in the archives which are littered with clearly laid out positions to which I subscribe.
Why, I've only just finished pointing out precisely what I believe about free will, determinism and
(in this very posting) value. How much do you want? If you really can't find my opinions about an
issue upon which you are interested, then feel free to let me know and I will post them - if they
have anything to do with the moq.
Struan
------------------------------------------
Struan Hellier
< mailto:struan@clara.co.uk>
"All our best activities involve desires which are disciplined and
purified in the process."
(Iris Murdoch)
MOQ Online Homepage - http://www.moq.org
Mail Archive - http://alt.venus.co.uk/hypermail/moq_discuss/
Unsubscribe - http://www.moq.org/md/index.html
MD Queries - horse@wasted.demon.nl
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Sat Aug 17 2002 - 16:00:36 BST